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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CASTING AND STRAYING: hybrid approaches to understanding the 
dissolution of the body into landscape and landscape into body 
 
 
 
This research project interrogates our understanding of the relationship between 
body and landscape through audiovisual art practice. It takes displacement as 
the framework for this exploration, while specifically drawing on audiovisual field 
research undertaken in Europe in 2011. Deploying practice-led research and its 
attendant approaches and methodologies, it culminates in Straying, an 
audiovisual installation that creates a space of expression that is beyond the 
seeable and sayable. The poetic and documentary impulse that drive the 
creation of the installation also help move beyond the representational, beyond 
each form, and towards a hybrid, ‘haptic’ space of experience. Casting, the 
exegetical component of the research, offers up various prisms through which to 
engage with the installation work. The work’s nomadic theoretical terrain looks to 
the practice of poetry, documentary, the essay, translation, philosophy, 
intercultural film practice, and the phenomenology of the moving image as a 
means to frame and illuminate the project. This transdisciplinary, practice-based 
research examines unique ways of knowing and knowledge production that 
transcend habitual ontological and epistemological frameworks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This doctoral project comprises two parts: Straying, an audiovisual installation; 
and Casting, the exegetical writing contained herein. The audiovisual component 
is a three-channel video and single-channel audio installation. The audio element 
is a voice-over that addresses the moving images that play on the three screens 
in the installation space. In “speaking” to them, the Voice attempts to re-
constitute her body out of the pictures.1 This might be seen another way: She 
speaks to the images so that she might achieve complete dissolution into them. 
Both of these motives express a desire towards a conciliation between image 
and voice; landscape and body. The pictures that play are of urban and natural 
environments, mostly absent of bodies. Statues frequent the image, they appear 
as possible ‘homes’ for the Voice; they remind us of her disembodied condition. 
Her absence from the image to which She reaches with her loving, desiring 
words underscores her dislocated status.   
This exegesis, Casting, is composed of six parts following this introduction: 
Return, Aspect, Passage, Hinge, Space and Flesh; followed by a conclusion. 
The titles for the six sections are movements that have been articulated at 
various levels of the research project. They emerge at thematic, theoretical and 
processual levels across the research as a whole. These six parts are intended 
as provocations toward a different or deeper engagement with Straying.  
Return evokes both a setting forth and a (re)casting into the past. This 
makes chronological sense: I will address the beginnings of the research project 
in this section; my first impulses and intentions. The research proceeded by re-
                                            
1 I use a capital V for Voice and a capital S for She when I am referring to the character 
that speaks in voice-over in the installation. 
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turning, re-doing, re-thinking, re-framing, re-appropriating, re-focusing, re-
conciliating. I will address how the documentary film and the poem guided the 
fieldtrip that was taken in order to collect the footage for Straying; and how these 
approaches both complicated the experience and were complicated by the 
experience of the fieldtrip. I consider that this may partly have been precipitated 
by the intercultural space I was working in.2 The act of return also has thematic 
resonances for Straying but that emerged much later in the process. I make 
mention of it here to begin to set up the way in which these sections not only 
make chronological sense, but rather, the themes and ideas re-emerge, re-
constitute themselves in relation to other aspects of the research. See Figure 1.3  
Aspect evokes a play of perspectives, to look for various positions from 
which to speak, from which to look, to see. The Voice in the installation speaks 
about the need to find the right perspective so that She might be able to see and 
to speak what She desires. The audience that moves through the installation is 
also always offered the opportunity to move around and find themselves 
physically in different positions in relation to the images in the room. Finding the 
right aspect has also been my task in writing this exegetical work. I have 
considered very seriously from which perspective to write, from which angle to 
tell the story (if telling a story is, after all, my task). The task of the exegesis is the 
subject I address directly in this section. I do this with the help of Hans Georg 
Gadamer’s discussion of knowledge and the beautiful in art4 and Walter 
Benjamin’s study of translation.5   
 
                                            
2 I use Laura U. Marks’ theorisation of intercultural cinema to guide this discussion. 
Marks, Laura U. The Skin of the Film. London: Duke University Press, 2000. 
3 I have included figures throughout Casting which reference particular moments in 
Straying that I think might either be illustrative of an argument at that point, or offer 
another layer of complexity to the argument.  
4 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays. Edited by  
Robert Bernasconi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.  
5 Benjamin, Walter. “The Task of the Translator.” In Illuminations, edited by Hannah 
Arendt. New York: Schocken Books, 1968.   
 4 
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Passage takes us along the paths that were taken during this research 
project: the theoretical, formal and material processes and aspects of the 
installation. I will consider the “imperatives” that drove the fieldwork, and why 
improvisation was such an important part of how the research was conducted. I 
will briefly set up how both scholarship on place-making, and the treatment of 
the body-in-landscape in cinema, provided an initial foundation for the research, 
and ultimately oriented me away from a focus on these areas and towards other 
fields. I encountered Sergei Eisenstein’s concept of Nonindifferent Nature, and 
similarly this concept was both fertile and ultimately irreconcilable with the 
various theoretical and practical layers that were forming in the conduct of the 
research. I started to move towards impossibilities and difficulties of expression, 
rather than ideal forms. This eventually took me towards an investigation of 
displacement in particular.  
In Hinge I revisit in detail how a dialogue between the documentary and 
the poetic helped me deal with the audiovisual material and opened up a further 
space where I could accommodate the fractured nature of my findings. This is a 
space of multiplicity; it is the space of the essayistic. This is the path I explore in 
Space, which addresses how the space of the installation can be thought of as 
an essayistic space and why this was conducive to reconceptualising the work 
from a single-screen documentary to a multiple screen installation. I also address 
how this move complicated the relationship between the voice and the image. 
This complication presented a new set of questions around the ontological 
status of the image and what this implies about its role in helping to constitute a 
sense of place and a sense of self. This has implications for how the Voice 
addresses the image and what is represented in the image.  
Flesh brings to the foreground the flesh of the body and the flesh of the 
world. This phenomenological turn focuses the body of the audience, visceral 
experiences and multiple subjectivities. There are a number of bodies to be 
found across this research including: the body of the audience; the absent body 
of the Voice; and the body of the installation. There are figures that I identify as 
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bodies represented in the moving image:  the figure of the dead body of the 
statues, bodies of water, buildings as bodies. But the representative power of 
the images fails; we must come to another kind of knowing, a knowing through 
the body. To help us cross this terrain, I look to phenomenologies of perception.6 
Further to this, Anne Rutherford’s notion of sympathetic vibration and the 
porousness between the perceiver and the perceived helps frame how Straying 
contributes knowledge in the form of experience of what is outside the seeable 
and sayable.7  
These parts of the exegesis and their titles are broad. To a degree they 
work to organise the material, but the material contained in them is also in 
excess of their position within their specific section. I would like to think of them 
as speaking across the sections to one another, ideas chiming across the 
corpus in the way chiming occurs in poetry.8 Lacks and excesses have marked 
this research project: the lack of a firm footing and the excess of memory and 
emotion for a place and a body that are absent. I work to preserve these 
qualities in this exegesis that argues on the side of a work that asserts one must 
experience displacement and dislocation; one cannot be merely shown it or told 
about it. And so I err on the side of offering up experience in this writing also.9 
 A taxonomic approach would not work here. There were too many 
mistakes and wrong turns that proved generative and which I fear would not find 
their place in an exegesis with a more linear trajectory. I want to stay close to the 
process taken and the discoveries made along the way. Staying close to the 
experience is open enough to imply that many approaches are possible here. 
                                            
6 In particular I look at Sue Cataldi’s use of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s and James J 
Gibson’s phenomenologies in order to connect deep emotion with embodiment and 
space. Cataldi, Sue L. Emotion, Depth, and Flesh.  Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1993. 
7 Rutherford, Anne. What Makes a Film Tick? Bern: Peter Lang, 2011. 
8 ‘Chiming means that tiny sounds chime with each other inside the line. It's a sort of 
interior rhyming. Most good poems have repeating sounds. But one can make chiming 
into a sort of principle. If the chiming sound returns three times, it becomes a tune. Then 
the whole stanza turns to music.’ Bly, Robert. "The Art of Poetry: Interview with Robert 
Bly." By Francis Quinn, Paris Review no. 79 (2000).  
9 I do not think this stands in contradiction to the general tasks that an exegesis is 
required to perform. I broach this topic in greater detail in the Aspect part of this 
exegesis.  
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What I hope to do in this exegesis is to offer some possible entry points into the 
work, while implying that there are many others.   
The six parts of this exegesis evolved like the making of a sculpture; each 
section is like a limb. The making of each limb happened in dialogue with various 
theoretical, formal, material and contextual (intercultural) terrains. We could think 
of these limbs, then, as parts of Osiris’ body:10 strewn across the landscape, his 
body scattered. Our task now is to traverse the landscape and look for the 
‘hidden resemblances’ between parts in an attempt to re-constitute a body.11 
This same task of searching is also the one performed in the installation. It is how 
the installation, too, came into being – my own searching through a landscape, 
both literally and metaphorically. I will confess now that there is no single body to 
be found; we will not come to the end of our experience with either Straying or 
Casting and be able to constitute one single, identifiable body like a sculpture.12   
I will make another confession: the point I was searching for in this 
investigation – the point at which the body and the landscape touch on one 
another, the point of their dissolution into each other – is not locatable and is not 
representable in ways that are seeable and sayable. But this impossibility gives 
rise to another experience: the search for this very point and its absence. This 
yearning is the condition of a body displaced. The paths I set out here and in the 
installation are paths towards a visceral and haptic experience of this yearning, of 
the re-peated, re-cast attempt at finding a unity which will always remain 
possible only in the realm of imagination. See Figure 2.  
 In the attempt to find unity, I have found multiplicity: multiple screens, 
multiple approaches, multiple possibilities and subjectivities. I will address all of  
                                            
10 Plutarch, “Isis and Osiris,” in Moralia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 23.  
11 This is a reference to Michel Foucault’s notion of a time when language was in a kind 
of primordial condition in a ‘profound kinship with the world.’ This time is now lost to us, 
and Foucault suggests that it is the poet’s task is to rediscover these kinships. Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 2002), 47. 
12 Isis, Osiris’ wife, did manage to piece together all of Osiris’ body parts, minus the 
phallus, but nonetheless was impregnated by him and bore him a son (Plutarch, “Isis and 
Osiris,” 49). Even though I claim we cannot achieve the task Isis did, I do contend that 
the process of piecing together disparate parts is generative in this work. 
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I can imagine us close, touching, I can 
imagine so well it feels like memory.
Figure 2
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these aspects separately, later, but for now I would like to simply evoke the 
cubist artwork in order to think about the relationships and qualities of 
movement among the multiple elements that are to be found in Straying and 
Casting. Imagine Pablo Picasso’s portraits13 or Alexander Archipenko’s 
sculptures;14 the face struggles to be whole while also pulling away in different 
directions, making wholeness impossible. The tension in this movement both 
towards and away from the formation of a single and complete image (or self – in 
the case of the works depicting faces and bodies) depicts a complexity in the 
thing represented because it offers us multiple, irreconcilable perspectives on 
it.15 The complexity is in the very impossibility of conflating all of the dimensions 
into one.   
 I would like to draw out a proposition that each of these separate parts 
are fragments that remain porous and are changed when brought into contact 
with another. How this manifests in Straying will become clear throughout this 
exegesis – it is a more literal manifestation because the elements that make up 
Straying are not stuck or set in a representation as they are in the paintings and 
sculptures I have referenced.16 But my intention is that Casting is porous also, 
despite its more set form. My approach has been to position Straying and 
Casting in such a relation that they too, in their relationship, each reveal a 
complexity in the other. 
 I have already borrowed a number of images in aid of introducing this 
work. My reference points are cross-medial – one supplements another, or 
serves to re-orient the thinking, to help move through an impasse. To this end – 
                                            
13 Consider for example Dora Maar Au Chat (1941), The Weeping Woman (1937) 
14 Consider for example Dancers (1912), Family Life (1912). 
15 Cubism itself was a challenge to traditional or realist representations and moved 
toward abstracted ways of seeing and representing; with the intention of showing 
something more “real”.  
16 This is the nature, for example, of the relationship between sound and image in the 
installation. As they “touch” they change each other’s meaning, constantly transforming 
through changing relationships. This movement never achieves either unity or total 
destruction, but a revelation of yet other dimensions and possibilities.  
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to continue re-framing, re-thinking and re-conceptualising – I will borrow other 
ideas and images throughout this writing. From Louise Glück I borrow poetry. 
From Maya Deren I borrow the poetic. From Laura U. Marks I borrow skin. From 
André Bazin I borrow the mummy. From Walter Benjamin I borrow pure 
language and the palimpsest. I borrow statues from Alphonso Lingis and Antony 
Gormley. From Hans Georg Gadamer I borrow the beautiful. From Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty I borrow the thinking body, I borrow flesh. From Michel de 
Montaigne I borrow the essay, the error.  
 Here, the end of a thought is not necessarily a conclusion to a thought. 
The end of a thought could be a trailing off or an arrival at an impasse. So then a 
leap might be required of us and we might have to follow Barthes’ advice that 
we ‘must allow the utterance’ of the text ‘to proceed in contradiction’.17 We do 
not have to go forward, onwards, and complete each thought; we can go back, 
return, start again: it is about re-discovery, re-search. This is all part of my poetic 
intention: a form that can privilege ellipses, excesses, the things that cannot be 
named. It is not about definitions or taxonomies; it is about expansion, always 
pointing onwards, expanding its reach. Poetry allows us or invites us to listen 
differently.18 I ask you in this instance, and always at least in the first instance, to 
listen with your poetic ear and by extension to see with your poetic eye.  
 I make this request because I offer up an experience in Casting that is 
intrinsically of the nature of Straying – its geography, its terrain. The transient 
nature of this terrain arose as one of the pivotal difficulties in this research. To 
name it transient sounds like a truism – of course both the body and the 
environment are always in a state of flux – but I do not mean it thus. I mean to 
say that my experience of trying to photograph my subject, to record it, to set it 
down, has been an impossible task. And this very impossibility yielded the 
continuance of the research. In Casting this unattainability takes on a slightly 
                                            
17 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), 20. 
18 ‘People listen differently to poetry than to other forms of writing as if the very sound of 
poetic language signals a more intense iteration of something.’ Kristine S Santilli, Poetic 
Gesture (New York: Routledge, 2002), xi.   
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different shape, but nonetheless a solid form sometimes escapes me. Or rather, I 
do not run after a form that is elegant in its solidity, closed and reassuring.  
 I will not enclose the reader either, but endeavour to give you room to 
perambulate, even here, as you may do in Straying. Straying is in a constant 
state of inconsistency because it is at the mercy of the spectator in relation to its 
coherency, but he/she is always departing, returning, recombining its constituent 
elements. The screens in Straying are literally transparent so that you may see 
yourselves walking around the installation space, inscribing it in your own way, 
almost literally with your own body. This is the moment I am most interested in, 
this part of its evolution. I will send you forth into the body of this work with 
Ludwig Wittgenstein as the last (or first) hum in your ear: ‘A picture held us 
captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably’.19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
19 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), 48. 
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RETURN 
 
 
 
In an attempt to fashion a story or to know a subject wholly, my impulse seems 
almost always to be to go back to the beginning.20 Return in this research 
project, however, has not been a simple matter, or rather, finding the beginning 
has sometimes felt like an impossible task. Even so, the location of this point of 
origin exerts an imperative, an act of return which is insistent, obsessive: a return 
to ideas, concepts, first inspirations, a return to certain places and specific 
moments. The hope is that marking them with beginning will reveal a destined 
path, a path that I could recount for you, here, so you might understand this 
story. But each time we return, things are a little different; a different version is 
found, constructed. We can never return to the same place; never in the same 
way. The notion of beginnings and origins starts to take on mythical proportions.  
 The gesture of the obsessive return to an unattainable point of origin is 
that described by Benjamin in his study on German tragic drama – most 
specifically in his work on allegory, which he theorises not as a convention but as 
an impulse.21 The allegorical impulse arises out of an intuition that the world is 
transient and passing out of being. This intuition inspires a gesture of gathering 
that which is passing to oneself in order to recuperate it for the present. This is 
often the impulse when we take a photograph or video: we record, we capture. 
We are already looking back as we gather. We pile up ceaselessly the fragments 
of history that are left in the hope of recuperating their meaning.22 The fragments 
are images of what is already becoming the past.  
                                            
20 I would proffer to say, though, that this is not only my impulse. Is this not the same 
impulse that drives origin myths? 
21 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (Brooklyn: Verso, 2009), 159-
233. 
22 Ibid., 178. 
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 Craig Owens calls the ‘paradigm’ for the allegorical work the 
‘palimpsest’. In this obsessive act of piling up images on top of one another, we 
read one image through another.23 The dynamic relationship between the various 
fragments in an allegorical work is dialectical: one fragment is read through 
another and, in so doing, meaning is composed. This relationship creates a 
multiplicity of meaning, meaning that is continually made and re-made. Each 
fragment remains porous and vulnerable to all of the other fragments. We might 
consider all of the elements in Straying and Casting in this vein: meaning is made 
in their dynamic relationship. There is no original or true meaning to recuperate; 
the meaning is always deferred and constituted anew through another image.  
 Allegory is a way of seeing, a mode of expression rather than a 
convention.24 Allegory, according to Benjamin, is also an intuition, an intention.25 
Allegory is a process, a perspective; it is not a form or an object but a way of 
making, reading, experiencing. I could describe the impulses, intentions and the 
shape of the journey in the making of both Straying and Casting in just these 
terms: an impulse to return to and recuperate a point of origin and its meaning – 
and the impossibility of ever arriving at one definitive point. The point I was 
looking for was where the body and landscape touch one another. I wanted to 
make visible this point – how the two bleed into each other. To evoke Benjamin 
here is to point towards the impossibility of my intention. Benjamin brings to light 
that points are not necessarily available and neither are they necessarily the most 
significant or revealing element of an idea or experience. This turned my attention 
away from the notion of capture or perfect expression and towards desire, 
intention and testing out various modes of expression. See Figure 3.  
  
 
 
                                            
23 Craig Owens, “The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism," October 
12, Spring (1980): 69.  
24 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 116. 
25 Ibid., 162, 176. 
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My expression will always fall short of the 
way I thought you up in early morning.
Figure 3
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Although I have argued that the beginning or the origin is constantly 
deferred, the return of the look must be re-enacted. For our immediate purposes 
here, I mean that I will tell a chronological story in this section about “what 
happened”, specifically on the fieldtrip to Serbia, which was undertaken for the 
purpose of collecting the audiovisual material for the installation. I could also say 
of this work that it is about the search for a beginning or a way to begin. The 
installation is made of the material that documents this search. This point ought 
to become clear when I address how initial “failures” spawned new approaches. 
The return of the look also references the audience and the nature of their 
engagement with the installation, a point I will discuss in detail when I consider 
the role of the audience in the installation.  
I also want to briefly address the problem of tense. Do I speak here in the 
past or in the present? Any number of tenses might suffice, but where do I place 
myself in order to turn us towards the most critical view? The present perfect 
would mark the difficulty of fixing exact points and timeframes, as in: I have 
written the following story so that you might get a sense of the journey of the 
research. At what point this writing took place along this journey remains 
unfixed, an approach I would deem appropriate because the writing has 
happened at all stages of this process. This construction, however, takes on a 
completeness and finality that I do not think are appropriate to this work. The 
present perfect continuous would describe how the past is having an ongoing 
effect on the present, as in: I have been returning to Serbia ever since I left, 
returning sometimes figuratively and sometimes actually. This implies a return 
that has happened and continues to happen; this continuance resounds more 
truthfully with the nature of the work and experience, where I do not want to 
imply that an end -point was reached or that this exegesis will take us to that 
end -point.  
It ought to become apparent how this is one of the trials of the research: 
finding and losing stable or fixed points and forms; and therefore the problem of 
tense is worth indulging. The difficulty of tense poses a practical problem for the 
writing at this stage, but I also simply want to evoke the problem of tense in 
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general for its thematic resonance across the research. To think of tense evokes 
the subject of memory, of the past playing into our sense of the present, of 
desire and its relationship to the past and the future. This interplay between 
pasts and futures is enacted in Straying with the intention of undoing spatial 
boundaries with the dissolution of temporal ones. To approach the question of 
body and landscape is to interrogate spatio-temporal relationships that 
constitute our sense of self and our sense of landscape.  
I will designate the beginning to be an investigation into the relationship 
between body and place. I was explicitly interested in what an audiovisual 
practice might contribute to that investigation. I desired to make an auditory and 
visible manifestation of this relationship. I wanted to make pictures and sounds, 
contain them in a frame. My early contentions were that these internal and 
external spaces of bodies and places together constitute our sense of place, our 
sense of self.26   
Filmmaker Agnès Varda claims that ‘if you really look into people, you find 
landscapes there too.’27 Varda says if we opened her up we would find beaches. 
Varda uses ‘landscape’ to designate not only a spatial dimension, but also a 
temporal one; history and memory are often important aspects which make up 
Varda’s ‘landscapes’. For Varda it is about accessing feeling and emotion, 
accessing the past as opposed to, or only, accessing a place – it always 
includes a temporal dimension.28 This term is similarly flexible in my usage, where 
“landscape” is not only a designation for the natural environment but also refers 
                                            
26 A note on the usage of terms. While I recognise the importance of making a distinction 
between “place” and “space”, and that this distinction has important philosophical and 
historical implications and trajectories (see Casey, Edward S. The Fate of Place.  Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1997.); I do not make a strong demarcation 
between the two in this work. I take it that “space” always has the potential to become 
“place” as the individual begins to inscribe it thus, i.e. to inscribe it with a specific 
relationship to it. I privilege the use of “body” over “self” because I wish to de-emphasise 
psychological or psychoanalytic approaches to the material. I equally want to emphasise 
that the “self”, or our sense of “identity”, constitutes itself through movement: as a body 
moving through space. This is to begin to connect the body to the environment in a way 
that implies a mutual constitution and begins to see the “self” and “place” as inexorably 
connected. 
27 Agnès Varda, “The Beaches of Agnès” 110mins. France, 2008.  
28 Certainly in the theory and philosophy of place the temporal is also always inextricably 
bound to the discussion of the spatial.  
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to built environments, urban landscapes.29 I use “landscape” in terms of: 
landscapes of the body, of the environment, of our desires, dreams and 
nightmares. From this standpoint I can then speak about the body of 
landscapes, the body of the environment, the body of desires and dreams. In 
this usage, landscape and body are brought so close together that we begin to 
consider their complicity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
29 This is not a newfound flexibility for the term, I am instead taking advantage of the rich 
history of contention over what ‘landscape’ actually designates: a subjective, political, 
geographical and/or framed space? See Kenneth R. Olwig, “Recovering the Substantive 
Nature of Landscape”, in Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86, no. 4 
(1996): 630-653. I appreciate the difference between the terms place, space, and 
landscape, and use landscape here because it implies a space that is somewhat 
bordered. In this case by skin and/or by frame.  
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THE FIELDTRIP 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the fieldtrip took place in Serbia. I was explicitly interested 
in how an audiovisual practice might offer expression of the dynamic between 
body and place, and less interested in explicitly interrogating how political, 
historical or geographic tensions mark this relationship in Serbia specifically. Of 
course, these aspects do mark the relationship, and particularly for the territories 
across ex-Yugoslavia, where the long history of contestation over territory and 
ethnicity has made the question of belonging to nation and place a prescient one 
for its peoples. My intention was to conduct my research in a place where these 
topics had currency, while not directly interrogating the histories that have given 
the topics such agency. In order to capitalise on this “currency” and in order to 
conduct what my idea of “proper research” was (the approach towards the 
discovery of something as yet unknown), I intended to conduct the research 
through making a documentary.30   
According to poet Adrienne Rich: the body is the geography closest in.31 
One always departs from oneself. An idea catches because there is already 
something of it present inside you. A key factor in my choice to partly conduct 
this research in Serbia is that I was born there (I came to Australia as a child). 
Serbia was the place where I could most connect to the ideas around the 
relationship between the body and landscape. I had to start from the self, from 
what I already knew. But this was only a way to begin, a departure point. My 
intention was never to make my own history and experience the subject of the 
work. I did not want to make an explicitly autobiographical or personal work. I 
                                            
30 I will discuss this idea of documentary in greater detail in the Hinge section of this 
exegesis. For now I simply want to detail in fairly broad-brush strokes “what happened”, 
to establish a point of reference for later discussions.  
31 Adrienne Rich, “Notes Towards a Politics of Location,” in Feminist Postcolonial Theory: 
a reader, ed. Sara Mills and Reina Lewis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 
30. 
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had attached the idea of autobiography to the idea of ‘decanting’ the self.32  
Maintaining that my personal connection to and history with Serbia would remain 
invisible, I wanted to approach the subject of the research from an observational 
documentary approach, which meant staying very close to the subject of the 
film, and as far as possible from the filmmaker herself.33 I was interested in inner 
landscapes – but not my own, not as the subject of the research. I wanted to 
find ways I could access interiorities that I suspected communed in some way 
with exterior landscapes – a communion that was invisible, but that, with the 
help of audiovisual representations, I would reveal.  
My intention was to find a way to approach these boundaries between 
the internal and the external so that I might gain access to that very boundary 
between self and place. I would use the poem as artefact in this aim. The use of  
poetry as a tool for achieving these ambitions was born of a double intention and 
assumption. My proposition was that to recite poetry that lived in the memory of 
the interview subject would reveal a certain intimate or “inner” dimension. Poetry 
would access these inner landscapes and coax them to the surface, making 
them available for capture by the camera.34 This part was based on the second 
premise about the relationship between poetry and the moving image.  
 The assumption that poetry lives in some deep recesses of our being 
and hence can disclose our inner landscapes is one that I can pin to my own 
experience of growing up in the early 1980s in a small town near the capital of a 
country still called Yugoslavia. National festivals were celebrated with children 
and schools participating in all proceedings. Public recitation of poetry was 
                                            
32 This is poet Louise Glück’s phrase for the worst kind of recruitment of the self in 
autobiographical writing. Louise Glück, Proofs and Theories (New Jersey: Harper Collins, 
1994), 35. I return to this question of autobiography in the Hinge part of the exegesis.  
33 I was taking my definition of observational documentary from Anna Grimshaw and 
Amanda Ravetz, Observational Cinema. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. 
This choice was also based on an ethics of approach connected to the potentially 
sensitive nature of the topic given the site of the research. I elaborate this in the Hinge 
section.  
34 I was thinking here of Hedy Honigmann’s film Crazy (1999). She records UN 
peacekeepers listening to music that they listened to during their missions. The music 
seems to trigger the experiences and memories and bring them to the surface of the 
interviewees’ faces. The sequences are deeply moving, and appear revealing and honest 
because the interview subject themselves is so deeply moved by the music.   
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always part of my own contribution and even proud duty at these events.35 I 
learned and recited poetry from kindergarten through to primary school. I recited 
poetry for radio, for school plays, for children’s impromptu concerts prepared for 
the children in the neighbourhood, alongside games of forty-forty or elastics. For 
this reason, I had carried a belief that all people had poetry at least in some 
reaches of their memory. Of course my own experience was unique in that I was 
part of the last generation born in Yugoslavia. My parents were the last 
generation of adults to go through that particular education system that stressed 
the Serbo-Croatian literary tradition. We are also uniquely placed in that we left 
the country in 1988, before the breakup of Yugoslavia, so that our experiences 
and memories have remained within the customs. We did not evolve with the 
new system, form new attitudes, forget old ones.36  
Cinema and poetry have had a long association or, rather more 
specifically, the concept of the ‘poetic’. For Dziga Vertov this meant that, like 
poetry, the kino-eye ‘sees that which the eye does not see;’37 both poetry and 
cinema see with an eye that penetrates beyond what is otherwise visible, it 
reveals the hidden. For Deren this “hidden” is the emotional register of a moment 
or character. For Deren ‘poetry (is) concerned, in a sense, not with what is 
occurring but with what it feels like.’38 Structure is at the centre of Deren’s 
conceptualisation of how poetry works in the cinema, which ‘lends itself 
particularly to the poetic statement, because it is essentially a montage and, 
therefore, seems by its very nature to be a poetic medium.’39 This, for Deren, is 
essentially a question of time and the nature of its unfolding. Her designation for 
                                            
35 A further investigation into the circumstances surrounding this practice (of poetry 
recitation at national festivals) which consequently had such a formative influence on the 
construction of my own ideas about this nation, its people and history – how poetry is 
connected to, or formative of, these ideas – would certainly yield interesting findings, but 
is unfortunately beyond the scope of this research. 
36 My notion of this nation was rooted to that particular time and experience (and 
influenced by my consequent distance from it). 
37 Dziga Vertov, Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov (California: University of California 
Press, 1984), 180. 
38 Maya Deren, “Poetry and the Film: a symposium,” in Film Culture: An Anthology, ed. 
Sitney, P. Adams (London: Secker & Warburg, 1971), 174.  
39 Ibid., 179 
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a poetic structure is ‘vertical time’, and for linear narrative ‘horizontal time’.40 The 
‘vertical’ structure of time, for Deren, is a particular ‘approach to experience.’41 
The objective is to ‘create visible or auditory forms for something that is invisible, 
which is the feeling, or the emotion, or the metaphysical content of the 
moment.’42  
Filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky has also written extensively about poetic 
cinema, which for him is about ‘examining life beneath the surface’43 and 
approaching life’s ‘deep complexity and truth.’44 Although Tarkovsky does use 
poems as literary artefacts in his cinema, he also claims that he does not speak 
of poetry as genre but as ‘an awareness of the world, a particular way of relating 
to reality. So poetry becomes a philosophy.’45 This philosophy and deep 
complexity in Tarkovsky’s cinema often reveals itself to be about the 
connectedness between things: time-spaces, spiritual and physical worlds. 
Formally and thematically, these philosophies often manifest in Tarkovsky’s films 
with a breakdown in boundaries between internal and external environments, 
and between the present and the past. Natural elements literally invade internal 
spaces of homes and memories violate the present.46 In these sequences, what 
we gain access to is a deeply subjective emotional register; we come close to 
the internal state of characters, the hidden dimension.  
Vertov was a documentarist, but also considered himself a poet. Writing 
in his diary in 1934, he says that he was a ‘newsreel poet’ during his early 
                                            
40 This of course places poetry and narrative at somewhat opposite ends of a spectrum; I 
do not adopt this position. I think this may be a problem of Deren’s nomenclature, rather 
than an expression of a separation she intends either. There is such a thing as the 
narrative poem, or non-fiction poetry, for example.   
41 Deren, “Poetry and the Film”, 173. An example in Deren’s films is the repetitive nature 
of her work. We visit and re-visit certain moments in her films, probing them further, 
interrogating their significance and their evolving relationships to other moments in the 
film. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Andrei Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008), 21. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. Poetry as literary artefact that is recited does of course frequently appear in 
Tarkovsky’s films, but this is not what designates a poetic cinema. 
46 For example in his film Nostalghia (1983), Domenico’s house has been reclaimed by 
the earth, it is as a ruin – reclaimed by history, and memory.  
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filmmaking practice.47 Deren was an experimental filmmaker and Tarkovsky is 
generally taken to be a fiction filmmaker. However, his film Mirror (1975), is 
based on his childhood memories, in which he inserts newsreel footage into his 
predominantly scripted and performed scenes, which include Tarkovsky’s father, 
Arseny Tarkovsky, reading his own poetry.48 I too was interested in the poetic 
and the documentary in documenting a revelation of the hidden, the emotional 
register of how my interview subjects related to the environments they inhabited. 
I did not want to explicitly plan a poetic structure; this to me seemed antithetical 
to the documentary approach. But by using the poetic literary artefact, I was 
hoping to discover a structure through the experience of making that would 
meet the documentary and poetic intentions.   
My plan was to ask my interview subjects to recite the poetry that lived in 
their memory while I recorded them in their habitual dwelling places. I would pay 
attention to and record the quality of their movement through these places: their 
homes, their gardens, places they habitually occupied. I was looking for a certain 
quality that might be revealed in this attention to movement of the body. I was 
heeding Deren’s advice: ‘we are not so much concerned with who he is as with 
how he moves’49. I take Deren’s meaning to be that ‘who he is’ is only 
cinematographically knowable through ‘how he moves’. I wanted to pay 
attention to the movement of the body in the landscape so that the relationship 
between the visual and the audio fields might open up a passage between the 
internal and external landscapes. To this end, what is knowable and accessible 
of ‘who he is’ might be expanded through attention to the movement of thought 
and body.  
 I started the fieldtrip in Serbia in February 2011. I bought a car and set off 
on my own around the country. I drove without a strong sense of destination. I 
                                            
47 Vertov, Kino-Eye, 45. 
48 Tarkovsky claims that the newsreel footage raises the film ‘above the level of lyrical 
memoir’. Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, 129. 
49 Deren, “Film in Progress,” 111. Deren here is speaking about one of the dancers in her 
film A Study in Choreography for Camera (1945) 
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stopped on mere intuition, deciding to spend a night or two in this or that town 
or village. I conducted interviews with anyone who would give me their 
permission. The interviews happened on park benches, in people’s homes, at 
restaurants, by the side of the road. I covered 5000 kilometres, driving on the 
opposite side of the road to that which I was used to, on very bad roads with 
holes like craters and a navigation instrument which had not been updated since 
2007, while dragging heavy and expensive video recording equipment around. I 
speak Serbian, but it took time to feel comfortable in it after a long absence. I 
was producer, director, camera operator, sound recordist, interviewer, 
production manager. The fact that I was a woman travelling alone also marked 
what kind of access I had. I soon discovered that I was out of my depth. I had 
expected that it would be a challenge, but I had had no idea of its scale. I situate 
the experience for you in this way because the details of these realities, the 
logistical factors, determined how the fieldtrip unfolded and, therefore, the shape 
of the work. Not only have I explicitly and deliberately written some of these 
details into the work, but I think much of this remains inextricably scored into it. 
The unexpected influence these factors exerted partly caused the 
“autobiographical turn” the work underwent, which I will address a little later. See 
Figure 4. 
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I heard about an island in the middle of a 
wide span in the river.
I went out looking for it. 
I must have followed the wrong one of 
the two sleeves.
Figure 4
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 When I broached the topic of poetry with my interview subjects, there 
was always an uncomfortable pause, a shrug, a shake of the head. People did 
not remember any poetry. It was at this point that I realised my entire proposal 
was based only on my own experience and memory of this place. I had to very 
quickly relinquish the notion that the recitation of poetry would provide me with 
any insight into ‘who he or she is’. I modified my approach to the interviews and 
started asking the interview subjects to describe the places they lived, and their 
desires and dreams of past or future homes. People knew very well how to 
“behave” for the camera. I got “official” answers, stories told in a way that I 
imagine the interview subject would have expected to see and hear on the local 
television station: reportage on the history of the region, complete with folksy 
flute tunes and picture dissolves from the mountain range into the river.  I was 
certainly not accessing the “subterranean” dimension of sentiment or experience 
and found myself recording only anecdotes, facts, information, what sat on the 
surface, what was already available.   
 What I present here as failures did also yield discoveries. I realised how 
anthropological my proposition was. The design of my approach pulled towards 
a social-scientific methodology that is about the collection of “data”. Data was 
not what I was interested in, because the drawing up of conclusions was also 
not my goal. I was interested in qualities, in relationships and dynamics. But the 
relationship between my notion of documentary, or truth, and my formal, 
aesthetic and poetic interests did not find complicity. There are a number of 
reasons for this, some partly to do with my lack of experience in conducting 
interviews; other reasons were more practical, about the physical constraints I 
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was working under.50 One of the things that this experience facilitated was a 
space where I could connect theoretical and practical experience and 
knowledge. I had not, previous to this experience, had that opportunity. Now 
that I look back on it, the failure was always destined to occur. The theoretical 
material I was reading always had to find an instance of practice on which to be 
exercised. This was that moment and no amount of theoretical preparation 
would have influenced a more “successful” experience. The real interaction 
between the theoretical and practical, where both illuminated aspects of the 
other, happed quite some time after the fieldtrip, and it was at that moment of 
engagement that this failed and fraught fieldtrip instigated the next phase of the 
research which led to further discovery. I will return to this in the Passage part of 
this exegesis.   
 To go back to Serbia: the interviews did not yield “confessions” or 
unmediated responses. The poem was not a simple gateway into the private, 
most personal and emotional world of the interviewee. And the image was not 
incontestable evidence of the nature of how this body related to the place it 
inhabited. The documentary and the poem failed: I had mistaken documentary 
for the visible or for evidence, I had mistaken the interview for the confession and 
hence the “truth”.51 See Figure 5. 
 I continued shooting interviews and watching them back each night, 
hoping to learn from them, looking for a moment that would propel me onwards 
                                            
50 I can now recognise the difficulty of playing all the roles of interviewer, sound recordist, 
videographer, production manager, director, and first-time guest and stranger in 
people’s homes. The kind of project I had in mind would require that I establish a 
relationship with the interview subject before filming, and before any meaningful 
exchange could happen. But my idea of documentary then, was “immediacy”. This partly 
stemmed from my dedication to the observational mode of recording (I elaborate on this 
in Passage). At the time, I took the observational mode as one that promotes an 
immediacy in the approach to recording.  
51 See Elizabeth Cowie on the development of the idea of seeing as knowledge, in “The 
Spectacle of Actuality,” in Collecting Visible Evidence, ed. Jane M Gaines and Michael 
Renov (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 19-45. Also see Michael 
Renov on how ‘truth is co-implicated with speech’ in Theorizing Documentary (New 
York: Routledge, 1993), 7. And see Michel Foucault on how ‘the confession became one 
of the West's most highly valued techniques for producing “truth” in History of Sexuality  
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 60. 
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the following day. You might say I was looking for the work in the work: 
shooting, reviewing, shooting, reviewing. At this stage I was no longer certain of 
what I was looking for and remained open to the possibility that another subject 
for this investigation might simply emerge or that I might “stumble” across it.  
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If I knew what you would become, I 
would have paid you a different kind of 
attention.
Figure 5
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 I was concurrently having another kind of experience that I thought was 
unconnected to the PhD research project. I explored every new town I arrived in 
by wandering in the early mornings and taking footage of the empty streets, just 
getting to know the place. I did not interrogate this practice or these impulses. It 
was like I was having a double experience, the “official” one and the private one; 
I did not see a relationship between them. These new or other obsessions were 
empty spaces, statues, non-human faces, single figures in the landscape. I was 
drawn to filming “empty” or depopulated places where one might expect bodies 
to be. The basketball courts and football fields I was filming had a sense of the 
absent body. I liked filming facades, with the expectation that someone might 
come to the window and close it or draw the curtain. I was interested in things 
that had the potential to move and expected to see this happen.  
 Eventually these snippets of footage of unrelated objects seemed to me 
to start to exchange their “values”. I was watching facades as if they were trees 
or bodies. The human body became potently absent from the frame or rather, I 
framed the human figure out. There was a strong feeling of emptiness and 
absence, of desertion of unfulfilled possibility. But what I seemed to actually be 
searching, or yearning, for was body, flesh, movement, breath. The exchange 
seemed to be one of desire and refusal: I persistently had the experience of 
alienation, the refusal of the landscape to be colonised by a well-composed 
frame.52 I felt I was skimming the surface of the moment and of the place. Rather 
than thematising this difficulty, I saw it as a limitation to the work which I was 
trying to overcome. I continued to collect stories and footage, and continued to 
move across the country although I no longer knew to what end. I was not 
certain that I was staying close to my initial questions. I did not know what it was 
exactly I was researching.  
 The fieldtrip to Serbia lasted four and half months. I returned to 
Melbourne with a bagful of footage to start the editing process. But I was unsure 
                                            
52 Brad Prager says of Werner Herzog’s depictions of landscapes: he ‘wants his 
landscapes to talk back to us and to the figures that populate them, yet from his point of 
view they have nothing to express but their wholesale indifference.’ The Cinema of 
Werner Herzog: aesthetic ecstasy and truth (London: Wallflower Press, 2007),14. 
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what exactly I was editing. I did not have an image of what this artefact might 
look like or even be “about”. I did not feel I was coming back with a project but 
simply with fragments testifying to my failures. I mean that I felt as if I had not 
captured any particular knowledge or insights on camera, in the frame. I did not 
feel I had answered any of my initial questions around the conciliation of the 
body and landscape. I had not seen any internal or external landscapes 
“touching”. I cut together the interviews I had conducted but these did not 
achieve the kind of poetic expression I had worked towards, one that was 
revealing of “deeper truths”, an expression that inspired thinking beyond 
conclusions, beyond facts or information.  
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INTERCULTURAL SPACES 
 
 
I had branded as a failure my own inability to capture the quality of relationship 
between body and place. I was looking for representations that were clear and 
ordered, that spoke eloquently and made sense. I did not find this in the footage 
I had collected. My engagement with Marks’ study on intercultural cinema 
helped me see the positive value in this apparent inadequacy of my footage.53 
My experience started to speak to me of displacement and dislocation as 
opposed to the more idealised perspective I was searching for about the co-
constitution of body and place. It was at this point that the fact of having 
conducted this fieldtrip in Serbia started to take on a significance I recognised. 
My practice as an artist/researcher had taken place in an intercultural space. 
This shift in focus brought with it problems for which I had to find formal 
resolutions.  
Marks identifies the genre as one that necessarily must reach towards 
expression of that which is outside the ‘seeable and sayable’. Marks adopts this 
expression from Foucault,54 and Deleuze after him,55 to articulate the way in 
which the representation of experience is always bound by discursive practices 
of the seeable and sayable. The two cannot be reduced into one and the same 
but rather confront each other as ‘two incommensurable forms of truth’.56  Marks 
identifies the gap between the two truths as the space of the intercultural film, 
where ‘to read/hear the image, then, is to look/listen not for what is there but for 
the gaps … to look for what might be in the face of what is not’.57 The diasporic 
experience hinges on ‘violent disjunctions in space and time’ where places, 
memories and people are unavailable for representation.58 Intercultural films have 
                                            
53 Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film. London: Duke University Press, 2000. 
54 See Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things. London: Routledge, 2005. 
55 See Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988. 
56 Marks, The Skin of the Film, 30. 
57 Ibid., 31.  
 
58 Ibid., 1. 
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to go beyond what can be shown in clear images or spoken directly and find a 
new language. This new language, according to Marks, exists in the other 
sensual registers and it is towards these registers that the intercultural films 
appeal. In particular, Marks is interested in the sense of touch and how diasporic 
films turn to a ‘haptic visuality,’59 a seeing close to touching, in order to find 
expression. We must turn to sensory experiences of place because they are 
otherwise not available, they are silent and absent, because to the diaspora they 
exist only in the realm of memory. We must turn to the ‘knowledges of the 
body’60 in order to find expression of them in an audiovisual mode. To express 
these ‘silent registers’,61 Marks claims, the projection screen starts to become 
like skin. The audience is moved to touch the image with their eyes: it evokes a 
physical, sensory response. 
 Marks identifies some formal features common in intercultural films. These 
include images that are hard to read and are faded or grainy; the films are often 
‘marked by silence, absence, and hesitation’.62 Reflecting now, I can see that 
these formal features are what I initially saw as limitations in my own work. But to 
approach these limitations, to show them as such, is exactly the work of the 
intercultural film: to show the limit of what is representable in the audiovisual 
work, to make an appeal ‘to the limits of naming and the limits of 
understanding.’63 In order to interrogate how these ideas related to the footage I 
had taken, and to my experience of the fieldtrip, I used some of these elements 
to form the narrative frame, so that I could interrogate these notions in the actual 
work.  
 
                                            
59 Ibid., 2. Marks describes haptic visuality as a ‘caressing gaze’, Ibid., 6. For a detailed 
history on the use of the term ‘haptic’ in relation to vision – from art historian Alois Riegl’s 
use at the turn of the twentieth century, to Noel Burch’s use in the first instance in 
relation to cinema – see Laura U Marks, Touch: sensuous theory and multisensory media 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 4-8.  
60 Ibid., 5. 
61 Ibid., 5. 
62 Ibid., 21. 
63 Ibid., 21. 
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Marks’ phenomenological approach (way of making, writing and thinking, 
not just theorising) helped me make the shift away from questions of 
representation, towards not only a phenomenological but also an ontological 
approach to the image. I will address both of these aspects in greater detail in 
Space and Flesh. See Figure 6.   
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If I could reach out, touch this screen, I 
think it would feel like touching my own 
skin.
Figure 6
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ASPECT 
 
 
 
Having offered a preliminary outline of the trajectory of the first part of the 
research – the fieldtrip – I would now like to address my approach to this 
exegetical writing. This is a subject worth addressing because I have intended to 
create a dynamic between Straying and Casting that works to access 
dimensions of each that would otherwise be inaccessible or remain obscured. 
This course works to offer various levels of embeddedness, various orientations 
or entry points into the research. To introduce this, I would like to dwell a while 
on the word aspect. Aspect can relate to a feature, a direction, the appearance 
of something or someone, or to time in grammar.64 All of these applications for 
the word aspect illuminate a quality appropriate to the dynamics to be found 
within this exegesis and in its relationship to Straying.   
 To think of aspect in terms of a “feature” is to consider a particular 
characteristic of an object or an idea. To say that this exegesis offers some 
possible aspects to consider is to say that I will highlight some features of 
Straying so that we can interrogate them in greater detail in order to clarify an 
idea or underscore a conceptual point. The second usage of the word is in 
relation to direction. This can either be in terms of the direction a building or a 
window faces65 or the view from that building, its outlook.66  
 We might think of this in terms of exposure, which can designate both 
the way it is exposed to its environment or what view is exposed from that 
vantage point. This has literal, abstract and metaphoric significance not only for 
how the exegesis and artwork relate to one another, but also for some of the 
narrative themes to be found in Straying. See Figure 7.  
                                            
64 Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 8th ed., “Aspect.” 
65 Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, 2nd ed., “Aspect.” 
66 Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 8th ed., “Aspect.” 
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 With the exegesis I aim to offer up various aspects from which you might 
view the installation. I will also position the installation in relation to various 
theoretical material, so that what we see, and how we see it, may change. This 
usage implies not features, but rather ways of looking and standing in relation to 
the work that might enable seeing various angles.  
 We say an aspect is the appearance of a thing: the look of it, its air, its 
condition or quality, maybe its expression or countenance, its demeanour. This is 
used especially ‘as represented to the mind of the viewer.’67 We come to a 
privileging of the subjective experience of the appearance of things, what the 
viewer sees. As my definition of “aspect” here evolves, an appropriate affinity is 
drawn between buildings, windows and faces; their expressions, outlooks and 
perspectives. The resonance of this will become clearer in my discussion of the 
subject matter in the moving images. For now, I simply want to draw on the 
importance of the subjective experience.  
 Grammatical aspect qualifies the temporal dimensions of verbs: whether 
an action is complete or continuous.68 It tells us not when in time something 
happened (which is the task of tense) but rather how it happened and what 
relation it has to the flow of time; it tells us whether the action is completed or 
still has bearing on the present moment. This dynamic plays out across the  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
 
67 Tom McArthur and Thomas Burns, Concise Oxford Companion to English Language 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 76. 
68 The “aspect” can be perfect or imperfect (also called progressive, continuous or 
durative). The perfect designates an action that started and finished in the past, the 
imperfect designates an action that started in the past and continues into the present. 
Pam Peters, The Cambridge Guide to English Usage (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 50. 
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It’s a matter of perspective. 
And distance.
Figure 7
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exegesis as I move back and forth through different stages of the research, and 
as I connect various processes and what bearing they had on both Straying and  
in the writing of Casting. The actions and processes I detail are complete in one 
temporal sense, however: their impact continues as I re-visit these processes in 
the present writing. 
 Aspect is a productive word to call to mind because relationality is one of 
the features it describes: action in relation of the flow of time, perspective in 
relation to the object observed or the relation between two gazes. These 
relationships are articulated not only in terms of the exegesis and artwork; but 
also in terms of the relationship between the image and the voice in Straying and 
between the audience/reader of Casting and Straying. The audience in the 
installation forms and un-forms physical, conceptual and metaphoric aspects in 
relation to the work.   
 Aspect can address both temporal and spatial relationships and to this 
end, it articulates how the audience might experience time and place due to 
aspectual disturbances. Where in the room an audience member finds 
themselves (particularly in terms of the relationships they form physically in 
relation to the screens and other people in the room) might be disturbed or 
transformed by the temporal shifts that the Voice articulates in voice-over. This in 
turn may shift their perspective, the way they look at the image, or the 
relationship they (re)form to the temporal space that the Voice (re)creates. These 
shifts and transformations in time and in space may lead to a feeling of 
dislocation, a loss of bearings.  
 The experience of being in the installation may lead to a transformed 
sense of time and space for the audience. This “transformation” might engender 
something like Barthes' “pregnant moment”.69 For Barthes, the pregnant 
                                            
69 The expression first appeared in relation to the static arts and their ability to capture 
the moment before a climax or completion of an action that it depicts. For Lessing this 
gives the spectator room for the ‘free play of the imagination’, it offers up the experience 
with the work of art to be had and re-had, the spectator always adding to the artwork, 
‘completing’ the moment. G. E. Lessing, Laocoön (Letchworth: J. M. Dent and Sons 
1970), 14. 
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moment has implications for the flow of time.70 It is a moment when the present, 
past, and future find expression in a single moment: ‘the pregnant moment is 
just this presence of all the absences (memories, lessons, promises)’.71 A hiatus 
or suspension in the flow of time breaks its linear progression. In this hiatus our 
experience of space is transfigured by the ‘presence of all the absences’. Gyorgy 
Ligeti’s comment may also be germane here: ‘music which seems to stand still 
and yet flows on’72. This certainly is an offering of a very different kind of aspect 
both temporally and spatially. This is like a spatial opening into a single moment 
of time. This is something like the way Deren conceives ‘vertical time’ in her 
poetic structure: stopping the linear flow of time so that we may dwell more 
deeply on one moment. Stopping the flow of time and dwelling in it implies that a 
dwelling space is enabled.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
70 Barthes’ study connects ‘the tableaux’ to the cinema of Eisenstein and the way it is 
made up of tableaux where ‘all the burden of meaning bears on each scene, not on the 
whole … there is no final meaning.’ Ilse Lafer, ed., Behind the Fourth Wall (Wien: Generali 
Foundation, 2010), 141. 
71 Ibid., 142. 
72 Bálint András Varga, Three Questions for Sixty-Five Composers (University of 
Rochester Press, 2011), 156. 
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MAKING DARK SPACE 
 
 
I have already spoken about the way in which the images and words failed me in 
my initial attempts to make the documentary I set out to complete. I have also 
used Marks’ reading of intercultural cinema to re-think this and re-conceive it as 
an expression of the unseeable and unsayable experience of displacement; of 
occupying an intercultural space. This begs the question: if Casting is to address 
Straying, a work that I claim is about the unsayable and unseeable, a work that 
is about the limits of naming, then how do I approach speaking and writing 
about it? If the installation offers up various aspects to the viewer, how might the 
exegesis reflect upon this material? What theoretical tools might I need to 
employ to speak about this structure of multiplicity that is not fixed but always 
evolving and offering up another perspective? The relationship between exegesis 
and artwork ought to be generative, as opposed to simply explicatory or 
illustrative. I think of both works as organisms that are open to change, to 
various ways of reading and experiencing. I want to maintain this “aliveness” 
rather than reduce it. To help us through this terrain, I will consider some of the 
features that this writing employs.  
 The question regarding these two aspects of a practice-based research 
project begs the question: where is the contribution to knowledge located? Is it 
in the artwork, or in the exegesis, or in their very relationship? What implications 
does this have for the form the exegesis ought to take? I will consider 
Gadamer’s perspective on knowledge and art73 and I will also consider how 
Benjamin’s study of the task of the translator might help us think about the 
relationship between artwork and exegetical writing so that it might be 
generative.74    
                                            
73 Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful 
74 Benjamin, The Task of the Translator  
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 Firstly I will consider the image Barthes offers us for such a text that can 
work in this space of the indeterminate, the difficult to say or classify.75 He calls 
this kind of text one of pleasure where there is always ‘a margin of indecision … 
the paradigm will falter, the meaning will be precarious, revocable, reversible, the 
discourse incomplete’.76 This kind of text ‘brings to a crisis (a) relation with 
language’.77 This is the very site of pleasure for Barthes, this very space of the in-
between where speaking is difficult: 
 
is not the most erotic portion of the body where the garment gapes? … 
the intermittence of skin flashing between two articles of clothing … 
between two edges … it is this flash itself which seduces, or rather: the 
staging of an appearance-as-disappearance.78  
 
I use Barthes to summon an energy to propel you forwards into the work, with 
an encouragement to take pleasure in the things that are difficult or impossible to 
translate. Barthes’ image of Babel confirms that ‘the confusion of the tongues is 
no longer a punishment, the subject gains access to bliss by the cohabitation of 
languages working side by side’.79 And though this research is not only about a 
deliberate staging of the ‘flash’, a continual encounter with the ‘gape’ has been 
my experience of this research and herein must be found its pleasure.   
 This kind of text includes digressions; it invites the reader to ‘drift’ and to 
stray.80 These features can be found in Casting. This is not a cosmetic 
appendage or an afterthought; this is what was discovered in the process of 
writing, in the process of attempting to find the right way to speak. I write in 
order to say the things that the words will always fail in saying fully or completely 
truly to experience and potentiality.  
                                            
75 Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text 
76 Ibid., 4. 
77 Ibid., 14. 
78 Ibid., 10. 
79 Ibid., 3-4. 
80 Ibid. 
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 I have taken the approach that I must follow the path of thought and 
practice rather than the path of logic or a particular or singular framework (either 
contextual or theoretical). This has led to the inclusion of the personal, the 
theoretical, the quotidian and the abstract. The reason for this is that the 
research processes that were undertaken were emerging as explicitly connected 
to the discoveries that were being made and that to adopt a self-reflexive voice 
was my way of being able to include all of these processes and link them to the 
forms that have manifested.81  
 As is already evident, I have also used footnotes extensively. We can also 
borrow Barthes’ image of the ‘seam’ here, the footnote that splinters the text 
and creates the cut.82 He says ‘the best pleasure’ is the one that ‘manages to 
make itself heard indirectly; if, reading it, I am led to look up often, to listen to 
something else’. 83 This implies that there is pleasure in getting a little lost, in the 
text encouraging a thinking beyond itself, a text that points off into multiple 
directions, away from itself. This diversion, this pointing to elsewhere, is precisely 
what the footnotes “perform”. The figures are also used to both cut and connect 
– to divert your attention from one to the other (the text proper to the figure that 
stands in for a moment in Straying) so that you might come back and re-engage 
more deeply.  
 The footnotes and figures also serve something like Jacques Derrida’s 
notion of ‘the supplement.’84 The supplement and the footnote simultaneously 
add and subtract. They point onwards beyond themselves to yet other images, 
thoughts and concepts, and they relate to the text proper by enriching it. They 
take us away from the text and embed us more deeply into it.  
 This ‘act’ or image means more to this work, however, than just how it 
relates to the footnotes. It encourages a pleasure in this double movement, a 
                                            
81 I interrogate this in further in the Space section of this exegesis.   
82 The cut is the creation of the seam, or the gape that stages appearance-as-
disappearance.  
83 Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, 24. 
  
84 See Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Delhi: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002. 
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work which simultaneously exposes lacks and aporias, and vouches for its 
completeness. I have worked to preserve these features in Casting because they 
articulate the shape of my experience throughout this research. The experience 
is indicative of the subject matter itself: the relationship of body and place is 
perhaps to be found somewhere in that ‘gape’.  
 If I cannot articulate the experience exactly, then I might be able to offer 
up the experience to be had by the audience/reader. This is true of both of 
Straying and Casting. I will expand on this point throughout the following 
sections. For now: I intend to allow you plenty of space, dark corners for you to 
inhabit, to stray, to wander. See Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
I need the dark, for a while, please. Pure 
darkness, because the dark sits so close 
to the skin.
Figure 8
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KNOWLEDGE AND THE BEAUTIFUL 
 
 
Gadamer’s work on ‘the relevance of the beautiful’ in a work of art, where the 
beautiful means knowledge,85 helped me frame my own position on how we 
think about the nature of the knowledge that is to be found in an artwork and, in 
turn, how this relates to the exegetical writing. I will argue that the exegesis can 
help illuminate some paths to be taken in the production of knowledge which 
happens in the experience of Straying. What I mean when I say the production of 
knowledge is that the knowledge is made in the contact between audience and 
artwork.  
 I offer up no object of knowledge in either Straying or Casting. If I am not 
offering up objects of knowledge, available as complete, like a statue able to be 
held in the hand, every surface available for interrogation, every line followed to 
its natural conclusion, then what form does my contribution take? At this point, 
knowledge becomes not object but experience. The idea of knowledge as 
experience evokes Beaumegarten’s notion of ‘sensuous knowledge’,86 of 
Hegel’s notion of art as the ‘sensuous showing of the idea’.87 The ‘beautiful’, in 
Gadamer’s definition, must be experienced. That experience brings us to a kind 
of knowing, a knowing through the senses, a knowing that happens via the 
body. How do we speak about this experience? How do we articulate the 
knowledge that we have produced from contact with the artwork? 
 Gadamer would claim that we cannot. The beautiful is that which 
belongs to the artwork alone and that which cannot be known in any way other 
than in contact with the work itself.  The significance of the work of art cannot be 
                                            
85 Gadamer’s preference for the term ‘beautiful’ stems from the Greek roots where what 
was beautiful was truth. After Hegel and Kant, Gadamer argues for the beautiful as 
something that is not simply subjective. It is what Kant expresses with his ‘I demand 
everyone’s agreement’, whilst not being able to convince by argument. I return to this 
idea and elaborate, shortly. Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 18. 
86 Ibid., 16. 
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appropriated ‘for knowledge and understanding in all its meaning’, the work of 
art is not a ‘bearer of a message’.88 The work is not a vessel for a particular idea, 
‘it resists pure conceptualisation’.89 I would consider a ‘pure’ conceptualisation 
one that is divested of its sensuous dimensions, which would mean also that it 
was atemporal and aspatial. Temporality, spatiality and sensuality, then, are 
instrumental in accessing meaning in the artwork.  
 To further explicate this notion that meaning exists in the artwork alone, 
Gadamer uses the idea of ‘play’. Art and play, he claims, are both ‘self-
representing’.90 In play, the movement ‘is not tied down to any goal’;91 as in a 
‘play of light’ where there is nothing outside the beauty of that phenomenon, its 
beauty is not connected to anything outside of itself, it is not beautiful because it 
represents another thing. What constitutes play or what constitutes an artwork 
exists within the form itself, where the ‘play is thus the self-representation of its 
own movement’.92  
 Play requires participants. The observer can be called participant, where 
they need to project themselves into the play so they can be part of ‘playing 
along with’.93 No meaning or intention exists outside of the work; the work is 
created at the moment that the audience member engages with, or projects 
themselves into, the artwork. Gadamer claims that in full participation play has 
the potential to transform its players. As the audience projects themselves into 
the artwork, they move beyond themselves, which opens up the potential for the 
audience to be transformed. The work of art moves the viewer towards new 
knowledge.    
 It is important to mark that, for Gadamer both the individual participant 
and the artwork must meet one another in the creation of this new experience or 
                                                                                                                   
87 Ibid., 33. My treatment of these ideas is cursory, at best, but I point to them here if 
only to demonstrate that the “knowledge as experience” reaches back to eighteenth-
century western philosophy. I will return to this idea in a more meaningful way with the 
study of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in the Flesh part of this exegesis. 
88 Ibid., 33. 
89 Ibid., 37. 
90 Ibid., 22. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., 23. 
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knowledge: ‘we both elicit the image from things and imaginatively project the 
image into things in one and the same process’.94 Our projections into the 
artwork are elicited by that artwork; we do not project any image whatsoever 
into it: it is rather ‘only in the presence of the particular individual work that 
concepts ‘come to reverberate’.95  
 This might suggest that our own projections can surprise us, might be 
images that have been dormant, outside our awareness or consciousness. This 
idea is developed after Kant, who instructively phrases this in terms of creativity: 
‘the concept functions as a kind of sounding board capable of articulating the 
free play of the imagination’.96 This space of play and imagination is a foreign 
space inasmuch as it is a projection beyond oneself into another. Out there we 
might experience a loss of words, we may not have the language with which to 
speak about what we encounter or the transformation we experience. This is an 
experience ‘for which we have to seek new words.’97 This exegesis is part of the 
search for ‘new words’, a way of speaking “about” or “through” or “nearby” the 
artwork98 in order to offer a deeper projection into it, to achieve a deeper or more 
nuanced embeddedness which results in a more visceral and a more vivid 
dialogue with it.  
 The task of the exegesis, then, cannot be to interpret the artwork and 
therefore to ‘recuperate it in intellectual terms’.99 It might, however, be able to 
                                                                                                                   
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., 17-8. 
95 Ibid., 21. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., 83. 
98 I am referencing Trinh T. Min-ha here and her film Reassemblage (1982). In the film the 
voice-over says she will speak ‘nearby’ her subject. Trinh is negotiating the dynamic 
between filmmaker and subject and in particular the dynamic between coloniser and 
colonised. My “ethics of approach” was about negotiating this kind of power dynamic. 
The question is: whose voice is being heard when you speak “about” the other, as 
opposed to “nearby” the other? My role as researcher requires that I do not “colonise” 
the artwork by speaking about it. I would like to preserve the “voice” of the artwork whilst 
at the same time acknowledging that to speak of it is to change it or mediate it in some 
way. This concern manifested materially in Straying in the way I re-tell my interview 
subjects’ stories, in the attempt to bring my voice and their voice close together, while 
never conflating them. I elaborate on how and why this came about in the Space part of 
this exegesis. 
99 Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 37. 
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inspire a set of images – not only the artwork, but also the exegesis can be part 
of the creation of new images that are projected by the viewer onto the artwork. 
My task here then is not necessarily to present indisputable facts or to make 
sense of the work or to find the most convincing shape for the argument or 
experience. It is to provide a critical engagement with the work that aims to 
inspire images in the reader, which in turn will offer up further entry points into 
Straying. Part of my approach to this is to preserve in this exegesis the nature of 
the process of this research and the structure of Straying. The fractured nature 
of Straying and its multiplicity give rise to both absences and excesses. I have 
worked to preserve these features in Casting because fractures and excesses 
are inextricably part of the work and its significance.  
 I have intended with this discussion to orient us towards the notion of 
experience as knowledge/knowledge as experience. I have worked to create the 
conditions for engagement and experience in Straying. Casting works as part of 
this provocation. I would like to consider how this provocation might be 
something like the act of translation. To this end I would like to call on 
Benjamin’s study of translation in order to consider that this is not always a 
reductive or literal process. The question what is the task of the exegesis? might 
be answered by way of answering another question: what is the task of the 
translator?  
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TRANSLATION AS APPROACH 
 
 
There are important distinctions to be made between Benjamin’s study of 
translation, where he is referring specifically to translation of one linguistic text 
into another linguistic text, and my own question regarding the exegesis and the 
artwork. One of these distinctions is that in linguistic translation there is a first 
and a consequent text: the ‘original’ and the ‘translation’. This pair, first and 
consequent, original and other, is unlike the relationship between exegesis and 
installation; the making of both has been an ongoing and simultaneous process. 
I ask us to suspend this difference for now to see what we might gain from the 
translation analogy.  
 For Benjamin, a translation that attempts to impart all of the information of 
the ‘original’ is sure to miss what is ‘in addition to’ the information.100 What is ‘in 
addition to’ is unique to the ’original’ language; it is what is ‘unfathomable, the 
mysterious, the ‘poetic’.101 This ‘mysteriousness’ is the significance of the text. 
How then do I write about ‘the significant’ in the audiovisual installation in this 
other ‘language’ of the exegesis? Imparting the information is, in the end, 
meaningless or only part of the meaning; certainly, for Benjamin, it is not the 
‘poetic’ dimension.102 
 What might be the use of translating or transposing or retelling? Benjamin 
claims that ‘no translation would be possible if in its ultimate essence it strove for 
likeness to the original.’103 The second text needs to be its own text, as opposed 
to only imitating faithfully the original version. This is not to say that there should 
be no correspondence between the two texts. Benjamin calls the translation the 
‘afterlife’ of the original text.104 Again, ‘afterlife’ implies too much a linear 
                                            
100 Benjamin, The Task of the Translator, 70. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Again we have Benjamin here referring to the ‘poetic’ dimension as the dimension that 
is profound and difficult to access. 
103 Ibid., 73. 
  
104 Ibid. 
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consequence, but it is nonetheless fruitful to think about the exegesis as a 
continuance – it is not the same as, it is not a replica, it is another life, another 
text, which has issued from elsewhere. The ‘afterlife’ implies a transformation, a 
change or ‘renewal’, and in this renewed form it is both connected to and 
separate from the ‘other’, first or original life. In any case the translation stands 
as a work in itself, with its own significance.  
 In Benjamin’s construction, the idea of the first and consequent becomes 
decentralised too, because translation ‘ultimately serves the purpose of 
expressing the central reciprocal relationship between languages’, their 
‘kinship’.105 We might then consider that the contribution a creative practice PhD 
offers is precisely the ‘reciprocal relationship’ between the artwork and the 
exegesis: the very fact of having two parts in different forms and finding a 
relationship between them. The ‘renewal’ happens to each language, or work, 
and is ongoing in its perpetual attempt at finding what Benjamin calls ‘pure 
language’.106  
 ‘Pure language’ for Benjamin is not achievable by any language alone, 
although it is the thing each language strives for in itself. In translation, two 
languages ‘supplement’ each other and approach ‘pure language’ together. 
There is a significance that remains hidden in every utterance. A complete, full or 
perfect expression is impossible in any language alone. However, in bringing an 
utterance into a relation with its translation, with another language, the two move 
together towards ‘pure language’. We get a glimpse of what was previously 
hidden, not a full revelation, but in any case we might see something in excess of 
what either language could speak on its own. Languages supplement one 
another in a way that makes them more full, a little more complete, moving 
toward that which is mysterious in each. What I describe here, after Benjamin, is 
                                            
105 Ibid., 72. Recall Foucault’s notion of ‘kinship’ between language and the world, a 
primordial condition now lost to us. See note 11 above. 
 
106 ‘All supra historical kinship of languages rests in the intention underlying each 
language as a whole – an intention, however, which no single language can attain by 
itself but which is realised only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each 
other: pure language.’ Ibid., 74. 
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an idealised state, not a permanent or complete or entirely achievable position. It 
articulates an intention, it ‘points the way to this region’,107 the passage towards 
the hidden. 
 We might think of the exegesis and the installation elevating each other 
towards this idealised expression, supplementing one another, allowing each to 
speak more fully than they are able to on their own. It is precisely their relation, 
their shared intention, that allows this approach (although perhaps never truly 
fulfilled) towards complete or pure expression. This space is ‘beyond transmittal 
of subject matter. This nucleus is best defined as the element that does not lend 
itself to translation’108 or you might call this the untranslatable, or the impossible.  
 If we think of translation as a mode of its own, as Benjamin does, then the 
task of the translator is different to the task of the poet. For Benjamin, because 
the translation comes second, the translator’s task is to find the echo of the 
original in their own work. The poet stands inside the ‘language forest’ and 
attends to the detail of ‘specific linguistic contextual aspects’109 whereas the 
translator stands outside this forest and tries to find the echo of the original in 
their own text, in a kind of ‘totality’.110  The practitioner/researcher in a practice-
based PhD is at some times a poet and other times a translator; echoes are to 
be found across both texts. The practitioner/researcher stands inside the 
‘language forest’, and at its edge the call is made into it and from within it. The 
movement from one to the other might be elucidating, just as the movement 
from attention to the specific, to the spontaneous and to the ideational.111 I might 
suggest that in this scenario the practitioner/researcher might have to listen to 
the echo with their poetic ear both inside and outside the ‘forest’. I would call the 
echo a chime then.112 
                                            
107 Ibid., 75 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid., 76 
110 ‘The intention of the poet is spontaneous, primary, graphic; that of the translator is 
derivative, ultimate, ideational’. Ibid. 
111 This is in reference to note 110 above.  
112 Recall Robert Bly on chiming in poetry. See note 8 above. 
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Benjamin recalls Mallarme’s thesis on the multiplicity of languages, which 
speaks of the impossibility of any single truth or its utterance: 
 
the imperfection of languages consists in their plurality … the diversity of 
idioms on earth prevents everybody from uttering the words which 
otherwise, at one single stroke, would materialise as truth.113 
 
Mallarme is saying that ‘truth’ evades because of the ‘imperfection’ that yields 
multiplicity and a multiplicity that yields an imperfection.114 Benjamin says that ‘in 
all language and linguistic creations there remains in addition to what can be 
conveyed something that cannot be communicated’.115 If I continue the parallel 
between translation and the present research project, I would claim that 
‘imperfection’ is true of both the exegesis and installation. I claim that there is 
something outside of what can be communicated in each, that neither 
approaches “truth” and so together they create a multiplicity of possibilities. But 
think of it in a more positive light: there is no single truth or version to 
communicate; somewhere between the multiple versions, somewhere between 
the multiple voices and utterances, is where this ‘excess’ falls. The space of the 
excess is the space that the reader/audience occupies.  
 Benjamin says it is the task of the translator not only to illuminate what is 
dormant in the original but also to ‘break through the decayed barriers of his 
own language’ to illuminate a little more of what has remained hidden.116 This is 
surely the task of the practitioner/researcher also: to break through established 
boundaries within which we practice, how we speak about the practice. This 
happens precisely when we allow one form to influence the other. The 
practitioner/researcher must allow their practice to be ‘powerfully affected’ by 
their exegetical writing, and the writing must ‘expand and deepen’ the 
                                            
113 Benjamin, The Task of the Translator, 77. 
114 I like to also think of it the other way: that multiplicity reveals an imperfection that 
resonates on a more “true” level. 
115 Benjamin, The Task of the Translator, 79. 
116 Ibid. 
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practice.117 This is a ‘transformation’, a movement towards making visible what 
was previously invisible.  
What I have been describing here is the quality and nature of the relation 
between two texts. For this particular research project, this also places the 
audience/reader in the role of translator. The audience/reader negotiates this 
relationship, not only between the exegesis and the installation but within the 
installation itself. The audience member listens for the echo between one image 
and another, between one utterance and an image. For the audience, in this kind 
of set up, the translation is somewhat enacted, the body of the audience 
dictates the relations as it perambulates around the space. Translation, then, 
becomes like a dance, through movement accessing deeper meaning, deeper 
knowledge. It is towards this region that we stray. See Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
117 Ibid., 81. 
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I have strayed from the text.
Figure 9
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PASSAGE 
 
 
 
We come now to the formal construction of Straying and the theoretical 
concerns that guided this making. What brings together the various parts of this 
section is a sense of movement, of what I can literally and metaphorically call 
geographies, landscapes and transitive states. This movement through 
geographies of the body, landscapes of sound and image, is an expression of 
longing for transformation, a transitive state for the body, and possibly place.  
 This section will look at the range of paths – literal, theoretical and 
metaphorical – that were dreamt -up, found, formed and taken. This research 
project has been indelibly marked by the passages that opened up and the ones 
that led to dead-ends; both were transformative. An unplanned trajectory was an 
intention that I formed very early in this process. What this means exactly, how 
much exactly one can leave unplanned and how much one needs to confirm the 
paths they will travel, has been an area of discovery for me and my practice 
during this research. How much can one really commit to straying when 
outcomes and conclusions necessarily have to take some form at some 
determined end, or at least what will have to be chosen to stand in for an end? 
 Alienation from certain paths, from memories and landscapes, are 
equally our subject. For this reason, I will look at theoretical material that is 
significant because it was abandoned and likewise at plans for the project that 
were discarded or that failed. I will make room for fields that are mostly absent 
from Straying but mark it nonetheless: scholarship on place-making; the 
treatment of the body-in-landscape in cinema; and Eisenstein’s concept of 
nonindifferent nature. These fields were equally as formative as the theoretical 
material that became so plaited into the fabric of the research that it forms both 
the narrative arc and its theoretical underpinning. This is to say that I worked 
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through some theoretical concerns by plaiting them into the narrative and 
thereby working to resolve or understand them in practice.  
 Chronologically, we are going back to the very beginning in this section – 
the point at which I was readying myself for the fieldtrip to Serbia to collect 
footage for what was, at the time, conceived as a single-screen documentary 
work.  
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PROCEED BY WAY OF IMPERATIVES 
 
 
The movements made and generated in the production of this work might be 
considered ‘non-goal oriented’.118 This project is both practice-led research and 
research-led practice:119 the research and the practice led this work 
simultaneously, the two evolving conterminously. There are names and models 
for research that generally takes this course. One model could be what Terence 
Rosenberg calls ‘poetic research’.120 I might call it ‘process-driven research’ 
where there is no particular starting point in mind and no preconceived end.121 
Such an approach can be directed towards emergence, that is, the generation 
of ideas which were unforeseen at the beginning of the project.122  
 The methodologies which I have named, above, and there are many 
others, are attempts at finding alternatives to the more traditional social-scientific 
methodologies that are not always conducive to research that includes creative 
practice. Generally speaking, these alternatives to goal-oriented approaches 
focus on process-driven research. I would venture to say that every research 
project includes aspects of both goal-oriented and process-driven approaches 
at different stages, but may favour one more than the other.  
 It would not be inaccurate to speak of this research in the image of any 
of these models and yet I resist choosing one over another. These models, if at 
                                            
118 Hazel Smith and Roger T. Dean, Practice-Led Research, Research-Led Practice in 
the Creative Arts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 23. 
119 This distinction is made by Linda Candy, Practice-based Research: A Guide, 
Creativity and Cognition Studios Report 1006-V1.0, Sydney Creativity and Cognition 
Studios, University of Technology. This is a useful distinction to make, however, it is not a 
distinction I could vouch for in this work where both practices are fundamental to it. 
120 Rosenberg’s term attempts to give validity to the ‘imaginative hunch’ in the process of 
researching, which, according to him, is often ‘considered in subjugation to rigorous 
method’. He calls the ‘movement’ of this research ‘centrifugal’, the ‘movement is counter 
to the process of grounding’, the ‘impulse is not towards certainty but to escape from it. 
It pulls out in different directions … the centrifugal is relational.’ Terence Rosenberg, "The 
Reservoir Towards a Poetic Model of Research in Design" (working papers in art and 
design 1, 2000). 
121 Smith and Dean, Practice-Led Research, Research-Led Practice in the Creative Arts 
23. 
  
122 Ibid. 
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all useful, are only useful in hindsight, in as much as they are a short -hand for 
the type of research done or perhaps only in so much as they might validate the 
process. But I am not in the business of constructing taxonomies or making 
equivalencies. I am in the business of offering up what I think is most true to the 
philosophy of the approach, most evocative of the experience, more generative 
of further investigations outside of what I can set down in these pages.  
 Rather than thinking in terms of already defined methodologies, I thought 
in terms of following “imperatives”. These emerged as a result of a number of 
other convictions to do with what “research” meant, with an ethics of approach 
and an ambition to avoid pushing ‘thought along well-worn grooves.’123 
 In aid of this, one of the central tenets of the research was to proceed in 
order to lose your way. I was most optimistic when I took this advice to heart 
and assumed that to proceed in this way would necessarily lead me to 
encounter previously unfamiliar places. This in turn, I thought, must be an 
encounter and contribution to new knowledge. I had not considered the 
possibility of simply losing my way and not encountering anything very interesting 
or novel about which I could “report back”. 
 This imperative was served by another: think your way into things by 
making. This refers to a desire to stay connected to the material and formal 
affordances of the predominantly audiovisual medium(s) I was working in. I did 
not want to compose a perfect idea and then simply execute it. I wanted to 
develop the idea through execution. I wanted the research and the new 
knowledge to “happen” in that process of making, where the interviewee would 
lead me to previously unimagined places. This approach would connect the 
discoveries directly to the mode of discovery, i.e. the knowledge would be 
intimately connected to the medium and the use of the moving image. This 
approach was also connected to an ethics around working with interview 
subjects from Serbia and speaking to them on the topic of place, knowing that 
this was potentially a sensitive topic. For this reason, I wanted to arrive at the 
                                            
123 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 206. 
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interview without preconceived aesthetic ideas, which would be tantamount to 
pre-determined agendas. I wanted to proceed without these, but rather, arrive 
with a sensitivity towards the interview subject that would not speak for them, 
but enable them to speak.  
 This leads to another imperative: proceed in order to find your way 
through the other. I constructed this imperative in order to stay focused on what 
is outside the self and to work towards establishing a dialogic relationship with 
this “other”, making oneself in the image of another in order to understand it. It is 
a generative relationship that has the power to influence both shapes, a 
transformative power where one object is read through another.124  
 These imperatives determined  an improvisatory way of working. Specific 
elements of Keith Johnston’s theorisation of improvisation for actors can be 
helpful in informing improvisatory approaches to other art practices.125 The 
notion of ‘marking time’ is a very valuable starting point – it is about allowing a 
situation to develop, being comfortable with the passing of time, being patient, 
not discarding anything because it seems ‘uninteresting.’ 126 The thinking here is 
not turned towards the pressure of being funny or clever or exciting. Attaining 
this comfort can lead to a state where one can follow one’s first impulses. The 
spontaneous move is often the most interesting, but often initially rejected as 
insignificant. It is about saying ‘yes’ to everything that arises: it is about yielding 
to rather than blocking an idea.127 Johnston’s claim is that we usually go to block 
the idea that is the most dangerous.128  
 These dictums fail as any kind of “road-map” since they become a 
prescriptive, and thereby proscriptive, map superimposed on the landscape I 
was literally and metaphorically traversing. I was looking to lose my way, after all. 
                                            
124 Again, we have Benjamin’s image of the palimpsest, where one image is read through 
another, and in this act a third meaning released.  
125 Johnstone, Keith. Impro: improvisation and the theatre. New York: Taylor and Francis, 
1992. 
126 Ibid., 33. 
127 Ibid., 92. 
128 Ibid., 97. 
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And to this end, I think I was well-served. This process has led me down 
unimagined and, at the time, unimaginable paths.  
 I advanced in the same way when considering how the theoretical 
research might illuminate, connect to or disturb the creative practice and vice-
versa. If a true disruption is to occur, if a truly novel connection between theory 
and practice is to be made, and therefore previously proven connections 
challenged, then I had to work in such a way that I was not applying theory to 
practice or illustrating practice with theory. I drew no equivalencies between 
them, but rather wanted the working method to enable each to inform the other. 
I was wary of bending one into the shape of the other simply so that they could 
act as alibis for already determined ideas. This process, where I make direct 
connections between theory and the creative work, is one of reading the work in 
hindsight, following the trail. This very writing of the exegesis has been a means 
towards discovering the details of how one (the exegesis) is implicated in the 
other (the project).   
 This is not a blind kind of exercise where I had no foundations 
whatsoever upon which my theoretical and practice journeys found their 
trajectories. But certainly for much of the research, I listened with my poetic ear 
and looked for resemblances and chimes and for complications. I discarded 
conclusion in the face of evidence and sought to continually find openings.129   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
129 This is a reference to Louise Glück’s conception of a poet’s responsibility. I will return 
to this idea shortly. 
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ABSENCES 
 
 
My initial vision for this work was a single-screen documentary that depicted 
interviews to camera and recitations of poetry. Straying is now a three-channel 
video and single-channel audio installation. It is a work that depicts no bodies, a 
work with only one Voice heard (mine) and this Voice does not recite any poetry. 
Three screens hang in the middle of the installation space. They are white and 
semi-transparent. A voice-over is heard, it fills the space. The audience can 
move about the space, can catch different angles and associate the Voice with 
different images. The moving images on the screens depict external built and 
natural environments: statues, buildings, rivers, fields, basketball courts and 
football fields, playgrounds. Bodies only skirt the edges of the frame, if at all. See 
Figure 10. 
 From this summary description, this installation may sound like a poetry 
film without poetry, a documentary with no subjects, a dance film without 
dancers or an autobiography that keeps the self invisible. The work is indeed 
about a lot of things you do not see. It is about the body, about sensuality, about 
poetry, and none of these things are visually or aurally present. It is not like the 
work of Claire Denis,130 Andrei Tarkovsky131 or Agnès Varda,132 each of whom 
explicitly find form for some very similar preoccupations. And yet all of these films 
have served to orient this research, to refine its questions, even if the formal or 
aesthetic choices remain very different. The installation is marked by absences, 
the evocation or suggestion of the body, the poem, the personal and the public  
                                            
130 For example in the film Beau Travail (1999) the movement of the body and the 
movement of the camera play out a fine dance together that elevates the mundane to 
the status of the poetic. 
131 Nature figures as one of Tarkovsky’s most emblematic features. Water seeps into 
houses (Solaris [1972], Mirror [1975], Nostalghia [1983]); bodies bury themselves in earth 
(Stalker [1979], Ivan’s Childhood [1962]), and buildings are often ruins being reclaimed 
by nature (Mirror, Nostalghia). 
132 In the film The Gleaners and I (2000), for example, Varda literally films her self, her own 
body. She also often voices her own documentaries and uses herself as subject. 
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story; it hopes to achieve this through associations, metaphors and its structure, 
which makes room for multiple iterations or attempts.   
 This exegesis might be marked by some absences too. For example, 
there might be fields of knowledge that one might expect to find in such a work 
as this, but does not. Most obviously, you might expect to find a section that 
deals with the critical literature on “place” and “place-making” or a more 
sustained engagement with cinematic representations of landscape and the 
body. These are two of the most direct correlates to what I was investigating and 
these fields served well as a foundation and to help orient me towards the 
subject. The direction in which I then proceeded did not speak directly back to 
these fields. Nevertheless, I would like to briefly acknowledge some of the most 
influential material.  
 
 
PLACE 
 
Edward S. Casey’s idea of ‘implacement’, which is concerned with the 
‘experience of being in (a) place … becoming part of (a) place’,133 provoked me 
to think about the body’s relationship to place in terms of levels of 
embeddedness. This conjures for me the idea that the space we occupy has a 
density.134 Movement through space then has a particular quality and effort 
which are unique to that body and that space. To think of the level at which a 
person is embedded in a place is also to affect how we consider time. If we 
return to the earlier notion of hiatus and the pregnant moment, a moment that is 
                                            
133 Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2009), 33. 
134 For Casey this has to do with an entire complex of cultural, social and historical 
factors. My focus is on the part of the term that articulates the physical space around the 
body. I think of this space as having density, and within that density there are levels of 
embeddedness and feelings of implacement, or being in place. It is not a matter only of 
being or not being in place, but the quality of implacement. 
 64 
not governed by the linear flow of time, then we might be able to think of space 
opening up and allowing the body to embed itself deeper into it.  
This is my idealised construction. I respond to Doreen Massey’s 
unromanticised perspective on place which is not ‘constructed out of an 
introverted, inward-looking history based on delving into the past for internalized 
Origins’.135 She argues that the ‘specificity of place is continually reproduced’ 
and that ‘what is special about place is not some romance of a pre-given 
collective identity [but] throwntogetherness, the unavoidable challenge of 
negotiating the here and now’.136 While I agree with Massey in terms of her 
political and social argument, I also find validity in the things that she claims 
place is not – the desire for something, even if it is not “true” or “real”, is 
interesting as desire, and potentially revealing. The reach inwards and towards 
origins is a real impulse, even if it is not the complete and whole story of what 
constitutes our sense of place.  
The imagination as an important dimension in our conceptualisation and 
experience of place is a focus in Tim Ingold’s work on the perception of 
landscapes:  
 
to imagine … is not so much to conjure up images of a reality “out there”, 
whether virtual or actual, true or false, as to participate from within, 
through perception and action, in the very becoming of things.137  
 
Ingold’s work focuses on the sensing, moving body and its relationship to the 
environment.138 This is central to my own approach: what happens when the 
body is displaced and is not occupying the environment in order to enact or 
participate in this ‘becoming’? The Voice in Straying must turn towards 
                                            
135 Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994), 254. 
136 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005), 140. 
137 See in particular Monica Janowski and Tim Ingold, ed., Imagining landscapes: Past, 
present and future (Ashgate, Surrey, 2012), 3. 
138 See Ingold, Tim. The Perception of the Environment. London: Routledge, 2000. 
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imagination and memory, an inward and an outward looking, in an attempt to 
(re)constitute a sense of place.139  
Henri Lefebvre privileges the body in his study on rhythms and place-
making. In Rhythmanalysis, Lefebvre reads place through the study of rhythms 
that are made by the interacting rhythms of human and non-human forms. From 
this perspective, place becomes a kind of pulsating rhythmic body.140 This is an 
image that I carried into this research where I could consider place as body and 
the space of the installation as a body also.  
This proposition focused my attention on the rhythms that played out in 
the frame and where I took rhythm to be not only a temporal measure of 
movement but a graphic one. For example, several shots in the installation 
depict building facades, with an arrangement of windows and airconditioning 
units. I started reading these images of buildings in terms of the rhythms made 
by the graphic shapes. This kind of reading of or approach to the images helped 
me begin to look away from questions of representation and towards a more 
visceral, rhythmic engagement with the image.141  
The common thread between the literature I have covered is that place is 
made; it is a process rather than a point; place is lived, an extension of our 
bodies rather than a container that houses bodies; it is multi-dimensional, part of 
a collective making and remembering, playing a part in constituting, preserving 
and erasing memory. Place is one with action and thought, with history and 
culture. My own research, however, had to move beyond the attempt to define 
“place”. This was, after all, not research into place alone: my research interest 
was triadic. I wanted to understand how the moving image specifically 
complicated or resolved some of the ways we thought about, and found 
expression for, the relationship between body and place.  
 
 
                                            
139 See Schama, Simon. Landscape and Memory. London: Haper Collins, 1995. 
140 Lefebvre, Henri. Rhythmanalysis. London: Continuum, 2004. 
141 This is part of the phenomenological turn that I address in the final section of this 
exegesis.  
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LANDSCAPE AND CINEMA 
 
My video-making practice evolved out of a formal background in film theory, 
creative writing and performance. My previous video work was produced for 
single-screen projection (as opposed to exhibition in an installation setting). For 
this reason, the community of practice I first looked to was cinematic 
representations of landscape and the treatment of the human figure in that 
landscape.142 This starting point eventually oriented me away from a 
preoccupation with representations of these subjects in cinema and their 
aesthetic values. However, this engagement did help me refine my questions 
and approach, and for this reason I will briefly trace the cinematic influences on 
this research project.  
 The formal ways in which landscape is represented in cinema became 
less important than what the fact of framing nature, and hence turning it into a 
landscape, says about the relationship between the person that frames and that 
environment. Scott MacDonald draws a direct trajectory from nineteenth-century 
depictions of landscapes in painting to the depiction of landscape in cinema143. 
That the landscape in pictorial art is a human construction is clear. That it 
produces a certain kind of gaze upon the world and that framing it places limits 
and hence a philosophical world view on that landscape is also a typical 
approach to reading the practice of landscape in painting, photography and 
                                            
142 For example I was looking at Tarkovksy’s work, which deals explicitly with the 
converging layers of memory, landscape, nostalgia and faith. Often these themes 
culminate in the physical relationship a character has to their environment. Tarkovsky 
depicts a very sensuous relationship between them, often we see bodies sinking into 
earth or enfolded by the landscape in which they stand. See for example the opening 
scene of Solaris (1972), opening to Nostalghia (1983), opening to Ivan’s Childhood 
(1962). 
143 MacDonald, Scott. The Garden in the Machine. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001. Of course in cinema there is the element of movement within the frame 
which opens up a space for another kind of interaction between spectator and 
landscape. That there can be a sequence of frames rather than one static depiction is a 
significant contribution that the moving image makes to the depiction of landscapes; it 
offers a more complex discursive field. It is beyond the scope of this exegesis to 
interrogate this further. I propose this only as an introduction to my indebtedness to 
cinema in the journey of this research.   
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cinema.144 This approach assumes that the depiction of a landscape is revealing 
of how the human (both the filmmaker and spectator) constitutes their 
relationship to it – the revelation is historically and contextually specific.  
 Part of MacDonald’s study focuses on early American “landscape films”, 
where MacDonald makes a distinction between films that depict ‘landscapes 
themselves’ and films that are focused on a movement into the landscape. Tom 
Gunning takes this as a provocation that seems to suggest that ‘a true 
landscape … maintains a certain distance from the viewer’.145 The contrast here 
is between ‘contemplative beauty’ which is achieved through distance and the 
penetration of that ‘invisible barrier’ into the landscape. This provocation does 
not form the central argument either for MacDonald nor Gunning; however, it 
instigated my focus towards the drive to construct a relationship with the 
environment through framing it, and away from how I might frame the landscape 
in order to project a certain meaning (a question of representation and formal 
aesthetic).  
 The narrative frame in Straying is that the Voice is attempting to 
constitute a relationship to this place by photographing it.146 She desires to 
capture it and, in capturing it, know it, own it, colonise it, have it signify 
something in particular in relation to her own self. She cannot know/own herself 
until She knows/owns the place. However, simply framing the environment and 
capturing it does not yield the kind of intimacy and ‘knowing’ that the Voice 
desires of it. The place escapes clear or unambiguous signification; it is not 
available for colonisation. The Voice cannot find the right distance and neither 
can She penetrate it. See Figure 11. 
                                            
144 See MacDonald, The Garden, 2001. Or consider Rayner and Harper’s comparison of 
the landscape to a map: ‘the cinematic landscape is the imposition of order on the 
elements of landscape, collapsing the distinction between the found and the 
constructed.’ Jonathan Rayner and Graeme Harper, ed., Cinema and Landscape 
(Bristol: Intellect, 2010), 16. 
145 Tom Gunning, "Landscape and the Fantasy of Moving Pictures," in Cinema and 
Landscape, ed., Jonathan Rayner and Graeme Harper (Bristol: Intellect, 2010), 36. 
146 It is unclear whether the Voice took the images or another hand made the recordings, 
this ambiguity is important to the work as a whole, as I will discuss later, however, for the 
purposes of this argument, it is not important whether it is the Voice or another person. 
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 Another way to look at this dynamic is not in terms of power or 
colonisation, but in terms of Eisenstein’s conception of nonindifferent nature, 
which expresses a kind of idealised relationship between the body and 
landscape.  
 
 
NONINDIFFERENT NATURE 
 
Eisenstein’s theorisation of nonindifferent nature (in which he seeks to depict the 
human as nonindifferent to nature) is perhaps the most explicit example of the 
treatment of landscape and the body in cinema. Eisenstein was interested in 
‘total’ experiences, ones which involved a unity between mind, body and 
landscape.147 Eisenstein’s interest in finding an expression of this relationship on 
screen culminated during his experience in Mexico in the early 1930s, shooting 
the film that would never be completed by the director himself: Que Viva 
Mexico!148 He wrote extensively while he was there, trying to express in words 
what he would attempt to represent on screen:  
 
in those moments at dawn or sunset, when the air is so transparent that 
it seems as if someone had stolen it, and distant slopes reddish 
mountains hang with blinding distinctness in the airless space between 
the ultramarine sky and the violet shadow of its own foothills – and 
suddenly you feel clearly that our eye cannot see, but feels and senses 
objects just as a blind man does with his hands.149 
                                            
147 Robert Robertson, Eisenstein on the Audiovisual (London: I B Tauris, 2011), 120. 
148 Upton Sinclair financed the film, but when the cost of the project blew out Sinclair 
ceased the financing and the film was never finished. In 1979 Grigori Alexandrov cut the 
film together based on Eisenstein’s detailed notes. 
149 Eisenstein, Nonindifferent Nature, 380-381. 
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It’s a distance I create in order to cross. 
It’s a game. 
Figure 11
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I too wrote extensively during my fieldtrip in Serbia:  
 
It was twilight, and I stood with masses of other people on the side of a 
busy city street, waiting for a bus. The wait is unpleasant, the street is 
narrow, this street is on every bus line route. The buses are old; many of 
them are buses that were in German or Japanese junkyards and donated 
to Serbia after the wars, welcome gifts but old. It was summer, the dust 
and fumes raised by the buses sticking to sweaty skin. The buses are 
always bursting full and, as I waited for my number, I watched more and 
more people flocking to the stop.  
 Looking for distraction, I cast my eyes away from the street and up 
the sides of the neoclassic building facades. They were grand and 
beautiful once, but now grey from exhaust smoke and dust like our skins. 
Their balconies jut out, many crammed with pots of red and pink and 
white carnations.  
 This very ordinary moment, lived many times before, in an instant 
became extraordinary. The way the pink sky peered over the heads of the 
buildings, the way the light fell onto the pavement, the falling temperature 
with the receding sun, the sounds and smells, swelled into a kind of 
opening up, where the light, and the sounds of engines and casual 
conversation, the smell of burning coming off the road, all of this in its 
unique play with one another, was suddenly something very beautiful. It 
was not any one of these putrid things in particular, it was the way they 
each fell together in that instant, fell together and included me in this play, 
in that moment of coalescence, of a being together. And as soon as it 
had formed, it started to dissipate, like smoke, forever forming and 
separating, rising and disappearing, absorbed into the air.  
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Like Eisenstein, I too take on a reverent tone, intoxicated by this apparent and 
perfect confluence of time, place and body, as expressed through colour, light, 
texture, rhythm, and sound. Eisenstein’s project was to find formal ways to 
create this feeling of unity and nonindifference between the human and the 
landscape on screen. Eisenstein achieved this intention visually on screen in Que 
Viva Mexico! by creating a “flat” image where all elements in the frame are on the 
same plane.150  
 According to Eisenstein ‘total experience’ is an ecstatic state. Eisenstein 
was particularly influenced by the tradition of the dance of the dervish as a 
conduit towards transformation, where repetition brought you outside of the self 
and into an ecstatic state.151 In this ecstatic state, according to Eisenstein, 
‘consciousness opens out and blends … with the surrounding landscape’.152 
While Eisenstein’s focus was on offering up this kind of experience of unity for 
the audience and finding visual representation for it, my focus in Straying was 
about the desire for unity between mind, body and landscape and its ultimate 
impossibility.   
 The elements in Straying have been taken apart, pulled and peeled away 
from one another: the screens are multiple and separate, the voice is not 
diegetic to any of the images. Time and space do not align here. This story is 
about the attempt at unity between mind, body and place; it is a laying bare of 
the process of reaching towards it.  The moment of nonindifferent nature, such 
as the one I experienced on the Belgrade street, becomes a moment that 
continually ebbs away out of grasp. It is a moment that is not representable, a 
moment that is always disappearing. This is a moment that feels only available 
as part of a receding memory, receding so far back that it becomes a 
mythology.  
                                            
150 Eisenstein was inspired by Diego Riviera’s paintings which he says have an ‘all-over 
texture’ where nature and human become ‘dynamically united into one.’ Eisenstein 
quoted in Robertson, Eisenstein, 134-135. He also formally attempted to achieve this by 
using patterns and shades of black and white to suggest the unity between the Mexican 
people, their history and their landscape. 
151 Eisenstein, Nonindifferent Nature, 35. 
152 Robert Robertson, Eisenstein on the audiovisual, 124.  
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 The yearning and attempt at achieving an ecstatic transformation where 
mind, body and place find unity is written into the narrative of Straying. The Voice 
desires this unity; her entire project is to achieve what She calls a “dissolution” 
into the image. She recounts various conduits towards this transformation: 
darkness, repetition, ritual, incantation, loss of self, commingling. These conduits 
manifest formally and materially: the Voice repeats certain phrases, certain 
images repeat on the screens. Repetition through dance, however, is not 
possible for the Voice because She has no body, She cannot gesture towards 
unity; She only has access to words. But Voice too can serve as a conduit, as in 
poetry, mantra and prayer. The work itself is on a loop; it repeats itself over and 
over. It is an incantation.153 The possibility of transformation finds form, recedes, 
comes back again. 
 In Straying the relationship between body and landscape is not simply 
organic, natural and complicit.154 To this displaced Voice, trying to get back into 
place, the landscape is impenetrable. This landscape does not remember her, it 
is resistant, it has forgotten this body, it has erased it. The landscape has even 
been resistant to being framed and photographed; the images do not yield and 
represent what the Voice wants to see in them. This landscape is not idealised 
or uncomplicated. See Figure 12. 
 Eisenstein was scripting Que Viva Mexico! as he was filming. He was 
taking his inspiration from travelling around the country and engaging with its 
people and places. He used non-actors in his scenes. You might say that he 
followed a documentary and improvisational approach. These two approaches 
were instrumental in how I proceeded with my own fieldtrip. This is the subject of 
the next section. 
                                            
153 Barthes too cites repetition as a conduit for bliss: ‘to repeat excessively is to enter into 
loss, into the zero of the signified.’ The important connection here is between bliss and 
loss. The Pleasure of the Text, 41.  
154 Eisenstein claims this kind of organic and complicit relationship between landscape 
and body. However, he does ultimately shift his focus to emphasise that ‘above all (it is) 
all within ourselves: It is not the nature around us that is particularly nonindifferent, but 
our own nature,’ Eisenstein, Nonindifferent, 396. 
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HINGE 
 
 
 
Poet Anne Carson says ‘hinge’ describes the work that poetry does. It exists 
between life and death: ‘mortality and immortality continue side by side … 
hinged by a strange arrangement of grace. A poet is also a sort of hinge.’155 The 
hinge is like a conduit between worlds, between orders of reality. Poet Susan 
Howe says that a documentary makes ‘an attempt to recapture someone 
something somewhere looking back. Looking back, Orpheus was the first 
known documentarist’.156 Orpheus’ famous passage from Hades appears in 
Straying or rather the Voice references it obliquely, questioning the passage he 
took from the underworld – and his subsequent turning back.  
 In one version of this myth, Eurydice was never really there, standing 
behind Orpheus in the underworld and following him. She was only an 
apparition.157 What sense then in Orpheus’ turning back to see his love and his 
consequent and eternal loss? Is it because he needed evidence that he looked? 
To document his perceived sense of her being there? Does this make him a 
good or a bad documentarist? This very impulse to turn, to see and to take 
evidence is interrogated in this section.  
 The passage from documentary to poetry is drawn in this section also. 
Orpheus was also a poet. Does this change anything about his impulse as 
documetarist and poet? Which was the impulse that had him turn and 
consequently lose Eurydice forever? His poetic or his documentary one? 
                                            
155 The economy of poetry in Ancient Greece was such that poets were paid by their 
patrons to write poems about them: ‘the Skopads sustain Simonides on earth, he 
sustains them in memory. An exchange of life for life. Of mortal for immortal 
continuance.’ Anne Carson, Economy of the Unlost (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 39. 
156 Susan Howe, Sorting Facts; or Nineteen Ways of Looking at Marker (New York: New 
Directions Books, 2013), 50. 
157 Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 9, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1925)  
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 In the following section I will look at how poetry as artefact slipped away 
as a concern in the research, but how a poetic structure helped organise the 
material I collected in Serbia. I will interrogate how the meeting of the poetic and 
the documentary created the hinge, which is to say, access to another aspect to 
this research. See Figure 13. 
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At some point we must acknowledge 
that these are all apparitions.
If there are repercussions for seeing, are 
there repercussions for listening?
Figure 13
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THE DOCUMENTARY 
 
 
My idea of documentary as an approach was synonymous with “doing 
research”: to move towards that which is unknown, to uncover something 
about/of/in the world through/with the medium of moving image and sound. The 
claims that the documentary makes on ‘the real’, on ’truth’, on ‘actuality’, 
‘evidence’ and ‘authenticity’ were part of my pursuit. 
 I also worked from the position that the nature of this ‘truth’ is always 
intimately connected to the medium itself, which is to say, its formal and 
aesthetic properties. This relationship has been at the centre of the debate 
around ethics of representation, which I was also conscious of addressing in my 
choice of method and approach. I took into consideration that I was working 
within a highly discursive mode of representation and wanted to temper that with 
an approach that I felt was ethically sound.158 
 The observational documentary approach as defined by Anna Grimshaw 
and Amanda Ravetz gave me a framework with which to begin.159 I use 
Grimshaw and Ravetz’s particular definition of observational cinema because 
they eschew the common connection that is made with this mode and to 
cinéma vérité and the ‘fly-on-the-wall’ style of production.160 Grimshaw and 
Ravetz provide a broader definition that focuses on privileging the subject of the 
documentary over the filmmaker’s agenda or intentions. To this end, the 
                                            
158 Catherine Russell encourages us to think of the relationship between aesthetics and 
authenticity (and specifically cultural representation) by considering the experimental film 
and the ethnographic film together rather than separately. Catherine Russell, 
Experimental Ethnography (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), xi. This has been 
Trinh’s project in both her films and critical writing. See for example Surname Viet Given 
name Nam (1989), Trinh T. Min-ha, When the Moon Waxes Red (London: Routledge, 
1991). More contemporary examples can be found in the work of Ben Rivers and Ben 
Russell. Both of these filmmakers take the history of ethnographic film, avant-garde, 
documentary practice and installation art practice (in the case of Ben Rivers), and make 
hybrid works that create a self-reflexive dialogue between these practices. See for 
example Rivers’ Slow Action (2009); and Russell’s Let Each One Go Where He May 
(2009).  
159 Grimshaw and Ravetz, Observational Cinema 
160 They deny for observational cinema that it is ‘neutral’ to the situation that is being 
recorded; as has been claimed for the latter two modes.  
 78 
aesthetic of the film is found in contact with the subject, where the filmmaker 
works to allow the subject to guide the encounter. This way of working is not 
about adhering ‘to fixed principles and prescribed methods,’161 but is rather 
focused on highlighting the ‘ad hoc and improvisatory’ ways of working: 
‘observation [means] a particular kind of alertness for the unexpected.’162  
 Clearly the focus here is on what is outside the filmmaker. Also, the 
aesthetic is not determined prior to the moment that this unexpected arises, 
therefore it is found with the subject itself. Presumably a new aesthetic might be 
‘found’ by way of the subject. This is a very neat formulation, as is Grimshaw 
and Ravetz’s idea of observation as simply ‘being there’, recording a ‘process of 
unfolding relationships in which small clues like gestures, facial expression, body 
posture [has] revelatory potential.’163 While this framing was initially helpful in 
encouraging me to be mindful of the quality of my attention in observation, I 
must also acknowledge that I was not entirely free of any expectation or vision or 
intention. I had a very specific intention indeed: to find out about the relationship 
between the body and place. Simply ‘being there’ was too loose and naïve an 
approach to a question that was as specific as mine.  
 Grimshaw and Ravetz’s ‘being there’ does not promote the proposition 
that the camera records a situation ‘as it is’, but supports the notion that the 
camera being there is clearly part of the situation being recorded. Ethnographic 
filmmaker Jean Rouch makes this claim for his experience filming a possession 
dance in Niger: ‘the shooting itself was what unlatched and sped up the 
possession process’.164 Deeper states of ‘possession’ are unlatched at the 
meeting of the camera and subject (this can include nature and inanimate 
objects). The camera and the subject, in their mutual interaction and experience, 
                                            
161 Ibid., xv. 
162 Ibid., 29. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Jean Rouch, "On the Vicissitudes of the Self," in Reverse Angle, Cinema and 
Anthropology, ed. Andy Davies and Nuria Rodriguez (Madrid: La Casa Encendida, 2007), 
46. 
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reveal something otherwise ‘hidden’ or unavailable.165 There is an assumption 
here that simply by placing the camera into a room, a process will be set in 
motion at the level of ‘possession’. Of course this is not so. But this conception 
begins to articulate the perspective that what is being recorded is what is 
between the filmmaker and the subject, and that this situation is unique to their 
meeting at the moment of filming.  
 In my experience, the meeting with the subject, the simply being there, 
proved to be less than fruitful. I did not precipitate any ‘possessions’ or 
‘revelations’. However, the actual process of filming (as opposed to what I 
recorded), left indelible marks on what would end up being Straying. The 
‘unlatching’ in my process started to happen on my return to Melbourne, when I 
started working with the footage in the editing room. At this point I started to 
interrogate my relationship to the subject, the footage and the experience of 
taking it. What I had recorded was not literally and only the dialogue between 
filmmaker and interview subject. I had also recorded things that were never 
intended to ‘make the cut’, for example my early morning meanderings through 
empty town squares. I could say that these recordings were of my own dialogue 
with the work and process itself.  
 This brought a highly subjective dimension into my process, which I had 
initially worked to eschew. The idea of allowing this subjectivity to dominate the 
work seemed to me to be taking it away from the documentary and into the 
fictional (or worse, according to me, the autobiographical)166 domain. However, 
the notion that subjectivity and fictionality are separate from, or even oppositional 
to, the documentary and the non-fiction is an assumption which was eventually 
dismantled through my continuing theoretical investigations into the 
documentary mode of filmmaking practice. This, in turn, opened up avenues to 
the completion of the project. 
                                            
165 Rouch calls this process a ‘shared anthropology’ and ‘participatory ethnography’. See 
Jean Rouch, Cine-Ethnography. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. 
166 I interrogate my aversion and consequent reassessment to the autobiographical, in 
relation to this work, in Passage and Hinge.  
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 Michael Renov theorises documentary by highlighting the role of fiction in 
non-fiction, arguing that they ‘inhabit’ one another.167  He does not exclude 
either as completely separate modes, but rather considers the two 
genres/practices as sharing ‘key conceptual and discursive characteristics’.168 It 
is not only fictional forms that might ‘appeal to the viewer’s Imaginary, that 
psychic domain of idealised forms, fantasy, identification, reversible time, and 
alternative logics’.169 The documentary too can mobilise these aesthetic, affective 
and structural approaches and remain on the side of the ‘true’. The ‘problem’ 
might be in this binary distinction fiction/non-fiction. Can there be a form that is 
not determined by these designations?170  
 I aimed to stay on this side of the ‘true’ by using an old documentary 
trope: the interview. But the interview subject must not be mistaken for the 
confessing subject that unproblematically imparts knowledge. As Julia Kristeva 
warns, the speaking subject does not necessarily have an uncomplicated 
relation to the real or to truth: 
 
The speaking subject is presumed to have known an object, a 
relationship, an experience that it is henceforth incapable of 
reconstituting accurately. Why? Because the knowing subject is also a 
desiring subject, and the paths of desire ensnarl the paths of 
knowledge… We normally assume the opposite of delirium to be an 
objective reality, objectively perceptible and objectively knowable, as if 
the speaking subject were only a simple knowing subject … perceptual 
                                            
167 Michael Renov, ed., Theorizing Documentary (New York: Routledge, 1993), 3. 
168 Ibid., 2. 
169 Ibid., 3. 
170 Phillip Lopate denies the need to insert fiction into non-fiction as a kind of ‘tarting up’ 
of the non-fiction genre: ‘Why can’t nonfiction be nonfiction? His argument is somewhat 
different to the one I am making here, but I do think it is worthwhile considering that the 
boundaries of non-fiction can be simply more flexible and not defined by the fictional. 
This is not an argument I have the pleasure of pursuing here in detail, however, this 
question does come up in the Hinge section when I address the documentary mode of 
filmmaking, and my consideration of the poetic in the documentary. ’ Lopate, Phillip “An 
Interview With Creative Nonfiction Writer Phillip Lopate” by Lania Knight, Poets and 
Writers  
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and knowing apprehension of the original object is only a theoretical, 
albeit undoubtedly indispensable, hypothesis.171  
 
If we use the latter part of Kristeva’s argument to think through its relevance to 
the documentary, then we might conclude that it is an impossible task to reach 
the object of truth – with or without the help of fiction or delirium. We might 
conclude the same about Errol Morris’ notion of documentary, which also does 
not exclude fiction, the subjective or personal from the documentary. For Morris, 
truth cannot be guaranteed by any set of ‘rules’ or ‘approaches’, including the 
‘absence’ or ‘invisibility’ of the filmmaker:   
 
There’s no reason why documentaries can’t be as personal as fiction 
filmmaking and bear the imprint of those who made them. Truth isn’t 
guaranteed by style or expression. It isn’t guaranteed by anything.172  
 
If truth is not guaranteed by anything at all, how do we draw any parameters 
around the genre/mode/intention of documentary? And why is it so important 
that we do so? Why do we keep going after this phantom? 
 I will proceed by considering Stella Bruzzi’s question that she claims we 
should be asking of the documentary: ‘how is actuality treated in order to 
sanction the documentary’s claims to be telling the truth?’173 This question 
refocuses the debate not around whether or not it is possible, whether or not the 
claims are valid, but rather, what have been the processes taken in the making 
of the documentary and what is the interplay between these processes, its 
formal elements and the subject matter? This question became central to my 
understanding of how to proceed with the ‘failed’ project I came back with from 
                                            
171 Julia Kristeva, “Psychoanallysis and the Polis,” in The Kristeva Reader, ed., Toril Moi, 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1986), 307. 
172 Errol Morris, “Truth Not Guaranteed: an interview with Errol Morris,” Cineaste 17, 
(1989): 16-17, in Michael Renov, ed. Theorizing Documentary (New York: Routledge, 
1993), 127. 
173 Louise Spence and Vinicius Navarro, Crafting Truth (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2011), 2. 
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the fieldtrip. Writing this exegesis has also been instrumental in working through 
the connection between these elements and elucidating just how mutually 
constitutive they are.  
 For Bruzzi, this connection between process, filmmaker and subject 
leads her to call the documentary ‘performative’; it happens right at the ‘juncture 
between reality and filmmaker’.174 Documentaries are ‘performative acts’ 
because their truth ‘comes into being only at the moment of filming’.175 The most 
pivotal influence Bruzzi exerted on my (re)conception of the work is that ‘the text 
itself reveals the tensions between the documentary pursuit of the most 
authentic mode of factual representation and the impossibility of this aim’.176 
What I mean by “influence” is that it started to articulate the experience I had in 
making Straying. This, in turn, gave me impetus to find other avenues for a 
project which I thought had simply not worked. While Bruzzi’s theorisation 
implies that this performance “happens” in the moment of filming, for me this 
work happened much later – at the editing stage, the writing stage, and it 
continually happens in Straying itself. This is one of the reasons the form went 
through such a major transformation: from the initial single-screen documentary 
to the three-screen installation. I will elaborate on this point further in the 
following section.   
 Absence and impossibility are also part of Linda Williams’ argument for 
the documentary; for her ‘there can be no a priori truth of the referent to which 
the image refers’; the ‘originary object’, as Kristeva puts it, is unavailable. What 
documentary can hope to achieve is not the apprehension of this event but to 
‘move audiences to a new appreciation of previously unknown truth.’177 William’s 
particular focus is on the relationship between a subject recounting memory and 
its interplay with already established histories around that subject or past. Past 
events, for Williams, are fractured and not entirely apprehensible: ‘they are 
                                            
174 Stella Bruzzi, New Documentary: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2000), 6. 
175 Ibid., 7. 
176 Ibid., 4. 
177 Linda Williams, "Mirror without Memories: Truth, History, and the New Documentary," 
Film Quarterly 46, no. 3 (1993): 10. 
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fragments, pieces of the past invoked by memory, not unitary representable 
truths’.178 Here we have an acceptance of a multivocal truth or history and one 
which is always transforming because of the ongoing dialogues that the 
documentary conditions. Williams’ concept for the documentary hinges on Mary 
Ann Doane’s analysis of Freud’s concept of memory as a palimpsest, a ‘sum 
total of … rewritings through time.’179  Williams urges that truth is to be found not 
in any single event, but the ‘reverberations’ between. Another way to consider 
this is to think back on Benjamin’s palimpsest and on the way each image, as it 
piles up on top of another, changes the meaning of the others. In either 
metaphor, we are creating a relationality between experiences, truths, memories, 
contexts and histories, and it is this relationality that brings forth an elucidation of 
what was previously unknown, unseen or unheard.  
 Williams’ construction, and particularly her inclusion of memory and 
subjectivity as layers in the palimpsest, might disturb the notion that the 
production of knowledge has an intimate relation to evidence and truth and 
hence what can be designated as documentary. But as Trinh claims: ‘what is 
presented as evidence remains evidence, whether the observing eye qualifies 
itself as being subjective or objective’.180 We might consider that the relation to 
the profilmic event, or capturing evidence, complicates rather than defines or 
stands in for ‘truth’; it is only another layer in the palimpsest which we create in 
our search and desire for knowledge about the world. Kristeva’s theory on 
delirium further undoes these boundaries with a focus on the subjective:  
 
delirium masks reality or spares itself from a reality while at the same time 
saying a truth about it. More true? Less true? Does delirium know a truth 
                                            
178 Ibid., 15. 
179 Ibid. See also Mary Ann Doane, "Remembering Women: Psychical and Historical 
Construction in Film Theory," The Australian Journal of Media and Culture 1, no. 2 
(1988): 3-4. 
180 Trinh, When the Moon Waxes Red, 35. Again, the films of Ben Rivers and Ben Russell 
are important examples to cite, where they often frame their work within the 
ethnographic paradigm, while using formal tools to create dialectic between (and not in 
opposition to) the ‘evidentiary’, fantastical, spiritual and performative dimensions of a 
situation. See for example Russell’s River Rites (2011). 
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which is true in a different way than objective reality because it speaks a 
certain subjective truth, instead of a presumed objective truth? Because 
it presents the state of the subject’s desire? This “mad truth”.181  
 
Kristeva begins to add levels of complexity to our notion of ‘truth’ which is 
synonymous with how J. L. Austin writes about hallucination: the subject 
experiences the hallucination as real, therefore, it can be said to be so.182 We 
could say the same perhaps of dream, imagination and desire. 
 Finally, we might think of the techniques of documentary in light of James 
M Moran’s proposition that considers documentary in terms of Foucault’s 
‘regimes of truth.’183 The documentarist’s intention is not to create ‘an image of 
truth itself,’184 but rather to use strategies to create compositions which might 
highlight or put into question the particular mechanisms and discourses which 
function as ‘truths’ at various levels of history, memory, desire, evidence. 
 I gave space for experimentation with this idea in Straying by moving into 
the installation setting with three screens and a voice-over. This is the space of 
fragmented history and memory. The audience is the key player in constructing 
the palimpsest and working through these questions about how we construct 
the self and place out of fragments of histories, memories and desires; what 
stands in for the authentic self or the ‘real’ or ‘true’ place? The audience is left to 
look for the reverberations between the elements, as an ongoing, performative 
act. And even in this context, it still holds true that ‘some form of truth is the 
always the receding goal of documentary film.’185 
 I am not claiming a generalised theory of documentary here. I am 
highlighting that during my experience with this particular project, in attempting 
to answer its particular questions, I discovered that these sets of ideas about the 
                                            
181 Kristeva, Psychoanalysis, 308. 
182 J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 69. 
183 James M Moran, “A Bone of Contention: documenting the prehistoric subject,” in 
Collecting Visible Evidence. Edited by Jane Gaines and Michael Renov (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 269. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Williams, Mirrors Without Memories, 20.  
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documentary have been fruitful and generative. These perspectives helped me 
complete this particular work, which continually either escaped me or was 
something other than what I had hoped for or expected. I reached a highly self-
reflexive and subjective space. I came once again to the image of the 
palimpsest, which is somewhat coincidental and at the same time its relevance 
indisputable, therefore it might be said it is fortuitous. See Figure 14. 
 The palimpsest is an image that works on conceptual, theoretical, 
thematic and concrete levels in this research. Reverberations between images 
and voices arise. These are not the most authentic or accurate versions of an 
experience because they are unique to the audience member that heard them. 
In Straying we enact the multiplicity that Bruzzi and Williams privilege. In the 
installation setting, because the audience is physically involved in the creation of 
the palimpsest, they are also involved in listening for and hearing the 
reverberations they themselves create. The audience member is moved towards 
the previously unencountered. 
  The documentary impulse drove this research from the beginning to the 
end, even while my idea of what constituted ‘documentary’ changed 
significantly. Something similar can be said of the poetic impulse that sat beside 
the documentary one. It was the poetic artefact, the poem as literary object, 
which was going to feature in the documentary. During the process of making 
Straying the poem as artefact slipped away as my key concern and the poetic 
emerged as fundamental to the structure of the work. 
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No one has ever loved this place as I 
love it. No one has ever made such a 
loving record of its squares and monu-
ments.
That’s a lie.
Figure 14
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THE POEM 
 
 
The poem as literary artefact, and the poetic as an adjective, both relate to a 
kind of ‘access’ that is privileged by the form. This is access to something that 
sits below the surface of things, aspects of experience that rely on relationality if 
they are to rise to the surface or find expression. At the same time, for this 
research project, this access has been continually denied or deferred. So 
perhaps I should say it is about the promise of access; or after Barthes, again, a 
‘staging of appearance as disappearance’.186 The poem is also about 
permission, that is, a yielding that multiple possibilities may be counted as 
‘true’.187 Note the words: access, denial, deferment, permission, yielding, 
possibility, disappearance. A word that is missing from this list might be: 
subterranean, whose synonyms are: private, secret, underfoot, sunken, buried. I 
like that there is an evocation of earth and water in this list. Fathomless and 
yawning, as in a yawning abyss, could also be added to our list of words about 
the poem. Many of these words summon imagery related to landscape, to a 
physical manifestation, an opening, a thickness.188  
The purpose of this word play is to gesture towards the expansive field 
which we might call the ‘poetic’ and how features of this field chime with some 
of the central preoccupations of the research project: landscape, absence, 
possibility, documentary. These are all words and concepts we have thus far 
encountered on our journey to understand the relationship between place and 
the dis-placed body.  
 Nomad-like, I traversed a country that I knew a little but like a stranger. I 
looked for poetry and looked to capture it with my camera. Poet Paul Celan 
places the poem in the landscape and calls it: nomadic, migratory; it is always 
                                            
186 Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, 10. 
187 This feels like a return to the documentary discussion. 
188 I mean this in Merleau-Ponty’s sense of the word, where the world is made up of 
‘folds’ that bring together various times and spaces. See Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Visible 
and the Invisible. Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1968. 
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on the way, in the making.189 Writer and philosopher Maurice Blanchot claims 
that the poem is entirely absent, outside of the world.190 Blanchot claims there is 
no moment of poetic existence. Does this mean I was destined to always be a 
little lost, a step behind, steeping in absences as if absence is made of a 
substance, catching like a virus. As Tarkovsky would say, the poem is a ‘hint and 
intimation (of) something that cannot be set forth;’191 running after that which 
‘remains in our thoughts and hearts as unrealised suggestion.’192 Displaced and 
drifting, I looked for this other nomad’s tracks, finding my way towards the 
subterranean, a way towards that hidden point between the body and the 
landscape. Celan saw the poem in the landscape, and I saw the poem in the 
body, or rather, I suspected the poem was a hinge between the internal space of 
the body and the external space of the landscape, articulating the kinship 
between places we inhabit and places that inhabit us.193  
 Poetry found itself in many guises in this work: as the inspiration, a guide, 
a provocation, a working model.194 Poetry helped me to come to the underside 
of a moment. We might even start to see Straying as a poem. In this guise, 
poetry is that which is ‘on that side of language which belongs to ‘flesh and 
breath’,195 it is ‘what knowledge looks like in the form of unmediated 
experience.’196 With this we return to the idea of poetry as a means of gaining 
access. See Figure 15. 
                                            
189 On insight into language and movement in Celan, see Jacques Derrida, “Shibboleth,” 
in Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan. Edited by Thomas Dutoit and 
Outi Pasanen. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005. Also see Paul Celan, “The 
Meridian” in Derrida, Sovereignties in Question, 173-185. 
190 I use these citations as provocations; of course neither Celan nor Blanchot intended 
these literally. 
191 Scholar and poet Vyacheslav Ivanov quoted in Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, 47 
192 Ibid., 22. 
193 I have previously cited Carson on her concept of the poet as hinge, but also poetry as 
the hinge between life and death.  
194 I started to re-write the interviews into pieces that would be said in voice-over. I made 
decisions about what aspects of the experience of the interview and the story itself I 
would re-tell. 
195 Gerald L. Bruns, Maurice Blanchot: A Refusal of Philosophy (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hokins University Press, 1997), xiv. 
196 Ibid., xvi. 
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words, as if they were vessels and the 
light was a solid.
Figure 15
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For George Steiner poetic language is about difficulty.197 This does not 
exclude access; in fact, it is by way of difficulty, according to Steiner, that we 
gain access to hidden layers of meaning (of the poem and of life). For Steiner, 
the difficulty or richness of a poem is the degree to which it points to these other 
layers that refer to things outside itself. These layers are like strata of rock, dense 
with meaning, rich with history. He claims that because a poem is:  
 
ontologically economical – the language of the poem implicates a 
surrounding and highly active context, a corpus, possibly an entire world 
of supporting, echoing, validating, or qualifying material whose compass 
underwrites its own concision.198 
 
The poem is both compact and expansive. It expands as it reaches to things 
outside its self. This expansiveness, the ability to allude to various ‘strata’ of 
history and experience, is achieved through formal means: 
 
An energised field of association and connotation, of overtones and 
undertones, of rebus and homophone … multiplicity of meaning, 
“enclosedness”, are the rule rather than the exception. We are meant to 
hear both solid and sullied, both toil and coil in the famous 
Shakespearean cruces.199 
  
Steiner here is writing about simultaneous and opposite meanings that work to 
expand a concept. Straying is made up of associations, echoes and chiming 
between word (what we hear in the voice-over) and image (what we see playing 
on the screens). This play between words and images takes on temporal 
significance; we recall an image or word that has since passed, we connect that 
                                            
197 George Steiner, "On Difficulty," in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 36, no. 3 
(1978): 263-76. 
198 Ibid., 265. 
199 Ibid., 264. 
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moment to the present one, we experience the present differently in light of this 
remembrance. These reverberations create an elastic experience of time: binding 
together history, memory, dream and desire.   
 Steiner calls this interplay ‘a tight-meshed skein of abstract and imaged 
meanings.’200 For Straying this has implications for how we read the moving 
images. In the installation we have literal projections of images on the screens, all 
of “concrete” objects. We also have another kind of ‘projection’ which is inspired 
by the voice-over, the images She conjures for us. A third kind of image can 
arise out of the interplay between these images: the three literal ones on screen 
and the images that the Voice conjures. Here we may have the appearance of 
the abstract within the concrete, as one image is read through another. Values 
are transformed, concrete images become doubtful, a little less ‘real’, something 
less stable. Each image tests the others’ veracity or claim to truth or abstraction. 
These simultaneous and potentially contradictory meanings are what Steiner 
calls a ‘rich undecidibility.’201 In this rich undecidibilty there is a knowing and a 
not knowing at the same time, a certainty and an uncertainty, which can be 
achieved by the poet through grammatical or syntactic instabilities: an instability 
of form. He says it ‘energises’ the ‘inertias’ otherwise found in language and 
hence, presumably, extends the scope of its reach. This expansiveness, 
however, comes to the limits of our understanding. At this level of difficulty we do 
not only 
 
stand poised between alternatives of signification. At certain levels, we 
are not meant to understand at all, and our interpretation, indeed our 
reading itself, is an intrusion.202  
 
How do we contend with this paradox? And what is the use of this level of 
difficulty if it seems to alienate the reader? Steiner assures us that the reader 
                                            
200 Ibid., 266. 
201 Ibid., 273. 
202 Ibid., 275. 
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knows this is not a ‘planned obfuscation’, that these are ‘profoundly moving 
statement(s), though we cannot say confidently or periphrastically “of what”.203 It 
is about being moved to a place where language cannot articulate fully. We 
might think of Gadamer, for whom it is impossible to recuperate the full meaning 
of an artwork in any other terms than the ones it offers, and particularly so when 
the meaning is multiple or nomadic. We might also think of Marks and the 
silences that fill the diasporic experience when it reaches the limits of the 
sayable. Steiner’s, Gadamer’s and Marks’ evocations all bring to mind a sense 
of both excess and incompleteness. The poetic artefact is incomplete because it 
cannot articulate its subject fully; but it is not lacking, it is in fact in excess of 
what can be named.  
Silence is not about a deliberate withholding of information. Silence for me 
is not a stubbornness but an inability to speak. The entire problem is one of 
expression. This is true of the voice-over in Straying. It is elliptical because the 
Voice goes so far into the abyss that She does not know how to articulate out 
there. There may also be too many possibilities – that to choose one would be 
false knowledge, a reduction of a moment, of the truth, a false conclusion.  
According to poet Louise Glück silence is ‘analogous to the unseen … 
such works inevitably allude to larger contexts; they haunt because they are not 
whole’.204 The Voice in Straying evokes “half-images” that we do not actually see 
in the moving image. By ‘half-image’ I mean there is often a sense that 
something has been left out – we do not get a clear or full picture of the thing the 
voice-over describes. 
We have a sense of being ‘back in time, back in the middle of 
something’ ⁠.205 In Straying the sense is that we are not moving onwards in a 
linear trajectory but deeper into a single moment, a single obsession, to achieve 
completeness and unity between self and place. We never arrive at this point; 
this moment is continually deferred, but the interplay between the images (some 
                                            
203 Ibid., 276 
204 Glück, Proofs and Theories, 173. 
205 This is the impact that incompleteness in a poem has on Glück. 
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of them playing on screens, some of them “half-images” conjured by the voice-
over) takes us towards the abyss that promises access to the hidden, to what is 
difficult to say. See Figure 16. 
  
 
THE LYRIC I 
 
In thinking about Straying as a poem, my intention has been to show how the 
silences and absences, multiplicities and relationalities, that play out in the 
installation bring us towards that yawning abyss where we are ‘moved’ to 
knowledge that is difficult or impossible to speak. This is achieved to a large 
extent in the interplay between the moving images and the voice-over. In order 
to interrogate this relationship further, it will be instructive to look at the voice 
specifically in terms of the lyric address which asks the questions: who is 
speaking the poem and to whom? And where is the reader in relation to this 
dialogue? 
A primary question for the voice (and for me while attempting to take 
account of the footage and work out what it spoke of) is: how do I speak to this 
image so that I can apprehend its ontological significance? This might lead me to 
understanding the story I had to tell, the story I had inadvertently recorded, lived, 
while in Serbia. To answer these questions in consonance with the image is to 
understand what the moving image specifically brought to the discovery, 
knowledge and expression of this story. 
 The voice-over in Straying speaks in a tone that seems somewhat 
detached from the content of her speech. This poses a series of questions: Who 
is speaking? Whose words are these? Is the Voice only reciting someone else’s 
words that have already been written down? Whatever the answer to these 
questions,206 another remains:  who is being addressed and by whom? The  
                                            
206 There are no certain answers. This ambiguity attempts to displace the origin, or the 
“owner” of the story. It is also a creation of another absence, of another half-presence. 
The body to which the Voice belongs remains obscured, absent, and so too perhaps the 
person behind the words. 
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When I’m in the forest I think of the 
sounds of the ocean.
Figure 16
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answers to these questions guide the relationship between the Voice, the 
moving image and the audience in the installation space. 
Some of these same questions are pertinent to a discussion of the lyric 
address. J. S. Mill famously defined the lyric address as predominantly a self-
communion.207 In T. S. Eliot’s definition too, the reader overhears the poem and 
the poem turns away from its reader ‘the better to bring a distinctively lyric “self” 
into focus’208. In Mill’s and Eliot’s definition the reader is somewhat excluded 
from the experience being uttered in the poem. Helen Vendler, however, 
disagrees.209 She says the lyric poem is ‘meant to be spoken by the reader as if 
the reader were the one uttering the words.’210 This notion of the reader 
speaking the text leads Jane Hedley to describe the lyric poem as a script for 
performance.211 My goal here is not to define the lyric address, but rather to 
frame a conversation about the range of addresses that occur in the installation 
through the use of various pronouns and to point to how this enables various 
subjectivities for the audience to occupy.  
The Voice addresses a ‘you’. She speaks of a ‘him’ and a ‘her’. This 
would imply that She speaks to more than one other person. This does not 
exclude the possibility that She also speaks to herself. While the Voice is 
somewhat removed, there is also an intimacy here that could feel like a speaking 
to the self. In any case a relationship between the Voice and an ‘other’ comes in 
and out of focus. The feeling is that we are thrust into the middle of something, a 
conversation that is taking – or has taken – place, that is being repeated, 
                                            
207 Paul De Mann, Jonathan Culler, and Barbara Johnson, concur. Jane Hedley, “Lyric 
Utterance and the Reader," Literature Compass 2 (2005): 1. 
208 Ibid., 2. 
209 This disagreement is also shared with W. R. Johnson and William Waters: ‘the lyric 
speaker and his hypothetical reader are always more or less explicitly in dialogue’. What 
Eliot et al describe was, according them, an aberration in the Romantic ‘meditative’ lyric, 
and not representative of the much older and bigger tradition of the lyric genre. Ibid.  
210 Helen Vendler, Poems, Poets, Poetry: an introduction and anthology. Boston: St. 
Martin’s, 1997. Quoted in Hedley, Lyric Utterance, 2. 
211 Vendler has since been accused of misconstruing J. S. Mill and Eliot, and Jackson, 
Altieri and Kenitson’s readings that the ‘reader is drawn into the poem by its speaker’s 
supposed unconsciousness of having an audience’. Jane Hedley, "Reader-Address in 
Louise Glück's Ararat Sequence." Literature Compass 2 (2005), n. 1. 
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remembered, excavated.212 She says: Stand still, let me admire you. To think of it 
now: you never looked at me. Whether the Voice addresses this other or the 
audience directly is sometimes unclear. She says: Why don’t you think of the 
beginning? The boundary between ‘other’ and audience becomes ambiguous. 
The speaking Voice too becomes ambiguous in this shifting address.  
Sometimes the Voice acknowledges that there is a listener that we are 
not overhearing, that we are implicated as active participants who can intervene. 
She says: We watch this image for the tenth time now. Sometimes She seems 
to speak to herself, as if She is alone in the room. She speaks to herself because 
She is trying to make sense of her self, as if She is not one but two. She says: 
What are you afraid of? Everyone is afraid of losing something. We not only have 
a fractured ‘self’ in the Voice, but also a fractured landscape, fractured by the 
stories She tells that are not hers, re-telling other people’s stories in other 
contexts, from other times and places. Again, the audience is left to find a 
relation to the stories, the Voice and the images.  
To help us understand these shifts in address further, we might consider 
Vendler’s assertion that the lyric poem is about an ‘inward, not an outward, 
quarrel’.213 The reader of this kind of poem, then, overhears the quarrel the Voice 
is having with herself. In Straying, as the address shifts, the quarrel also shifts 
from an inward to outward mode. The ‘figures’ in the work become various and 
mercurial; again, the Voice becomes an unstable identity. She says: I feel I ought 
to speak differently of different things. Whom do we trust? Who is telling this 
story? How do we begin to piece these fragments together when there is no 
anchorage? The quarrel in Straying is inward and outward; it is shifting, crossing 
boundaries, entering new spaces.  
All of these shifting modes of address have an impact on space. Nick 
Halpern argues that the question of address in the lyric poem is not a question of 
                                            
212 ‘I am attracted to ellipsis, to the unsaid, to suggestion, to eloquent, deliberate silence 
… It is analogous to the unseen; for example, to the power of ruins … they haunt 
because they are not whole, though wholeness is implied: another time.’ Glück, Proofs 
and Theories, 73.  
213 Helen Vendler, Poems, Poets, Poetry, 179. Quoted in Hedley, Lyric Utterance, 2. 
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overhearing or being invited to listen, but being invited to inhabit the ‘space’ that 
the speaker in the poem inhabits.214 Halpern argues that this inhabitation 
happens by way of language, where the language seduces the reader to speak 
the words themselves, as if they had written them.215 The notion of inhabitation 
points toward seeing and experiencing Straying as a poem. Fletcher and 
Halpern’s arguments are made literal in Straying.  
  This Voice does not only make a simple call for inhabitation – the audience 
is obviously inhabiting the installation on the most basic and literal level. She also 
appeals to the audience to inhabit the myriad different spaces that the She 
conjures. This call is also repealed, however, because there are other competing 
narratives: in the multiple stories that she re-tells, that are not hers, and also the 
images which call the audience away from the voice and toward the screen. In 
this double movement we feel a haunting, a half-presence – this is not the 
unbroken and available environment that Fletcher and Halpern both speak of. 
The environments in the installation are fragmented, multiple, incomplete.  
The shifting address of the voice-over makes and unmakes space: both 
space that She ‘occupies’ and also spaces for the audience to occupy. In this 
way the audience is given space to occupy various subjectivities. Boundaries 
between spaces are made and unmade; a stable sense of space, and of self, is 
difficult to establish. The audience is witnessing a quarrel taking place, but they 
are also taking part in this quarrel, standing in the middle of an intimacy that is 
shared between the voice and the image. However, they are also standing in the 
abyss that keeps them apart. The audience is neither here nor there; they are 
shuttled between spaces and subjectivities. Perhaps this gives rise to the feeling 
of being unmoored, of dislocation.  
                                            
214 Halpern is extending Angus Fletcher‘s provocation in A New Theory for American 
Poetry (2006), that it is possible for the poem to create a kind of ‘verbal construct’ in 
which we can dwell, an environment that surrounds us. Nick Halpern, "Louise Glück's 
"I"." Literature Compass 2 (2005): 3. 
215 He evokes Barthes’ notion of ‘self-presence’ where, in the act of uttering another’s 
words we feel not a sense of self, but a sense of ‘self-presence’. Halpern’s claim is that 
poetry offers language which the reader desires to speak because the words are almost 
more ‘perfect’ than ones they could have ever uttered; ‘there is a more intense relation to 
other people’s speech.’ Ibid., 2 
 98 
 The moving images play an important role in this fragmentation, in the 
paradoxical pull towards inhabitation and then away to the side of witnessing. I 
say ‘witnessing’ here because it is not only a matter of language. We are not 
only hearing, overhearing or uttering words; we are also engaging with pictures. 
The images displace the Voice. The images unground the anchors that the Voice 
finds, loses, searches for again. In relation to the image, the Voice herself plays 
witness and it is as if her entire project is to move towards inhabitation of the 
screen. The Voice uses language to reach towards her beloved, just as the 
reader might move toward inhabiting and uttering ‘the poet’s’ speech. 
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POETIC CINEMA 
 
 
We find here, again, some parallels between poetry and the kind of cinema that I 
would call poetic. It is this element of pointing beyond itself, creating the sense of 
a large compass, that refers to multiple times, spaces and histories.216 Often, in 
cinema, this is a question of how one might treat time and duration. For 
example, in Pier Paolo Pasolini’s The Gospel According to Matthew (1964) there 
are many instances of close-ups on a face whose narrative function is to 
communicate that this character is observing a particular event taking place 
within the diegetic space but just outside the frame. The long duration of these 
shots begins to exceed this basic narrative function: it opens up a space of 
contemplation that reaches beyond, outside this singular moment, and towards 
other times, places and people. We are thrust into a kind of silence, the pregnant 
moment of suspension that disrupts the flow of narrative time and reaches 
towards other spiritual and abstract dimensions.    
The relationship between poetry and documentary cinema has been the 
specific focus throughout the research. On the side of the poem we have: what it 
feels like. On the side of the documentary we have: evidence. We have 
established that poetic and documentary impulses are not so far apart: each is 
interested in gaining access to and expressing something about the ‘truth’ of 
experience.  
 The evidentiary or documentary status of the moving image in Straying is 
significant, and it is significant in its relationship to the Voice. The images are 
‘documentary’ in so far as they are all of public, external spaces. They are simple 
set-ups that record, it would seem, ‘nothing in particular’. As I mentioned earlier, 
this footage happened ‘on the side’ of the ‘official’ recording of interviews. I was 
recording this ‘unofficial’ footage but not knowing what I was looking for. My 
intention was not to create poetic images, but simply to ‘make records’ of ‘being 
                                            
216 Recall Williams’ documentary palimpsest.  
 100 
there’. I recorded simply so that something might reveal itself to me as 
‘significant’.  
 It is difficult to point to the very moment that this work developed its 
‘poetic’ capacity. Remember Tarkovsky’s attitude that the poetic is a philosophy, 
how one looks at the world. For this reason I call it a poetic attention. The use of 
the voice-over, however, concretised and formalised this aspect by literally 
playing out the search for the correct, or poetic, aspect – how to look at the 
images so that they might reveal a deeper, more profound, more telling inner 
quality. She speaks to the images in an attempt to access something more than 
what appears as only evidence. The Voice uses her ‘poetic intelligence’: that 
which  
 
lacks … such focused investment in conclusion, being naturally wary of its 
own assumptions. It derives its energy from a willingness to discard 
conclusion in the face of evidence, its willingness, in fact, to discard 
anything.217  
 
Evidence is not the end -point, it does not imply conclusion. The poetic Voice 
serves to see beyond the apparently evidentiary in the documentary image, to 
move beyond the surface of fact and to ask more of it. The Voice insistently 
interrogates the images; She does not read their evidentiary status as ‘closed’ in 
terms of meaning or referentiality, but digs like an archaeologist to find what 
other histories these images touch on.  
 But the documentary status of the images is important. To discard 
conclusion in the face of evidence, as Glück would have us do, is not to diminish 
the importance of the significance of the footage as evidence. The documentary 
images bring the qualities of tenuousness and unexpectedness into the work. 
We do not know and we cannot predict what might happen: a window might 
close, a bird might take flight. Not only the audience, but the Voice as well, has 
                                            
217 Glück, Proofs and Theories, 95. 
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this ‘tenuous’ relationship to the image. When the Voice speaks to the images 
with uncertainty, it confirms her as genuine. Or rather, it confirms the distance 
between the images and the Voice/filmmaker/me as a ‘real’ distance. 218 This is 
important because I want the audience to trust the Voice and her legitimate 
search for understanding in these images, these places and hence herself. I also 
want the audience to trust the Voice in her re-telling of other people’s stories. 
Their documentary status is critical; this is the very creation of the palimpsest. I 
want the audience to know that these are indeed conversations this Voice, this 
filmmaker, had with people along this journey. However, I deliberately question 
the importance of these being ‘true stories’. I place the seed of this doubt when 
the Voice says: this is a true story. Such a forthright declaration might suddenly 
seem disingenuous due to her insistence. Or at least the question of ‘what is a 
true story’ might be raised. Is such a designation important in how we engage 
with this work?  
 These images are documentary, these places are ‘real’. The Voice is 
genuine. But their interaction is not unambiguous. In their relation they take on 
some poetic qualities; together, in their dissonance, they point beyond what 
each, on its own, is able to express. They do not come to any conclusions but 
point towards yet other histories and experiences.  
 The poetic structure of Straying is partly mobilised by its fragmented 
setup. The elements (images, voice) are splintered, but in that splintering I have 
been able to put them in such an arrangement that they begin a dialogue across 
the space. This space opens up for the excesses that are beyond the simply 
evidentiary. In the relation between the various elements in the installation we 
can witness the transformation of the object/image into poetic artefact, from 
concrete to abstract, from the banal to the extraordinary. As the Voice speaks to 
the building facades (although of course She may not be speaking to them 
                                            
218 In this example the distinction between the Voice, the hand that took the images 
(within the narrative of the work) and my self as the filmmaker/researcher, is one that I 
deliberately do not make here because in this particular instance I think these ideas do 
operate at all of these levels and precisely because they are all part of the one ‘persona’. 
I discuss this shortly in relation to Vivian Gornick’s conception of the voice in non-fiction.  
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directly; whether the Voice sees what is playing on the screens is not certain), 
they take on various meanings, they stand -in for a number of other objects or 
times or places. As one word chimes with an image, we begin to see faces 
where we previously saw only windows.   
 This is the shape of my experience with the footage, consequently 
written into the work itself. This play between the poetic and the evidentiary 
found its realisation most explicitly when I started to speak to this footage which 
was silent, which did not give itself over to easy interpretation or unproblematic, 
unambiguous signification. The following section will address how and why this 
eventually became not only part of a method to dislodge the inertia I had 
reached with the project, but also a critical aspect of the installation and 
research as a whole.  
 
 
THE I-FILM 
 
 I started to investigate the ‘unofficial’ footage, the footage of empty streets 
and rivers, footage that spoke to me of absence, of implied movement – or the 
potential for movement – but not the thing itself. The footage, while being of 
‘nothing in particular’, still did not have the kind of unambiguous historical status 
that we sometimes wish of documentary footage.219 This was evidence, but 
evidence of what? I tried to alleviate the ambiguity and silence by replaying the 
footage over and over in the hope of ‘stabilising meaning’. I was still working 
within the old documentary assumption that reality can be ‘held and reviewable 
for analysis … a world of evidence confirmed through observation’.220 I willed the 
footage to ’speak’, but it would not do so clearly or lucidly. The consequence of 
this constant return and review was not that meaning was stabilised or simply 
revealed itself, but that new questions started to arise in relation to my subject. 
                                            
219 Renov, Theorizing Documentary, 8. 
220 Elizabeth Cowie, “The Spectacle of Actuality,” in Collecting Visible Evidence, ed. 
Gaines and Renov, 19. 
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The question was essentially: why am I left with these images as a result of 
asking the question about the relationship between body and landscape? Why is 
it that I made these recordings in response to this question? What do these 
images then tell me about this question?  
 I started to use language to create a dialogue with the images in order to 
explore these questions. I thought that in speaking to the clips, they might speak 
back, the language might mine the image for significance.221 I wrote various 
dialogues addressing the images directly, as in a conversation. At first, this was 
only a way towards finding new perspectives I had not considered, a new way to 
‘begin’. Through the process of writing and speaking, my own memory, 
imagination and desire arose as subject matter. Rather than simply offering a 
new perspective on how to read the images – and hence proceed by knowing 
how to edit them together into a cohesive story– this process revealed how my 
own experience of taking the footage was integrated into the work and how one 
single cohesive story was not one that I could tell.  
 This process showed me that the compass of the story was much larger 
than I had anticipated and that there were further layers to discover, much 
beyond the images that had been taken. This work was not only about putting 
images together. The images were only one step in a much larger process. To 
think back to Rouch, the unlatching of an event does not only happen at the 
meeting of the filmmaker and subject at the moment of recording. To work with 
the moving image is not only about using the camera to precipitate something in 
                                            
221 The commentary in documentary films is an oft-employed trope. The quality and 
address of this commentary works variously across what is a large and various genre. 
From the Griersonian tradition, for example the ‘Voice of God’ in March of Time. Bill 
Nichols, "The Voice of Documentary," Film Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1983): 17-30. To 
‘illustrated radio’ mode. This is what Channan calls the voice-overs that ‘do not let the 
picture breathe.’ Michael Chanan, "The Role of History in the Individual,” in The Cinema 
of Me, ed., Alisa Lebow (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 18. To direct-
address, omniscient narrator, to self-reflexive voice of the filmmaker (often found in the 
essay film). But these are not always relegated to one mode. For example, as Nichols 
identifies, as early as 1936 Night Mail ‘employed a supposedly authoritative yet often 
presumptuous off-screen narration. In many cases this narration effectively dominated 
the visuals’ (though this did not exclude the poetic or evocative, as in Night Mail and 
Listen to Britain). Nichols, The Voice of Documentary, 17. In Straying I work to establish 
an exchange between the image and the voice so that they are each suffocated and 
liberated by the other at different moments. 
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the profilmic event and then simply record it for presentation. The footage, once 
taken, can serve further to guide a deeper investigation. In this work, the footage 
posed more questions, it demanded a deeper engagement and investigation. 
The images demanded a voice-over. The relationship that was established 
between the voice and the image started to undo the borders that may have 
existed between process, theory, reality and imagination. The work found itself at 
the intersection between the theoretical and philosophical aspects of the 
research and the experience of gathering the material for the creative part of the 
research. In this, I am clearly implicated in the subject and theme of the work. 
The very moment when I abandoned a strict dedication to the ‘documentary’ 
was the moment that I started to engage with the documentary in the terms that 
Bruzzi describes: ‘the text itself reveals the tensions between the documentary 
pursuit of the most authentic mode of factual representation and the impossibility 
of this aim’.222 
 The impossibilities, failures and deep disappointments of the work 
revealed themselves as part of the question I was asking about the relationship 
between the body and place. My inability to achieve audiovisually what I had set 
out to do became the subject of the work. This also helped me realise how 
heavily the proposition was built on my own experiences and memories relating 
to the place where this research was being enacted. This started to chime with 
the subject matter that I was drawn to in the footage: moments of hiatus, of 
suspension, of expectation; the moment before, rather than its actualisation; 
emptiness, stagnation, lack of anchorage, especially to bodies in the frame. This 
work was now quite explicitly becoming about searching, about mourning, about 
attempts at articulation that end in ellipses and are never quite fulfilled or 
expressed. These elements were part of my experience, both as a migrant and 
as an expat in Serbia attempting to make a documentary about the conciliation 
between body and landscape, about how one constitutes oneself in relation to 
the place one inhabits.   
                                            
222 Bruzzi, New Documentary, 7. 
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 I did not welcome this shift to an autobiographical tone; I thought of the 
autobiography, as Glück might put it, as a ‘decanting of personality’.223 This was 
certainly not my original intention or interest in relation to the project. However, 
Glück makes a distinction between this and an inward listening and 
attentiveness. In defence of Keats’ use of the autobiographical, Glück says:  
  
His own life … afforded greatest access to the materials of greatest 
interest. That it was his hardly concerned him. It was a life, and therefore 
likely, in its large shapes and major struggles, to stand as a paradigm.224 
 
Marcel Proust makes a similar claim when he says that a writer’s introspection 
works to encourage the audience’s introspection, giving them access to 
themselves.225 Such an approach definitely informs this project.226 I replaced the 
interview subject with empty squares. I wrote my own Voice in, but I also 
preserved the other voices that were part of the making of this work: I re-told the 
stories told to me in the interviews I conducted. I became the speaking/desiring 
subject that searches to make a confession: about the places she has inhabited, 
loved and lost. She continually returns to dreams and fantasies. These are 
confessions also. See Figure 17.  
 Legitimising this subjectivity is one feature of the first-person film, or I-film 
as designated by Linda Dittmar. The problem (or affordance) of this subjectivity is 
well articulated by Michael Renov: ‘the subject of the documentary is the subject 
in the documentary, a space of ‘complication’ and ‘co-implication.’227 And  
                                            
223 Glück, Proofs and Theories, 35 
224 Ibid., 36 
225 Ibid. 
226 Vivian Gornick, writes about the creation of a non-fiction persona that is and is not the 
writer: to use oneself in order to make larger sense of things. Vivian Gornick, "A Narrator 
Leaps Past Journalism," New York Times 6 may 2002 (2002).  
227 Michael Renov, The Subject of Documentary (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
press, 2004), xxvi. 
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I repeat these stories, these other peo-
ple’s words as an abstraction.
Figure 17
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although I do not declare myself as a ‘subject’ in the work itself,228 this interplay 
and ‘complication’ were a definitive turn in my approach and consequently 
formed the narrative frame for the voice-over.  
 I could not proceed with the project until I confronted this co-implication. 
This is pertinent to filmmaker Andreas Di Tella claiming that the ‘I’ in a 
documentary is an ‘act of responsibility’ where ‘I assume responsibility for this 
story. I answer for it with my life. I answer for my ideas about film and art (and 
life) with my own life.’229 The project is not about me, but I use my voice in order 
to vouch for its integrity, in order to take responsibility for the intentions of the 
work and to take responsibility in using other people’s voices and words and 
stories in the work. This validates my claim that: this is a true story. I take 
responsibility for the contribution this work makes towards a reverberation that 
speaks of the body’s desire for intimate knowledge of place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
228 According to Laura Rascaroli, an ‘I-film’ must declare itself so in order to earn the 
designation. Laura Rascaroli, "The Self-Portrait Film: Michaelangelo's Last Gaze," in The 
Cinema of Me, ed., Alisa Lebow (New York: Columbia University press, 2012), 62. 
229 Andreas Di Tella, "The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Nighttime," in The Cinema of 
Me, Alisa Lebow, ed., (New York: Columbia University press, 2012), 35. 
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SPACE 
 
 
 
Along this road between documentary and poetry, I found the essay and the 
making of the essayistic self. In this section, I come to the point in the research 
when I needed space, I needed room and I needed to fill the room with bodies. 
“Bodies” here mean the screens that hang in the space and the body of the 
audience. This was not one of my imperatives, but rather emerged as a 
fundamental character of the work, which seemed to continually seek its 
subject.230 There needed to be space so that we had room to think. There 
needed to be space so that we had room to move. There needed to be space 
so that the making and unmaking of the self could be enacted and witnessed, 
not simply shown or presented.  
 Marking transitive states is important in this section. One of these 
transitions is the move from one to another position in terms of the ontology of 
the image. The Voice makes this move and the audience along with her. Here 
we have a working –through of the question of why we are dealing with the 
moving image at all in relation to this question about the relationship between 
body and place.  
 In order to proceed, I would like to take on György Lukács’s advice, even 
if only metaphorically: that ‘the title of every essay is receded in invisible letters, 
by the words ‘thoughts occasioned by’.231 
 
 
                                            
230 Or rather, it knew its subject, but continually searched for a way to represent it, to 
hold onto it, hold it up and review it in the hand.  
231 György Lukács, Soul and Form (London: Merlin Press, 1974),15. 
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THE ESSAY 
 
 
A form that can accommodate writing, that does not have one single and holistic 
meaning to impart – a writing that can capture a multiplicity of meaning – is the 
essay. Most importantly for this project, the essay can also capture the search 
for meaning (the kind of dialogue I have been drawing your attention to between 
the image and the voice, between the subject in and of the documentary). It was 
in an essayistic manner that this writing happened and so I work to preserve this 
passage in the way I offer it to the reader. Various theoretical ideas, formal 
discoveries and experiences needed to find their place and exert their influence 
in this exegesis. The essay helps to find coherence among fragments and 
contradictions; it finds this coherence in the very act of writing. I propose that the 
coherence is found through the creation of a field which we can traverse. I say 
field and not landscape because I deliberately do not want to imply that there are 
boundaries, but at the same time there is a sense that things are somewhat 
loosely held together because they coexist. To evoke the image of the field 
suggests that the eye can throw its gaze quite far, it can see all around, in all 
directions. As Nora Alter puts it: it is ‘a form of cognitive perambulation.’232  
 Michel de Montaigne first defined this mode of writing with his Essais 
(1580), framing the short works as letters to his deceased friend.233 This conceit 
speaks of the in-between, indeterminate spaces that Montaigne traverses in his 
writing: both personal and philosophical; intimate and formal. Montaigne is 
testing out various philosophical ideas as they might relate to everyday life in 
sixteenth-century France and, in so doing, crafting his own attitudes in regard to 
his subjects.234 In this the process of thinking, crafting and following a certain 
idea or thought is made visible. And so too are the aporias and the fissures one 
                                            
232 Nora M Alter, “Translating the Essay into Film and Installation,” Journal of Visual 
Culture 6, (2007): 45. 
233 Michel de Montaigne, The essays of Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (Chicago : 
Encyclopaedia Britannica ,1952).  
234 Essai in French translates as ‘attempt’, ‘try’ or ‘test’. 
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might encounter along the way. The form is flexible enough to work through 
these fissures by reaching towards other genres, other histories, other 
perspectives.  
 The essay form is about making sense of things, which implies a kind of 
flexible, ever-changing, malleable state – a playful trajectory. Max Bense 
describes this playfulness toward ‘the object’: 
 
He writes essayistically who writes while experimenting, who turns his 
object this way and that, who questions it, feels it, tests it, thoroughly 
reflects on it, attacks it from different angles, and in his mind’s eye 
collects what he sees, and puts into words what the object allows to be 
seen under the conditions established in the course of writing.235 
 
The last part of this rendering is particularly elucidating: ‘under the conditions 
established in the course of writing’. The process establishes both form and 
content. This articulates its self-reflexive nature, where ‘at every moment (it) must 
reflect on itself’.236 Adorno asserts that it is ‘without apology [that] the essay 
draws on itself the reproach that it does not know beyond a doubt just what is to 
be understood as the real content of concepts’.237 This means that the concepts 
remain open and liable to change and contradiction, and it makes this condition 
explicit ‘in the course of writing’.  
 This is not, however, a completely aimless writing, a writing where subjects 
are arbitrarily connected, but rather that the essayist ‘thinks in fragments just as 
reality is fragmented and gains its unity only by moving through the fissures’.238 
This movement creates what Adorno calls a ‘forcefield’, allowing the fragments 
to ‘crystallise into a configuration.’239 Unity and structure are found from within. 
                                            
235 Max Bense, “Über den Essay und seine Prosa,” Merkur 1:3 (1947), 418 quoted in T. 
W. Adorno, “The Essay as Form”, New German Critique, 32 (Spring-Summer, 1984), 
164. 
236 Adorno, The Essay as Form, 170. 
237 Ibid., 160. 
238 Ibid., 164. 
239 Ibid., 161. 
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This forcefield brings theory and experience together. The essay ‘absorbs 
concepts and experiences, so it absorbs theories.’240 The very movement 
through fissures creates coherence. This to me implies that one must listen with 
one’s poetic ear. Movement through fissures creates chiming among concepts. 
Chiming concepts are like skimming rocks on water, like the way the Voice 
brushes up against the screens in Straying. It happens and then it is gone.  
But the essay form is not about a deliberate elusiveness. It argues against 
‘indisputable certainty’ because it deems it impossible, a fallacy. For Adorno, 
being ‘exposed to error’ in this way connects it to the notion of ‘learning’:  
 
it must pay for its affinity with open intellectual experience by the lack of 
security, a lack which the norm of established thought fears like death. It is 
not so much that the essay ignores indisputable certainty, as that it 
abrogates the idea… 241 (This kind of thinking) does not advance in a single 
direction, rather the aspects of the argument interweave as in a carpet. 
The fruitfulness of the thoughts depends on the density of this texture.242 
 
Again I will turn to my use of density to bring the notion of ‘thinking’ into the 
realm of the physical as opposed to only the abstract: ‘the thinker does not 
think, but rather transforms himself into an arena of intellectual experience’.243 
Experience is crucial to Lukács, too: the essay helps express ‘intellectuality, 
conceptuality as sensed experience, as immediate reality’.244 So what is abstract 
becomes concrete, becomes available to the senses, which is to say: to the 
body. Through the process of thinking through these relationships, the self forms 
and undoes itself. Timothy Corrigan describes this very feature appearing in 
                                            
240 Ibid., 166. 
241 Ibid., 161. 
242 Ibid., 160. 
243 Ibid., 160-1. 
244 Lukács, Soul and Form, 7. 
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Montaigne’s work: ‘movement from a self-expression undoing itself in the 
process of thinking through the dynamics of the world’.245 
 In this research project, it is not only the path of thought that we trace, 
but also the literal paths I trod. The ‘process’ here is not only one of thinking, but 
also of doing. My essayistic -self was ‘constructed’ by way of travelling around 
Serbia and taking moving images of it. It was further constructed by putting the 
images together, writing a voice-over and consequently offering this work up for 
yet another (re)constitution that the audience would enact: making and 
unmaking the work and the self in relation to that work.   
 
 
STRAYING AS ESSAY 
 
Timothy Corrigan and Nora Alter, cited in the above section, were not only 
writing about the essay as literary form, but drawing a direct lineage to the essay 
film. This lineage has been thoroughly addressed by Corrigan, Alter, and 
especially Laura Rascaroli.246 I will not redo that work here. But I will look at how 
the essay film can be conceptualised as an ‘approach’, an ‘intention’ toward a 
subject, and how this absorbs the other modes and approaches used in the 
conduct of this research (specifically documentary and poetry). I will also 
examine why the subject matter itself is very well suited to this approach. Why 
the approach ‘solved’ some of the ‘problems’ I encountered. See Figure 18. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                            
245 Timothy Corrigan, The Essay Film: From Montaigne, After Marker (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 17. 
246 Rascaroli, Laura. "The Essay Film: Problems, Definitions, Textual Commitments." 
Framework 49.2 (2008): 24-47. 
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If I knew what I was looking for I might 
know what I have lost.
Figure 18
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Once an audience is present in the installation the space becomes a site of 
public and private experience. In this sense, we might see the installation as an 
essayistic work. We have also previously considered this work a poem. Lukács 
calls the literary essay an ‘intellectual poem’, and Alexandre Astruc calls the 
essay film ‘filmed philosophy’.247 In Straying, the audience can ‘perform’ what the 
essayists achieve in the form of literature or film. This is made possible by virtue 
of the composition of the installation space.  
As a discourse of ‘loosening’, ‘fragmentation’, ‘digression’ and 
’excursion,’248 the essay lends itself to redefining ‘representational 
assumptions’249 and forms, which make the essay so ‘productively inventive’.250 
For this reason Rascaroli warns us against ‘crystallising it into a genre.’251 For 
Reda Bensmaia, the essay does not have a determinate genre because it is 
‘essentially plural’, the ‘matrix of all generic possibilities’.252 These ‘possibilities’ 
suggest a way to work through aporia and to make this very ‘work’ visible. 
Montaigne’s experience still resonates: ‘I cannot keep my subject still … I do not 
portray being, I portray passing … If my mind could gain a firm footing, I would 
not make essays’.253 To make this search visible is of particular use to this 
research project because it not only illuminates the attempt and act of making 
relationships between self and place, which is our subject, but also because it 
facilitates the exploration of ‘the conditions of enunciation’, which is a 
documentary concern.254  
                                            
247 Alexandre Astruc, The Birth of a New Avant-Garde: La Camera-Stylo cited in Alter, 
Translating, 51. 
248 Roland Barthes, “Inaugural Lecture, College de France,” in A Barthes Reader, Susan 
Sontag, ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 476. 
249 Corrigan, The Essay Film, 4. 
250 For this reason Nora Alter says it is the perfect mode to move into installation and 
other media settings. Alter, Translating the Essay, 44. 
251 Rascaroli, Essay Film,10. Renov calls it an ‘anti-genre’. Michael Renov, "History 
and/as Autobiogrpahy; the Essayistic in Film and Video," Framework 2, no. 3 (1989),12. 
252 Reda, Bensmaia, The Barthes Effect: The Essay as Reflective Text (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1987), 90-91. This may imply a very loose and therefore all-
inclusive genre. However, some works simply are not essays, and Rascaroli makes a 
good argument for what we might exclude. See Rascaroli, The Essay Film, 42-43. 
253 Renov, History and/as Autobiography, 11. 
254 Ibid., 7. 
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This leads Renov to claim that ‘the essayistic is always research, the 
discovery of self and object (of object through self) as an active, critical 
process’.255 The essay is turned outwards and inwards, a  
 
subjection of an instrumental or expressive self to a public domain as a 
form of experience that continually tests and undoes the limits and 
capacities of that self through that experience … demands both loss of 
self and the rethinking and remaking of the self.256  
 
This resonates as a mode of research and expressivity for a work that is 
expressly about the relationship of the self to place, their mutual constitution. 
This ‘constitution’, however, is not a fixed or identifiable object; it is always in the 
making. So what the essayistic offers is the expression of a continual and 
changing dialogue between the self and the world, a searching for a form that 
will not find its end. All of these articulations refer specifically to the narrative 
theme. The Voice attempts quite literally to lose herself, and rethink and remake 
herself, through, with, from, the image.  
But it also refers to the experience I as researcher had in conducting the 
research. I was thrust into a relationship with the world I was recording, thrust 
into a relation with the people I was interviewing, challenging my own status, 
challenging my own history across this region, my experiences, memories and 
assumptions, my decisions for conducting the research there. This experience 
troubled my subjectivity in relation to the material. In the end, I documented a 
public and a private history, mine and that of others. For Renov  
 
there is no contradiction between the elemental documentary impulse … 
and the exploration of subjectivity; indeed, it is their obsessive 
convergence that marks the essayistic work.257  
                                            
255 Ibid., 11. 
256 Corrigan, The Essay Film, 17. 
257 Renov, The Subject of Documentary, 81. 
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But as he also claims, ‘essays tend willingly, and often aggressively, to 
undermine or disperse that very subjectivity as it becomes subsumed in the 
world it explores’.258 This is a condition that seems particularly suited to the 
exploration of displacement where fracture is one of the strong conditions of the 
experience and where there is difficulty in constituting the self in relation to place. 
The essay form gave me room to thematise these ideas. 
The installation setting makes the realisation of this work a physical, 
concrete entity rather than just a conceptual or narrative form – the screens do 
indeed fracture the space. As previously discussed, the multiple screens offer a 
range of possibilities where the Voice makes and unmakes herself in relation to 
the image. I have also discussed how this space borders the public and the 
private and that, given its configuration, the audience themselves become part of 
the work. But more than that, the audience is implicated in the act of making and 
unmaking: they become accountable as individuals to the public (the other 
audience members). Corrigan’s claim that ‘essays describe and provoke an 
activity of public thought’ which ‘highlights and even exaggerates the 
participations of their audience’259 is made literal in the installation setting. The 
individual audience member has a private experience in public, in the presence 
of others.260 How one moves about, the distances one keeps, become visible 
and open to interrogation by other people in the room. They also become part of 
the making of the ‘public’, where the dialogue is not only between the viewer 
and the artwork but also among the viewers in the room.  
In this case we are not speaking of audience as a collective, but in terms 
of the individuality of each audience member. The nature of the address of the 
Voice-over then is an ‘I’ that ‘always clearly and strongly implicates a “you”.261 
This is of foremost importance in the essay. The essayistic voice does not speak 
to a collective audience; the text must remain open enough so that it establishes 
                                            
258 Renov, History and/as Autobiography, 19. 
259 Corrigan, The Essay Film, 55. 
260 This conjures the images of statues – their private and public status. 
261 Lebow, Alisa, ed. The Cinema of Me (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 7. 
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a dialogue with each spectator where the dialogue is unique. This is the quality 
of the relationship Glück calls for when she says she likes to be needed by the 
poem as a reader. This means the poet asks genuine questions to which 
answers are sought. The other kind of poem expresses ideas that are already 
formed, a work that does not include the mistakes made along the way. An 
essayistic work is one in which ‘readers must feel included in a true 
conversation, allowed to follow through mental processes of contradiction and 
digression’.262  
In Spanish the term for “essay” has particular etymological significance 
where ensayo also appears in the expression for ‘trial and error’:  ensayo y error. 
In English, too, essay is etymologically connected to ‘doing’, to ‘trying out’, 
which implies the possibility of failure. For filmmaker Andreas Di Tella, ‘if there is 
no trial and error all we hear is the Voice of authority’.263 Di Tella had a similar 
journey to my own in the making of his film Fotografias (2007), where he made a 
journey from Argentina to his ancestral home of India.264 He too felt he was not 
capturing with his camera the things he thought he might. His trip also felt like a 
failure, a feeling and reality he had to address upon his return to Argentina for 
editing. He sifted through his fragments of footage looking for something that 
might speak of his experience. What he found most revealing was that there was 
no such footage to be found. Di Tella too looked to ‘the essay’ form to express 
most accurately the process he went through in making the work.  
 Failure itself can also be revealing: ‘the failure of a project, or the mistake 
of an idea crashing against reality, can express the truth of that idea or the 
meaning of that project’.265 This is precisely the experience I have been 
documenting for you here. It is also the movement that is enacted in the 
installation space (the audience goes through a process of trial and error in 
piecing the work together). The essayistic audiovisual installation accommodates 
                                            
262 Phillip Lopate, "In Search of the Centaur: The Essay-Film" The Threepenny Review, 
no. 48, Winter (1992): 19. 
263 Rascaroli, The Essay Film, 40. 
264 Di Tella, The Curious Incident of a Dog in the Nighttime 
265 Ibid., 40. 
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various levels of experience and discovery (including the failures), those of the 
researcher, the audience and the interview subjects’ stories. It yields a work that 
simultaneously interrogates its own mode as a tool towards these discoveries, 
because of the self-reflexive address that the essayistic favours.  
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THE NEED FOR SPACE 
 
 
What is to follow is a discussion of how the move from the cinema into the 
gallery created a hybrid work that capitalises on the affordances of each medium 
in order to challenge and extend the ideas presented so far in this exegesis. 
Marks claims for ‘hybrid cinema’ that its strength is its ability to ‘forgo any 
transparent relationship to the reality it represents, and to make evident the 
knowledge claims on which it is based’.266 This is performed in Straying and 
further problematized in the installation setting by virtue of ‘activating’ the lived 
time-space of the audience in that setting. Questions of representation are 
reconfigured in this context and the question of expression and experience in 
relation to the images arise as critical in furthering the conversation about how a 
body meets space.   
Historically, the rise of the gallery film was seen as responding to the ‘dark 
space’ of the cinema auditorium by working against cinema’s apparent focus on 
immersion; rather, the gallery film happened in the ‘white cube’ of the gallery 
space where the apparatus is ‘revealed’.267 The early argument made in favour of 
this shift was that the gallery film offered a more critical space, one that nurtured 
self-reflexivity in a manner unavailable in the dark immersive spaces of the 
cinema. In recent years, a number of scholarly works have sought to show how 
the two practices are not marked by such distinct differences; there are works in 
                                            
266 Marks, The Skin of the FIlm, 8.  
267 See Trodd, Tamara Jane, ed. Screen/Space : The Projected Image in Contemporary 
Art. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011. 
 120 
both the gallery and the cinema that demonstrate the use of material and 
conceptual tools to create immersive, affective and critical spaces.268  
 Although the installation has its roots in contemporary art practice, this is 
not to exclude the influence of cinema. In fact, their marriage leads Chris Dercon 
to pose an irreverent question: where is cinema? According to him: it is 
everywhere; in the contemporary world, the cinema has moved into the gallery 
space and started its ‘next phase’.269 Catherine Fowler suggests that a dialogue 
between film theory and the gallery film is an important one to establish, as the 
gallery film’s ambition is ‘often to explore and expand our understanding of what 
cinema is and could be’.270 
The installation as an art practice is a hybrid one, working across 
disciplines but always inclusive of the space of its ‘happening’.271 I say 
‘happening’ because the exhibition space in an installation is part of the 
experience of the work; it includes the real space and time of the audience and 
sets up a direct dialogue between the space they occupy and any other 
dimensions of time and space as articulated in the artwork (for example, 
depicted in the moving image). The space of the installation is a performative 
space, where the audience and the artwork perform their interaction. Each 
member of the audience has their own ‘dialogue’ (expressed in the way they 
move through the space, the way they sit, how long they stay) and this affects 
every other audience member in the room who is having their own dialogue with 
                                            
268 This distinction seems to have been more a problem in the critical debates which 
were marked by historical factors, as opposed to a divergence or difference in the 
practices. See in particular Trodd, ed., Screen/Space. Expanded cinema, avant-garde 
cinema and video art have shared critical, aesthetic and formal interests. See for 
example Iles, Chrissie. Into the Light: The Projected Image in American Art, 1964-1977. 
New York: Whitney Museum, 2001. See also Rush, Michael. Video Art. London: Thames 
& Hudson, 2007. See also Comer, Stuart. ed., Film and Video Art. London: Tate, 2009. 
For this reason I think it is valid and not amiss to have excluded an in-depth discussion of 
the community of practice in contemporary video art. However, I have also already 
addressed this in terms of my own background having been in cinema rather than visual 
art practice. In light of the lack of distinction that I am arguing for, however, this would 
make the present caveat unnecessary.   
269 Chris Dercon, "Gleaning the Future from the Gallery Floor," Senses of Cinema 28 
(2003): 2. 
270 Catherine Fowler, “Room for experiment: Gallery Films and Vertical Time from Maya 
Deren to Eijaliisa Ahtila," Screen 54:4 (2004): 327. 
271 Nicolas De Oliveira, Installation Art (London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994), 7. 
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the work and affecting those of others.272 This is not unique to Straying. Julie 
Reiss defines the ‘essence’ of installation art to be a participatory role on the 
side of the spectator.273 The installation as an art form regards the spectator ‘in 
some way … as integral to the completion of the work’, where ‘the meaning 
evolves from the interaction between the two.’274 Not only is the work in dialogue 
with the audience; we can say that the space too is in dialogue with the 
audience, and the interaction of the three make up the work.275 Positioning the 
audience in direct and active relation to the audiovisual material and setting up 
multiple times and spaces in direct dialogue with one another are critical aspects 
of this research. What this multiplicity and relationality enable is the kind of three-
dimensional space of the essay, a kind of ‘language of architecture’ which is a 
social space where a dialogue between public, private and communal is 
established.276  
Fowler’s discussion proceeds by way of Deren’s concept of a film’s 
‘poetic structure’ in order to illuminate how the gallery film can directly enact, or 
spatialise, the notion of ‘vertical time’. To briefly revisit Deren’s concept: her 
intentions are to suspend linear time in order to explore a single moment more 
fully. It ‘probes the ramifications of the moment, and is concerned with its 
qualities and its depth’.277 In Deren’s single-screen -cinema works, she makes 
‘space’ (depth) through time (duration); by suspending linear time, she “dwells” 
on a single moment.278 As effectively pointed out by Fowler, the linearity that 
                                            
272 The installation space is a collection of rhythms, where we individually and collectively 
make rhythms through movement. We might say then, after Lefebvre, that we are 
making place in this very room and that part of the experience of Straying is listening to 
the rhythms being made and ‘hearing’ the place with our bodies.  
273 Julie Reiss, From Margin to Centre: The Space of Installation Art (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1999), xiii. 
274 Ibid. 
275 This is one of the first definitions of installation art, offered by Rose Lee Goldberg in 
‘Space as Praxis’: space in active dialogue with the things and people it contains’ in 
Nicolas De Oliveira, Installation Art, 8.  
276 Ibid. 
277 Maya Deren, Poetry and the Film, 175. See Fowler’s discussion on how Deren 
achieves this in her films in Room for Experiment, 328. 
278 See Fowler for example. Ibid.  
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binds cinema is immediately ‘resolved’ in the installation setting – which is to say 
it is not bound by a linear imperative.279  
The spatialisation of vertical time is critical to Straying. What I have been 
calling “the pregnant moment” becomes a “place” in which the audience can 
dwell. Multiple times, histories and experiences are literally and physically 
hanging around the audience in the room, by virtue of the multiple screens. 
These ‘times’ do not move forward; they come into contact with one another 
‘interrupting the flow and allowing … pensiveness’.280 Space for pensiveness in 
Straying is important to the quality of engagement with the subject matter. I want 
to give the audience time and space to find their own images and ‘project’ them 
into the space. I want to occasion the making of a palimpsest, where the 
audience begins to have their own connection to the material. This is a process 
that might give rise to the creation of a density that becomes palpable to the 
audience member as they move through it.   
 There is no single or linear progression through the space either, in terms 
of how one might navigate one’s way around the room or the order in which one 
might engage with the screens. The time each audience member spends with 
any one of the three screens is also undetermined, ‘where beginning and end 
are not conditioned or conditional, but merely random’.281 Another escape from 
                                            
279 Ibid., 329. I do note that an audience may often search for a linear ‘story’, and will 
potentially be able to construct one. The images and the voice do indeed deliberately 
coincide at times in order to give the audience this kind of ‘satisfaction’ in unity. The 
work also simultaneously works to deny the audience this ‘pleasure in completeness’ 
through its fragmentary nature. This tension and release is an articulation of losing and 
finding.  
280 Ibid., 338. 
281 Chris Dercon, "Gleaning the Future”, 2. I would assume to give the audience a more 
engaged agency than one that is ‘merely random’.  
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linear time is the fact that the work plays on a loop.282 This raises the question of 
editing and ‘what it means to juxtapose images not simply in time but also in 
space’.283 In Straying, each audience member effectively becomes an editor in 
their autonomy to choose which screen to look at when and for what length of 
time.284 As Fowler says of Shirin Neshat’s double-screen works, this process 
offers ‘the possibility both of something being gained and something being lost 
through the combination of the two’.285 This connects to the overall subject of 
this research and the inability to (re)constitute one complete version of the self, 
or of a place, and the need to continually make and re-make versions of the self 
in relation to these places as they play out on the screens. There is a sense that 
there is always something else happening some place else, which we cannot 
take into our experience of the work and the version we are presently engaging 
in.  
 The arrangement of the screens in Straying, the positioning of the 
screens in the middle of the space, transforms them from simply projection 
surfaces into ‘sculptural objects’ where the frame of the screen becomes an 
                                            
282 Malcolm LeGrice makes an argument for why multiscreen installation work does not 
offer a space of deep engagement and contemplation: ‘I have largely rejected this form 
(multi screen installation) because of the transience of the viewers’ engagement and 
consequent lack of depth in time-based art in gallery. This lack of sustained attention 
and duration veers work towards concept and idea rather than engaged experience’. 
“Improvising time and image”, in Filmwaves, 14, (2001): 15-19, quoted in Fowler, Room 
for Experiment, 330. I largely concur with LeGrice’s sentiments, and for this reason I 
think the work must have an element of seduction, to invite the audience to stay and 
engage in a sustained way. This is connected to the notion of needing your 
reader/viewer, making room for them. I do this with the quality of address by the Voice, 
which is an appeal. Disengagement, however, is also an experience, it also tells us 
something, and to this end, disengagement, or indeed any kind of response in Straying 
has revelatory potential.   
283 Fowler, Room for Experiment, 337. 
284 Of course I edited each of the three tracks, and I worked to both “synchronise” and 
counterpoint the three tracks in relation to the Voice. But as editor in this process I am 
bound by linear progression. My intentions in editing were to create chimes, associations 
and counterpoints between each of the elements at each point in the work. This was the 
loose approach which often spawned happy coincidences that revealed an otherwise 
hidden depth and association amongst the various elements in the work. Each clip I 
used is the actual duration of the clip, i.e. not edited by me to achieve a certain rhythm in 
any one sequence. This choice was made on the side of the documentary, on the side of 
wanting chance and fortune to play their part. But this editing process is only one part of 
how the work might be viewed. 
285 Fowler, Room for Experiment, 337. 
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important boundary between off-frame and off-screen space.286 We must 
confront the significance of the frame that makes the boundary between the 
diegetic world of the moving image, projected within its boundaries and the 
space outside the frame/screen, which is the space of the gallery. It makes of 
the frame an ‘axiomatic point of tension’287 between the ‘off-frame’ space 
(material space around the frame, that is, the space of the gallery, the installation 
space), the ‘off-screen’ space (the imaginary or fictional field suggested or 
evoked by elements in the work) and the actual space on the screen, the moving 
image space.288  
 Straying is a public and a private space, where public and private acts 
are performed.289 It is a liminal space that we occupy, constituting both an 
outside and inside perspective. The Voice shares the same aural space as the 
audience, her voice resonates into a shared, public space. But you might also 
see the Voice vibrating inside the installation space as a voice vibrates inside the 
body – the geography closest in, the most intimate and private of spaces. Her 
address, however, her obsessive reach towards many different times and places 
and people’s stories, also splinters any sense of unity. You might say that She 
splinters the body.  
 In some sense the audience can be seen as rupturing the space 
between the Voice and the image. The re-constitution of the self through the 
image is fraught, tenuous. The audience is placed quite literally right into the 
middle of this relationship. But their role is not only to rupture, they are also the 
only ones that are able to suture this splintered self. 
 The liminal space of the installation, or its simultaneously outside and 
inside status, is partly facilitated by the materiality of the screen objects. The 
screens are deliberately sheer, light, ethereal. They hang suspended from the 
                                            
286 Fowler, Into the Light, 253. 
287 Ibid., 255. 
288 ‘Off-frame’ and ‘Off-screen’ as defined by Pascal Bonitzer (1971), see Fowler Ibid., 
256. 
289 This would not hold true if each audience member had a personal headphone, and 
hence there was no resonant sound in the room. 
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roof and are of a size that does not overwhelm the audience member. As 
audience members move around, their silhouettes are inscribed onto the 
screens and the images that play on them. These bodies are there and not 
there. Again it is an iteration of an in-between space, on its way from, and 
towards, some place else. Perhaps this is a space of easy transformation. 
Perhaps the audience finds this ease and finds easy transport from their own 
dream space, memory space or imagined space. See Figure 19.  
 Another ‘fourth screen’ on which the audience projects their imaginary 
world can be a shared screen on which the Voice too can project her own 
images. The Voice conjures images that do not play on the screens in the room, 
She evokes times and places not depicted, but together the Voice and the  
 126 
Crisis of desire is crisis of the imagina-
tion. ‘Crisis’ meaning ‘lack’. 
It’s all about distance. 
Figure 19
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audience constitute and occupy this ‘elsewhere’.290 The Voice and the audience 
can be said to share the space of the ‘off-frame’ and the ‘off-screen’. None of 
these are stable or even guaranteed positions, they arise, subside. I have 
created the conditions for these possibilities – specifically enabled through the 
use of the screen as object and through the explicit use of the limits of the 
screen frame (while also still employing more traditional elements such as 
narrative). 
 The effect is that the audience can empathise with, and occupy, a range 
of subject positions. This is both an immersive and a self-reflexive environment. 
The audience can stand apart from the work as observers; they are also 
implicated in it. They can empathise with the Voice, they can identify with it. They 
can occupy an elsewhere with the Voice. They can project themselves into the 
image. At the same time, the Voice leads a dialogue with the image which takes 
on a more self-reflexive tone: considering the image as object, what it affirms or 
fractures in terms of how we constitute our relationship to place. The work as a 
whole, in the traversal between these various spaces, asks: how might these 
images alleviate feelings of displacement, loss and mourning?  
 This is a question the Voice in Straying wrestles with by trying out various 
relations to the image. She is testing out how the image might guide her towards 
a reconciliation with her self and with the place She desires to inhabit.291 The 
question becomes one that hinges on the ontology of the moving image: what is 
the relationship between the image and the reality it depicts? This question can 
be framed in terms of temporality: on the one hand, the photograph depicts an 
object as it was in a past moment. In certain moments, the Voice sees the 
images thus: it seems She has taken these images in order to preserve the 
                                            
290 Pierre Huyghe writes about an ‘elsewhere’ as that which ‘refers to another time or 
another space’, constituted together with viewer and artwork; an elsewhere occupied 
together. Catherine Fowler, "Remembering Cinema 'Elsewhere': From Retrospection to 
Introspection in the Gallery Film," Cinema Journal 51:2 (2012): 36. 
Consider also Gadamer: ‘we both elicit the image from things and imaginatively project 
the image into things.’ The Relevance, 17. This relationship is bound by the work itself, 
what we project is not anything whatever, it is inspired by the work. 
291 Presumably this place is the place on screen. However, this is already complicated by 
the fact that there are three screens and, hence, potentially, (at least) three places. 
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places depicted in them. She has preserved them so She can keep returning to 
them in order to reconstitute her self in relation to the past that they represent. 
The pathos comes from the fact that, as André Bazin claims in his seminal work 
‘The ontology of the photographic image’: ‘we no longer believe in the 
ontological identity of model and image’, a ‘preservation of life by a 
representation of life.’292 The Voice is reconstituting her self out of an 
impossibility, a passed reality. Even in recognition of the photograph as an 
artefact depicting a reality in the past, the image fails the Voice. She reviews the 
image in order to see her own traces of having been there. According to the 
Voice the images are not fulfilling their representational power; She cannot find 
her self depicted in them. She speaks to them to rescue them from passing out 
of being because perhaps on the second or third or fifth viewing she might just 
catch a glimpse of what she desires – but this is a futile practice. 293 See Figure 
20. 
 On the other hand, we might consider Bazin’s claim for the photograph 
as having a positive value, an agency in the present as something more than a 
depiction of a moment past. According to Bazin, a photograph ‘affects us like a 
phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake’.294 The photograph is an 
‘increase’; it does not serve the purpose of representing the subject depicted in 
it, but is rather a thing in itself, has the power of beauty as photograph, not as 
representation of the beauty depicted; ‘photography actually contributes 
something to the order of natural creation instead of providing a substitute for 
it’.295 This ‘implies the possibility of forming relations to objects in photographs  
 
 
                                            
292 André Bazin, "The Ontology of the Photographic Image," Film Quarterly 13:4 (1960): 
5. Bazin here is referring to the ‘mummy complex’, which extends to consequent 
practices around statuary. 
293 This is the sense we might get from the repetition, the continual return to the same 
subject matter from different angles. Even though we see, we cannot make sense or 
meaning from what is represented. 
294 Bazin, The Ontology of the Photographic Image, 7. 
  
295 Ibid., 8.  
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that are not possible with respect to objects in the world’.296 If we consider the 
image as an ‘increase in being’, then the images might reveal what is otherwise 
unavailable to experience. 297 The Voice has taken these photographs because 
they may give her access to these places which She otherwise would not have. 
The images might act as a conduit towards the place the Voice desires to 
inhabit.  
 The Voice also speaks to the image as if it is of the present. The image 
as image, in its positive value, is not depicting something that has passed, but a 
place and event happening at the moment of its projection. The Voice sets up 
the real possibility of her being able to step into this image, into these places that 
play on the screen. But of course there will inevitably be a moment when we 
lapse back into understanding these images as having occurred, as being of a 
passed moment (this is the moment when we catch a glimpse of the frame of 
the screen). We lapse back when She speaks in the past tense. I intend a strong 
sense of loss in these moments. See Figure 21. 
To take Bazin’s concept of ‘transferal’, where some level of reality is 
transferred onto the image, then perhaps, as Remes suggests, it goes the other 
way too: the level of reality that is the ‘increase’ in a photograph can be 
transferred onto our physical reality. The implication is that, if the Voice can affect 
the image, then perhaps She can also affect her relationship to the place – the 
reality that the image depicts. But the images do not cooperate, they come, they 
go, they turn to black, they do not seem to ‘hear’ the Voice and her plea.  
These shifts in perspective and consideration of the moving image and its 
relationship to reality are enabled by the installation setting, where the image is 
both a sculptural object and a space of immersion. We might consider that, in  
                                            
296 Daniel Morgan, "Rethinking Bazin: Ontology and Realist Aesthetics." Critical Inquiry 32 
(2006): 452.  
297 ‘Increase in being’ is how Gadamer writes about art: ‘here ‘representation’ does not 
imply that something merely stands in for something else as if it were a replacement or 
substitute that enjoyed a less authentic, more indirect kind of existence. On the contrary, 
what is represented is itself present in the only way available to it … the work of art does 
not simply refer to something, because what it refers to is actually there. We could say 
that the work of art signifies an increase in being.’ The Relevance of the Beautiful, 35. 
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A stirring of the inner landscapes. I used 
to think there would be evidence, some-
where, of this.
Figure 21
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this making and unmaking of various relationships to the image and hence to 
reality, and if this new association to the image is also transferred to our reality, 
then the experience the audience has in the installation space, going on this 
same journey of making and unmaking relationships to the image, maybe 
changes their own relationship to reality: new knowledges, new awareness of 
place and how we constitute ourselves in terms of it. This movement between 
various orders of reality, between the ontological ambiguity of the moving image, 
is a productive difficulty. It precipitates questions around what orders of reality 
constitute our experience of place.  
 One other possibility we have not yet considered, is that these are the 
Voice’s memory images. That the tension I have so often mentioned is actually 
the kind of internal struggle, or quarrel that Vendler claims for the lyric address. 
As the Voice speaks, the images recur on the screen of her memory. The 
audience is privy to this most intimate and subjective of experiences. The Voice 
in the installation herself could not answer these questions for us. At one 
moment she considers whether it is actually the images that are giving rise to her 
own Voice. As the images play, the light and the movement give rise to a voice 
that is buried either in the image or the places the image depicts. The voice rises 
like vapour, dead, but excavated by the play of light. The image and the 
soundtrack in this version are united after all, but dead, only fragments of the 
past, a ruin. See Figure 22.  
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The most frightening moment was the 
moment I wondered whether the voice 
can be an apparition, in the way images 
are apparitions. 
Or the images performing an 
archaeology of the voice.  
Figure 22
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VOICE AND IMAGE 
 
 
We have already been addressing the complicated relationship between image 
and voice. I would like to specifically address this topic in light of the discussion 
on space – how does space complicate this relationship between voice and 
image? The installation context enacts and extends Marks’ ideas around how 
disjunction between sound and image is an interplay between the seeable and 
sayable, which approach ‘each other asymptotically, showing each other to be 
false even as they require each other to be true’.298 I want to highlight what 
Marks identifies as a dependency between image and sound, even while they 
displace one another. The Voice in the installation reaches toward the image, 
and the image toward the Voice. They both reach toward various times and 
places, toward multiple selves. Both look for one another, seek each other so 
that they might affirm memories, might fulfil or complete desires, bodies, selves. 
This evokes a crisis of image and language as each displaces certainty and truth 
in the other.  
We can consider the space between sound and image as the physical 
space the audience occupies. For Marks, this third space is the space of touch. 
But she is writing figuratively; the third space is evoked as a subjective 
experience. The individual cannot dwell (ie be physically immersed) in this third 
space as it is theorised by Marks. The installation, however, sets up a space that 
is both concrete, a place where we dwell, and this other figurative space 
between sound and image. The audience is physically thrust into the unstable, 
unidentifiable place where meaning has to be continually made in the interstices 
of what can be articulated. It is the space of both unity and fragmentation, 
enmeshing and instability.  
I will address how this relationship between sound and image in the 
installation problematises the relationship between body and place by first 
                                            
298 Marks, The Skin of the Film, 30. 
 135 
looking at how this trope, the disjunction between sound and image, is used in 
cinema. Filmmaker Marguerite Duras uses the disembodied voice in India Song 
(1975) to explore issues around fragmented identity and dislocation. The film 
opens with an image of a slowly descending sun and a ‘beggar-woman’ singing 
in a foreign tongue. Two other female voices speak; they conjure people and 
places from the past, they feed fragments of memories to one another. Do you 
remember? says one voice to the other: yes, I remember. These voices conjure 
other places outside those we see represented on screen; these are the places 
of nightmare, dream, desire and death. The use of off-screen sound in India 
Song creates a strong sense of displacement. Even when bodies eventually 
appear on screen, the voices we hear do and do not belong to these bodies. 
They sometimes tell stories about them, they sometimes speak as if the images 
we watch are from the past. But the voices always remain disembodied, at a 
distance from the image. The words in Duras’ film skim the surface of the image: 
they do and do not confirm one another. They create a kind of echo. The voices 
haunt their own bodies. They lean towards the image and the impossibility of the 
desire for embodiment is palpable.  
 In Straying, the Voice is also disembodied. She also speaks to the images, 
but this Voice speaks with urgency, not to tell a story, but to piece her own body 
back together. Part of this reconstitution of the body is a search for a closeness 
to the places showing on the screens. The Voice wants to touch the screen, 
because the screen is like the skin of the landscape. If She can touch the 
screen, it might be like touching the landscape. But more than this, the Voice 
yearns to be enfolded into the screen; She is looking for a place she can embed 
herself. How should She speak? What should She say? What images does She 
need to conjure apart from those we see? What secrets must She share? But 
She is consigned to wandering the surface, like skin.299  
                                            
299 This image comes from Michel Chion describing a voice that occupies a liminal space 
where it can neither occupy a body on screen, or the ‘removed position of the image 
presenter’. The Voice in Cinema (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 140.   
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 The Voice not only addresses what is represented in the image, She also 
addresses the image as object. This level of self-reflexivity is certainly not 
impossible in cinema; however, the installation setting creates a context where 
this kind of self-reflexivity is enmeshed in the entire architectural structure of the 
installation. This works to maintain an easy exchange from one perspective, 
address, world or subjectivity into another; it is not a jarring shift. See Figure 23.  
 You might say there is a battle for origins here: where and with whom does 
this story begin? It is unclear whether the Voice gives rise to the images, or the 
images give rise to Voice. The Voice and image challenge the veracity of one 
another; they each displace a notion of truth onto the other and argue for 
primacy in the story. The dissonance in story becomes a dissonance in time and 
place, a difficulty in pinpointing any stable ‘character’, event or place.300 The 
image persistently escapes the Voice; the Voice would colonise the image. The 
image does not cooperate on the level of representation. The images do not 
show what She speaks. Let us address, then, the subject matter in the frame.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
300 This is also true because the Voice re-tells so many other people’s stories, and 
addresses various others (using he, she, you, I) 
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I think I want to go back to that time 
when we believed we could slip into 
the shape of a lion, or a tree. And come 
back again. 
Figure 23
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FIGURES IN THE FRAME 
 
 
The moving image persistently returns to representations of statues. These 
statues are of human form and depicted from many perspectives. This depiction 
becomes an obsessive documentation of the figures in parks and public 
squares. Statues speak publicly and privately or occupy both public and private 
space. Often they are caught in some private moment of reflection or act. They 
stand in public squares, at the centre of towns. They are our public figures, the 
faces of our cities, histories and peoples. In Straying, the Voice sometimes 
addresses the statues directly, or so it seems. She addresses them both as 
statues and as actual figures embodying her object of desire. The statues’ 
lifelessness in the form of lifelike bodies makes the absence of people more 
present. The Voice seems to coax the statues to life through her speech. As we 
watch these “bodies” on screen, we might feel the absent body of the Voice 
more acutely. Their static forms are pregnant with the potential to move, caught 
as they often are at the height of some significant action.301  
The “birth” of the statue as it is told in Ancient Greek myth might help 
elucidate some narrative and thematic intentions for its dominance in the 
installation. This myth tells the story of how Athena accidentally kills her best 
friend Pallas.302 In her mourning for her friend she builds a wooden statue in her 
likeness – the Palladium – dresses it in her own aegis and places it next to her 
own father. Athena sometimes comes to inhabit the Palladium, making its/her 
eyes burn and body perspire, bringing it/her to ‘life’. The accident ‘haunts 
Athena much the way she herself haunts the palladiums as an expression of her 
deep desire and sorrow’.303 In this way the statue can be seen as a synecdoche, 
‘a part that bends or leans with desire toward wholeness or completion in a 
gesture of mourning for what is missing or lost’.304 Athena can only be whole, or 
                                            
301 Recall Lessing and Laocoön. See note 69 above. 
302 Kirstin S. Santilli, Poetic Gesture (New York: Routledge, 2002), 82. 
303  Ibid., 84. 
304  Ibid., 86. 
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complete, if she is reunited with Pallas; but the palladium is only a fragment that 
signifies the real Pallas. The Palladium then heralds the era of the lifeless statue: 
both a representation and a substitution.305 The Palladium also played the role of 
protector of the city and marker of other significant sites: for example mileage on 
the road, and burial sites.306 Statues immortalise the dead, but they also mark 
the site, they mark the dead body and the place where s/he was buried. The 
dead and the site are inseparable. The Voice speaks to the statues in the same 
way she speaks to the image. The Voice is like Athena, haunting these images 
like Athena haunted Pallas, so that she may bring her back to life.  
In Straying it is not clear what bodies and places the statues mark; we 
might say they do not have a voice. The Voice is missing a body. They each 
bend towards each other: the image haunting the Voice, the Voice haunting 
these empty bodies and empty landscapes. She appeals to the statues on 
screen. She appeals to something She has lost, a dead or lost part of her self. 
Perhaps for a moment it may appear that the Voice articulates the stone bodies, 
completing their static movements. The camera seems to articulate them too as 
it probes them from various angles. In some moments you might be able to 
imagine them moving. These are gestures of mourning, gestures towards the 
past, towards memory that is fast disappearing.  
For Alphonso Lingis, Antony Gormley’s sculptural works reach toward 
these multiple directions of place, history and emotion:  
 
diagnostic instruments set up to reveal the city and the landscape to which 
its inhabitants belong. They are guideposts leading us into deeper layers of 
the geography of the town, marking intersections of ancient pilgrimage and 
trade routes that gave rise to the town … They mark sites where the 
emotions of its inhabitants make contact with this deep structure.307 
                                            
305  Ibid. 
306 George Steiner, “Cosmogony,” Chapter 9, in The Owl's Legacy, written by Chris 
Marker (Film International Television Production and La Sept,1989). 
307 Alphonso Lingis, "Inner Space," Mosaic-a Journal For The Interdisciplinary Study Of 
Literature 43, no. 2 (2010): 42. 
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The statue has a revelatory power; it is not just a marker but a passage. You 
might say it is a passage towards the ‘hidden resemblances’ within this ‘deep 
structure’ that holds our connectedness to a place.308 
Gormley turns towards a similar attitude in his own approach to 
sculpture. For Gormley, statues are ‘something coming up from under the earth, 
becoming as we all are earth above ground, but retaining a feeling of having 
been hidden and then revealed’.309 Gormley’s description maintains an ‘always 
already there’ quality to the statue; emerging at some propitious moment. The 
disposition and focus on interconnectedness are resonant with Martin 
Heidegger’s conception of ‘dwelling’, which might help us extend this 
conversation from statues to other kinds of built forms, and hence how we might 
think of not only the statues in the images but also other natural and built forms 
that are depicted.    
 For Heidegger, the interconnectedness that both Gormley and Lingis 
identify is a gathering together of what he calls the ‘fourfold’: earth, sky, divinities 
and mortals.310 When we gather we build and we build so that we may dwell: 
‘Man is in so far as he dwells’.311 We build bridges, buildings and statues to mark 
place, to make sites. It is about “making significant” rather than marking 
something already significant. For example, to build a bridge makes the bank: 
‘the bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream’.312 When we build 
structures, we also bring meaning to the things around them.  
                                            
308 This ‘deep structure’ recalls Steiner on poetry and the ‘unnumbered furnishings of 
reality through which a poem incarnates’, the ‘highly active context, a corpus, possibly 
an entire world of supporting, echoing, validating, or qualifying material.’ On Difficulty, 
265. Note Steiner’s use of ‘corpus’, a living body of associations, a deep structure of 
connectedness.  
309 Gormley, Antony. “Learning to Think.” Quoted in Lingis, Inner Space, note 7, 44. 
310 Heidegger, Martin. Poetry, Language, Thought. New York: Harper Collins, 2001. I do 
not adopt Heidegger’s conception in its totality, and particularly the central idea of the 
fourfold as a kind of unity, completeness, all-encompassing being. I am interested in 
fractures. However, the multiplicity of what is gathered, what is made room for, does 
resonate with this work. 
311 Ibid., 145. 
312 Ibid.,150. 
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 Gathering is also about making space, not just about building, but also 
about making room for dwelling. This is a double movement, something like the 
cubist artwork that moves towards and away from itself, something like the idea 
of evolving and devolving simultaneously. This double movement accommodates 
Heidegger’s notion of where the human fits in this relation to the ‘fourfold’:  
 
when we speak of man and space, it sounds as though man stood on one 
side, space on the other. Yet space is not something that faces man. It is 
neither an external object nor an inner experience.313  
 
Heidegger dismantles this idea of the internal and external and focuses more on 
the process of ‘making’, of movement and flow from one into the other.  
  These are descriptions of ideal states. States such as these for a 
displaced, disembodied, dislocated person such as the Voice, are unavailable. 
But it is what She leans towards, what She desires, what She attempts to 
reconcile. The installation enacts this attempt: it has made room, it has gathered, 
it has erected screens as sculptures.314 Images have been taken in an attempt to 
structure meaning around the site, but the Voice is not ‘there’, She cannot quite 
make her way back in order to dwell (in the room, in the image, on the screen).  
All of the footage in the installation is of the exterior environment; there are 
no interior shots. We are always in some sense connected to the earth, the sky, 
the horizon. Buildings appear, bodies of water appear, fields and flowers and 
basketball courts appear. The buildings start to look like the statues; we might 
start to see them as faces. They are as equally impenetrable as the statues and 
they are as equally static but full of the promise of movement. Anyone at any 
moment might come to a window and open it, or draw a curtain.315  
                                            
313 Ibid.,154. 
314 These screens are not so much arising out of the earth as suspended in the air, 
somewhat ethereal. They are marked with an ambiguous status, quite different to 
Gormley, for example: arising out of, and being of, the earth. 
315 This possibility engenders expectation, it encourages an engaged look. This is one of 
the functions of the documentary image, to look expectantly. 
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 Here we have to acknowledge the specificity of site again. More than any 
other feature, the architecture betrays the geopolitical location; it betrays its 
socialist history. For this researcher, the architecture summons memories of 
prosperity, plenty, happiness and security. But these memories and impulses 
towards filming them were tempered by the empty or sometimes decayed 
buildings I was encountering. They were also countered by the stories that 
people were sharing with me about the mass exodus of populations from 
villages to towns, about the mass closure of factories and the ceasing of 
production.316  
 The images themselves are silent; there is no diegetic sound. This 
contributes to the feelings of absence, loss and distance. These feelings are 
themselves unsettled by the occasional small movements by the edge of the 
frame: someone might walk by on the edge of the court or a bird might take 
flight right across the screen. We latch onto these movements; a different kind of 
possibility is awakened. We thought we were alone, but there are movements 
that haunt the edges of the screen that tell us we are not. The movement of the 
camera is another trace of a body and of movements. 
 Another kind of urgency looms with the flowing bodies of water. The 
rhythm dislodges the inertia, bringing with it ideas of movement, travel and 
transport. Water can connect, like fascia in the body, holding everything 
together. The inevitable questions arise. Where does the river flow? Where is its 
source? Where is its mouth? Even rivers have beginnings and endings. But not 
in this frame. This image can tell you nothing of this. It is only a fragment. Bodies 
of water are of course also about the impossibility of crossing.  
‘Everything moves’, according to Lefebvre, even a rock; we just need to 
know how to read its rhythm.317 An image, of course, can be said to be 
ontologically static or moving. This has been one of the main arguments made 
                                            
316 Yugoslavia was famous for the way in which it built the economy on having factories 
in small towns and making villages prosperous. Of course also for its sustainable 
production and economy, being a socialist country, and rich with natural resources. 
317 Henri Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis (London: Continuum, 2004), 25. 
 143 
for the ontology of the cinema, made on the basis of its movement.318 But what 
we have not yet discussed in regard to the moving images in the installation is 
their duration. And, according to Justin Remes, this, in fact, comes closer to 
defining the ontology of cinema: not movement, but time.319 Remes makes his 
argument by way of a discussion of the ‘cinema of stasis’, where there is little or 
no movement – but there is duration. This kind of cinema, he argues, makes 
room for contemplation, allows the audience to make connections and 
associations across the work and in relation to their own experience.   
In Straying, movement duration and audience have direct bearing on one 
another and on the experience of the work. The relationship between stasis and 
movement is established within (and across) the frame(s). Given that the 
audience is free to move around the space, I am interested in how the different 
rhythms of movement and duration on screen affect the audience and the 
manner in which they move through, sit or stand still in the work.320 What kind of 
movement on screen makes the audience move? What kind of movement or 
stasis inspires them to move closer or further away from the screen, towards or 
away from this or that image?  
 In my editing process, I have attempted to allow each shot to run to its full 
length. This is to do with my interest in indexicality and maintaining a certain 
closeness to the experience. The audience member in this case engages or 
disengages with any of the three screens at any point; it is they that individually 
ascribe duration to the images; they virtually “edit” the work. The shots are often 
long in themselves. During shooting I was responding to this question of how 
long I must sit there before something “happened”? How long is long enough 
before we will understand the significance of this shot? How many angles must I 
get of this statue before we will really see and understand its form?  
                                            
318 For a comprehensive argument see Justin Remes, "Motion(Less) Pictures: The 
Cinema of Stasis," British Journal of Aesthetics 53, no. 3 (2012): 257-70.  
319 Chris Marker’s film La Jetée (1962) is perhaps the most significant film that explores 
this explicitly. 
320 There are stools in the space as well, so presumably some audience members will 
also chose to sit and watch from one perspective at least some of the time.  
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 My supposition is that the audience member has a more intimate 
relationship to the work because they have so much agency in creating it. My 
interest is in how this agency and intimacy play out in terms of the contemplative 
and the moving body in relation to the image and the passing of time. If duration 
opens up a space for contemplation, what does this mean for the body and how 
it moves? Where does the contemplative person find themselves in terms of their 
proximity to the image? Does the contemplative body move or stand still? What 
rhythms does it enact or does it eschew the contemplative potential of the work 
altogether? These questions begin to directly address the affective potential of 
Straying. In order to continue this discussion, we now must turn towards a more 
directly phenomenological perspective, which I will address in the following 
section.  
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FLESH 
 
 
 
Flesh is what holds everything together. Flesh is the world, according to Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. Flesh is what comes to mind when the stony skin of the statue 
plays on the screen. The work appeals to the flesh of the audience, the moving, 
thinking, feeling, seeing flesh. To what degree the Voice in Straying has any 
sensation of flesh is questionable because She seems to not have a body. She 
does seem to have eyes, so perhaps She has some sense of touch. The 
uncertainty around her disembodied, dislocated status, questions around her 
belonging or alienation from the image, are the primary concerns in the narrative 
and theme of the installation.  
 This section looks at the phenomenology of perception in order to think 
through some of the motivations and narrative turns in Straying. It may help us 
re-think or re-structure the initial question or concern. It directly connects the 
seeing, moving body to its environment and considers how this dynamic 
influences a sense of self. The narrative and the physical set up of the screens 
bring together the image, place and body so that an explicit enactment of the 
phenomenological lines of thought from Heidegger to Husserl to Merleau-Ponty 
is manifested: ‘we are in the world, we are the world and the world is us.’321 By 
placing the audience’s body and subjectivity at the centre of this (and alongside 
the subjectivity of the Voice), these dynamics are given room to be played out, 
tried out, imagined, re-formed.  
 In order to privilege thinking about the body, I would like to evoke the 
figure of the dancer. This figure is dancing toward the moment when She might 
speak. The work is perpetually at the edge of the moment when the dancer 
speaks or the actor dances. These moments arise when the figure reaches the 
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limit of their expression. They reach an uncrossable impasse and so they go 
through a transformation in order to ‘speak differently’. Whether they speak well 
or speak at all is not certain or given. It is the moment of transformation, foot to 
tongue or tongue to hip, which is of interest.  
The dancer’s movement, as I see it here, does not have a clear trajectory. 
Its beauty lies in its unpredictability. The figure does not move to any strict 
choreography. She improvises and her movements are unpredictable to her own 
self. The body moves and is moved, tensions arising from within and pulling from 
without. This dance might be set to music. The dancer moves to rhythms that 
move in and out of the body and sometimes against the grain. This kind of 
movement might let the garment gape;322 the music might seem to stand still 
and flow on;323 the body follows, suspends, falls.  
The dancer does not only move her body, She moves space. The point at 
which She moves her body and then moves space is difficult if not impossible to 
pinpoint. The figure becomes expressive beyond the boundaries of the skin, 
carrying her towards a state of ecstasy, transforming the body so that it achieves 
unity with what is outside the self, achieving a unity between self, time and 
space.  
But what of the statue that is caught in a single moment, taken out of the 
dance and fixed to a single gesture? The static object depicted in a static frame 
in the moving image calls attention to the flow of time. It conjures the ruin and 
time’s relationship to history, object and culture. The ruin stands in some place 
between the past and the now, standing some way between the natural and the 
human world, occupying this liminal space that is the hinge between life and 
death or the seam between what is seeable and what is sayable. The statue, in 
its human shape, teases with its obvious impossibility of movement. The image 
almost animates the statue’s form as it moves around it, showing it from various 
                                                                                                                   
321 Jenny Chamarette, Phenomenology and the Future of Film (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 13. 
322 Reference to Barthes. See note 78 above. 
323 Reference to Ligeti. See note 72 above. 
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angles. The Voice coaxes the statues to gesture by appealing directly to them 
with language imperatives.  
 Sculpture can awaken a sense of the inner space of our bodies, as Lingis 
claims of the work of Gormley. This inner space, according to Lingis, is ‘not 
something that our minds grasp conceptually … it is only accessible through 
direct physical relationship’.324 This direct relationship is and is not available in 
Straying – the audience has a direct physical relationship to the screen, to the 
image, and the image offers various aspects on the statue so we might know it 
from many sides. Still, the kind of accessibility Lingis speaks of is unavailable to 
us as pre-given, it isn’t simply available. It may leave the audience with a 
yearning, a reach, which is ultimately never fulfilled.  
The excursion I have led you on from the dancer to the statue, from the 
moving figure to the inner space of bodies, takes us to Gilles Deleuze’s ‘thinking 
body’. This is not a body that thinks, but a body that plunges us towards the 
‘unthought’.325 This kind of body must move toward a new way of being, must 
move toward new knowledge which remains otherwise inaccessible. The body is 
our transport towards it, towards transformation. This is why the figure of the 
dancer is apt: a figure that is always moving, looking for and finding new spaces 
in which to find new ways of expression; new ways of experiencing those spaces 
by way of the moving body. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology says that 
everything we know, we know through the body. If the world is dislocated, this is 
because  ‘one’s own body has ceased to be a knowing body.’326 This begs the 
question. How might one reawaken a body that has ceased to produce meaning 
                                            
324 Lingis, Inner Space, 40. 
325 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Roberta Galeta (London: 
Continuum, 1989), 182. 
326 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1962), 285, quoted in Santilli, Poetic Gesture, 61. 
This notion is challenged in Straying. In my use of the moving image I can imply that the 
environment actually does have agency, it is a character in as much as the Voice is. It is 
not only a matter of the body “knowing”, it is also about the image/ place yielding, 
coming to the conversation, allowing itself to be touched. The “environment” in this work 
allows and disallows a union with this body; it has a memory, it has its own desires. Both 
have subjective experiences of one another. 
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sensually in relation to its environment? This is one of the central questions in 
Straying.  
The notion of the ‘thinking body’ appeared in Homer, where the conditions 
of this body are what we might now think of as mental states.327 You will not find 
in Homer a thinking, deciding, knowing, remembering person.328 Emotions and 
feelings manifest physically in the body. There are three main states of the body; 
they are: thumos, psyche and noos. Thumos is the conscious feeling or soul, 
psyche is life,329 and noos is the seat of intelligence.330 We can see this, for 
example, in the way emotions are expressed in terms of physical manifestation: 
‘the palpitating heart or panting breath or uttering cries’.331 These are active 
bodies, not controlled by the mind as a separate organ that resides in the 
head.332 As Padel demonstrates:  
 
the pre-Aristotelian Greeks did not make a strict distinction between literal 
and metaphorical usage … Pre-Socratic Greeks did not feel it necessary 
to state clearly whether noos was a vessel, an organ or a force … they had 
not adopted the now-familiar view of mind as the organ of belief, desire 
and intention.333  
 
This is a view I privilege, even if only metaphorically, and if only to thrust the body 
rather than the psychology of the mind to the forefront of the investigation.334  
There are a number of ‘bodies’ that I have identified in this research: the 
body of the audience, the ‘absent’ body of the Voice, the figure of the dead body 
                                            
327 David R. Olson, The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of 
Writing and Reading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 238. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid., 239. 
330 Arthur Hilary Armstrong, Classical Mediterranean Spirituality (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1986), 361. 
331 Olson, The World, 239. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ruth Padel, In and Out of the Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1992), 
cited in Olson, The World, 241. 
334 As mentioned earlier, I do not completely eschew emotion and feeling and 
psychology. I do not completely adopt the Pre-Socratic ideas, either, but I privilege the 
idea over, for example, a psychoanalytic model.  
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of the statues, bodies of water, buildings as bodies and the body of the 
installation. In light of the pre-Socratic Greeks, can we think of these bodies as 
‘states’, as ‘thinking’, moving towards the ‘unthought’? The only ‘real’ body with 
such agency is the body of the audience. The other ‘bodies’ all evoke inertias 
and absences, but this is precisely what might focus the body of the audience as 
the primary ‘organ’ in the work. I intend to say, pay attention to how you move, 
your body is thinking, it is moving you toward the unthought. The statue and the 
Voice falter towards achieving a new way of thinking, experiencing, being. They 
do not have bodies where new thought can reside in the shape of a palpitating 
heart or uttering cry. The statue maybe once did. And the Voice is attempting to 
gather her body back to her self, but the passage is difficult to imagine or 
foresee. Nonetheless this is the desire that is articulated through the relationship 
between language and image.  
 Kristin Santilli, in her study on poetic gestures, traces the connection 
between the knowing, gesturing body and the linguistic impulse, so that the 
transformation from the gesturing body to speech is about speaking the body’s 
experience.335 This impulse manifests in poetry, the poem as body, ‘undulating 
with the natural and characteristic gestures of an earthly human being’.336 This 
brings us to the moment I evoked at the beginning of this section: the moment 
when the dancer speaks. However, for this work, it is the moment before, the 
movement towards speech, that we are most interested in,337 if only because 
actual expression is impossible. There is, after all, an absence of the poetic 
artefact in the installation, but the reach towards a poetic structure is an attempt 
to communicate the body’s experience through means other than speech. The 
attempt is to leave a trace of ‘what it feels like’.   
                                            
335 Santilli, Poetic Gesture, 66. 
336 Ibid. 
 
337 This is the same moment that Lessing is interested in, too, but in this instance, it is 
not only so that the viewer can have the pleasure of completing the movement. Here, 
expression beyond this point is impossible, or too frightening to even imagine. The 
audience is left at the edge of a precipice, at the yawning abyss. 
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Might we then think of the moving image in the terms Santilli sets up for 
the poem as body: that the moving image ‘speaks the body’s experience’? This 
would be to consider not only the screen as skin or body, but the image as a 
body sensually producing meaning. The ‘problem’ with the images/bodies in 
Straying, however, is that they too are only on the verge of speaking. This 
speaking cannot become manifest because there are fragmented and 
competing narratives (three irreconcilable screens).  
  The perspectives on the ‘thinking body’ which I share with you are all 
different; I do not wish to conflate their concepts or to ignore fundamental 
differences. But I rouse certain ways of seeing (through/with) the body that 
inspire a thinking about subjectivity and its explicit connection to movement, to 
thinking, to speaking.  
 I will offer up one more perspective which can only act as a provocation, 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s conception of our phenomenal reality as discussed by 
Jenny Chamarette: 
 
When referring to our (mis)constructions of a phenomenal tangible reality, 
through our bodies, Nietzsche describes a practice of falsification and 
misinterpretation, which takes place via a misapprehension of the chaos 
of becoming: that a body is whole, present in its entirety. Because we 
misapprehend the flux of our bodies and replace it with the illusion of a 
phenomenal, whole, tangible reality, this forms the beginnings of a 
constantly misplaced subjective self-grasp, producing a vicious circle of 
misapprehension and falsification in order to support the notion of a 
cohesive self.338  
 
In light of this view, we might say that the installation does not simply illuminate 
an impossibility of cohesion that a displaced person might experience, but that it 
may be bringing to light something like Nietzsche’s ‘practice of 
                                            
338 Jenny, Chamarette, Phenomenology and the Future of Film (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 204. 
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misapprehension’. Cohesion is impossible in the first place, and anything 
experienced as whole is only an illusion. The displaced body, however, does not 
have the privilege of that illusion and is consigned to continually searching for 
‘completion’.  
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THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL TURN 
 
 
The phenomenological turn in this research happened quite by accident, or by 
necessity. When the representative power of the images did not “speak”, my 
speaking to them became an act of excavation. This was the intention, but this is 
not what really happened. The image did not yield more rather, the image 
demanded a greater complexity of engagement of me, an engagement with my 
own sense of place. Because my own sense is full of breakages, errant 
experiences, lacks and excesses, finding a form that was representational of 
these things was an impossible task. I was like the dancer dancing to the limit of 
my expression. I needed another to complete the action. This other had to be 
the audience. I had to create a work with such conditions that the audience was 
empowered to take this next step. They had to be moved by the work.  
 I have already discussed Marks’ work and her phenomenological 
approach to intercultural cinema which turns toward a ‘haptic visuality’ when the 
sayable and the seeable are unavailable. At the time of making Straying, I had 
not made an explicit connection between it, the phenomenology of perception 
and film spectatorship. However, I can now see that this approach can help 
identify the relationships that are encouraged to manifest between the work and 
the audience.  
 This is key to the kind of contribution the research makes in investigating 
the quality of displacement. Straying is an invitation to the audience to literally 
and figuratively perambulate around the work, to bring something of themselves 
to it: their own imaginings and memories. I will now look at how I make this 
invitation in light of Merleau-Ponty’s and James J Gibson’s phenomenologies of 
perception, as well as the phenomenology of the moving image. I will refer to 
Sue Cataldi’s reading and application of Merleau-Ponty’s and Gibson’s 
phenomenologies in her study of ‘sensitive space’ and deep emotion. Cataldi’s 
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work in particular is resonant with this research because the idea of movement 
and knowing is core to both of our contentions.339 
 Merleau-Ponty’s and Gibson’s phenomenologies re-inserted the 
‘perceiver’ (as ‘individual’) into existing theories of perception, which were 
fundamentally scientific empiricist models. Phenomenological approaches to film 
and cinema studies also take this as an appropriate starting point, as it allows 
thinking through of the various subjectivities evident in the relationship between 
spectator and film and also enables thinking about an embodied and affective 
experience.340 My own study here will necessarily be oversimplified, forgoing a 
sustained and deep reading. I can only highlight the most insistent aspects. The 
following subsections can be thought of as swatches with which, or through 
which, to read and experience the work.  
 For both Merleau-Ponty and Gibson, the concomitant relationship 
between the body and the environment plays a central role in how we perceive 
that environment; we perceive with the whole, moving body. In their theories of 
depth perception both Merleau-Ponty and Gibson begin by dismantling the 
otherwise established dichotomies between subject and object, subjectivity and 
objectivity, the external and the internal. This is a critical shift to how I initially 
conceived this work. There are four key concepts that might guide us through a 
discussion about how the world may be experienced as such.  
 
 
 
                                            
339 Cataldi, Emotion, Depth, and Flesh. I will elaborate on this point at the conclusion of 
this section. I will just point here to a difference in my and Cataldi’s focus. Cataldi is 
interested in deep emotion, I am interested in the body. For this reason I prefer the term 
‘affect’ to Cataldi’s term ‘emotion’. I use affect after Spinoza and Deleuze after him, to 
imply that the body is moved to act without a cognitive, emotional, psychological 
response to the stimulus. Affect refers to those ‘forces … other than conscious knowing 
… beyond emotion – that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and 
extension.’ Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, ed. The Affect Theory Reader 
(London: Duke University Press, 2010), 1. 
 
340 See Anne Rutherford on the distinction and nuance: ‘subjectivity is not conterminous 
with embodied experience.’ Anne Rutherford, What Makes a Film Tick? (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 2011), 148. 
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Reversibilities 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘reversibility’, or in Gibson’s study, ‘reversible 
occlusions’, is the notion that, through movement, what stands as hidden in 
space can become unhidden and what is unhidden can become hidden (hence 
the relationship between hidden and unhidden is ‘reversible’).341 The ‘occluding 
edge’ separates what is hidden from the unhidden and in this way ‘it both 
separates and connects the hidden and unhidden surface, both divides and 
unites them’.342 This aspect of Gibson’s theory leads him to say that the visible 
and invisible are continuous; ‘to perceive the persistences of surfaces that are 
out of sight is also to perceive their coexistence with those that are in sight’.343 
Cataldi makes the point that Gibson does not mean that we can see the 
unseen;344 however, I take this idea to its quasi-fantastical end and do entertain 
the notion of seeing the unseen, or at least that one might be able to touch the 
invisible. The installation is endowed with this kind of ‘affordance’.  
 
Affordance 
 
This is another of Gibson’s terms where ‘the affordances of the environment are 
what it offers to the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill…It 
implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment’.345 An affordance 
points both to the environment and to the observer; it is both physical and 
psychical, phenomenal and a fact of the environment. In this construction we 
see the insufficiency of the subjective–objective dichotomy; we can see how a 
continuity between our sense of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ starts to point to a unity 
rather than separateness. We start to see here a blurring of the body–world 
                                            
341 Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 31 
342 James J Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New Jersey, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), 32, quoted in Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 
32. 
343 Gibson, Ecological Approach, 137, quoted in Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 32. 
344 Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 32. 
345 Gibson, Ecological Approach, 127, quoted in Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 33. 
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boundary. Merleau-Ponty describes this as ‘perceptible-percipience’; a hand 
that touches is also always simultaneously being touched.346  
 
Flesh 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘flesh ontology’ offers a concept with which to think about the 
‘fundamental unity permeating all interrelated, interwoven things.’347 Flesh holds 
everything together; therefore it functions as a ‘medium’348 where we can 
experience a kind of ‘distanced contact’: the notion of being connected to 
something that you are not touching but seeing at a distance. Merleau-Ponty 
asks, ‘where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the 
world is flesh?’349  Flesh is what connects the perceiving subject and the 
perceived object, one is not intelligible without the other, in fact, ‘what happens 
in me can pass over into the other. Our being is contagious … our experience is 
not immanent but transitive’.350 See Figure 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
346 See Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge, 
2002. 1958. 
347 Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 60. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible (Evanston: Northwest University 
Press, 1968), 138, quoted in Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 189, note 19.  
 
350 Remigius C. Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics, (Pittsburg, Duquesne 
University Press, 1966), 68, quoted in Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 71. I have 
been using the term “density” which Merleau-Ponty calls ‘flesh’. I like Merleau-Ponty’s 
use of ‘flesh’ because it brings the body and space into equanimity, both as alive and 
moving, as affecting one another. But I also like density because it designates that there 
is an effort that varies according to the body and the environment it moves through. 
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Conduits for transformation: darkness, 
repetition, ritual, incantation, loss of self, 
commingling.
Figure 24
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The right distance 
 
If our experience is transitive, then the dynamic between the perceiver and the 
perceived is a constantly changing one. However, maintenance of the right 
distance between self and world is crucial to our wellbeing.351 Merleau-Ponty 
conceives of distance as intimate, a ‘proximity through distance’. This has 
implications for our sense of ‘self’: ‘phenomenologically our sense of “self” 
hinges on the simultaneity of being ‘open to and closed off from others; 
simultaneously intermingled with and distanced from them.’352 The ‘normative’ 
perspective is that ‘our ‘lived’ experience of the world is that we belong to it, or 
are of it, but are not it.’353  
 
Disturbances 
 
We think of dislocation and displacement as a break between mind, body, time 
and place. This can be seen as a disturbance to our ‘happy distance’ from the 
environment. There are a number of disorders of the mind that hinge on this 
disturbance354 and involve the individual’s inability to control space or their 
relationship to it.355 Roger Caillois and Eugene Minkowski investigate this 
disturbance between body and space, and highlight how this disturbance 
impinges on a person’s sense of self, their sense of identity.356 Identity and 
environment, then, are intimately connected.  
                                            
351 Cataldi calls this the ‘happy medium,’ Ibid., 3. 
352 Ibid., 28. Note here that we start to speak not just about the individual and 
environment but anything outside the boundary of the skin of the individual (which 
encompasses other individuals). 
353 Ibid. 
354 These are not linked directly or specifically to how we would use the terms dislocation 
and displacement as they relate to a diasporic experience. 
355 Often this manifests in obsessive compulsive disorder, for example, where the sufferer 
attempts to control their environment through repetitive acts upon that environment. 
356 Caillois’ study is on legendary psychesthenia. Roger Caillois, “Mimicry and Legendary 
Psychesthenia”, in Claudine Frank ed. The Edge of Surrealism : A Roger Reader. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. Minkowski’s study is on how this disturbance is a 
feature of schizophrenia. Eugene Minkowski, Lived Time. Chicago: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970. 
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 Caillois names legendary psychesthenia as a disorder where the sufferer 
experiences a ‘veritable lure of space’, where they wish to become ‘assimilated 
into the environment’.357 By assimilation, Caillois means mimicry by the organism 
of the environment. This causes a disturbance in the sufferer’s feeling of their 
personality, which Caillois defines as ‘an awareness of the distinction between 
organism and environment’.358 In legendary psychesthenia this distinction fails, 
the distinction being specifically ‘between the mind and a specific point in 
space’.359 For Caillois, losing the self in relation to a coordinate outside the body 
is a schizophrenic experience which he describes in the following way: ‘I know 
where I am, but I don’t feel that I am where I am’.360  
 In the natural environment, some species achieve mimicry of their 
environment morphologically.361 For a human being, this mimicry means they are 
suffering from a perceptual disorder where they feel that  
 
space … is a devouring force. Space pursues them, encircles them, 
digests them … The body separates itself from thought, the individual 
breaks the boundary of his skin and occupies the other side of his senses 
… He feels himself becoming space, dark space into which things cannot 
be put.362  
 
Caillois borrows this notion of ‘dark space’ from Minkowski and his study on 
schizophrenia.363 Minkowski’s notion of ‘dark space’ can be read as both a 
disorder and a space of desire. Dark space has no depth of the kind that can 
                                            
357 Caillois, Mimicry and Legendary Psychesthenia, 99. 
358 Ibid., 100. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Caillois points out that this, in some species, is not about its survival (as, for example, 
camouflage often is). There are species where the ‘lure of space’ is so strong, and the 
mimesis so successful, that members of a particular species mistake each other for 
leaves and cannibalise one another. He concludes that ‘once we have established that 
mimicry cannot be a defence mechanism, then a disorder of spatial perception is the 
only thing it can be. Ibid., 99. 
362 Ibid., 100. 
363 Eugene Minkowski, Lived Time.  Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1970. 
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measure a distance ‘from here’, but it has a kind of ‘pure depth’,364 a single 
depth without dimension. Dark space is a personal and intimate space because 
there is no distance that separates the self from objects. Minkowski’s dark space 
has a positive value, just as the night is not only the absence of light but has its 
own materiality.365 The dark of the night is penetrating and reaches into the very 
depths of our being. It is more ‘mine’ than the ‘clear’ space of light or visual 
space.366 For Minkowsi, dark space is mysterious, but again a mystery which is 
positive, which is to say that you are in the presence of something hidden or 
unknown. In a review of Minkowski’s Lived Time, Jacques Lacan calls 
Minkowski’s dark space ‘another space besides geometrical space, namely, the 
dark space of groping, hallucination and music, which is the opposite of clear 
space, the framework of objectivity’.367 In this affective space, objects seem to 
touch us; they are no longer at a distance.  
 Caillois, Minkowski and Merleau-Ponty connect dark space with identity. 
And although Minkowski uses such descriptors as ‘intimate’ and ‘positive’, he 
also says it ‘almost destroy(s) (his) personal identity’.368 Dark space is so 
enveloping, so all-consuming that Merleau-Ponty says it is as if it is destroying 
him. Dark space for Merleau-Ponty is a very frightening place, it does not afford 
him the right distance from the world: 
 
what protects the sane man against delirium or hallucinations, is not his 
critical powers, but the structure of his space: objects remain before him, 
keeping their distance.369  
 
                                            
364 This is Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s term for a similar concept. Cataldi, Emotion, Depth 
and Flesh, 48. 
365 Minkowski, Lived Time, 406. 
366 Ibid. 
367 Lacan’s review appeared in Recherches philosophiques 1935-1936, quoted in 
Claudine Frank, ed., The Edge of Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003), 90. 
368 Minkowski, Lived Time, 406. 
369 Maurice Merlau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1962), 291, quoted in Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 52. 
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If we compare this to the idea of the right distance, then both legendary 
psychesthenia and dark space present as disorders, an uncomfortable place for 
the body to occupy. In Straying, because the Voice experiences not an 
uncomfortable proximity to space but an uncomfortable distance from it, the 
intimacy of dark space becomes her desire. Her desire for the place from which 
She is dislocated turns into a desire to become it, to be so close to it that She no 
longer feels the boundary between it and her self. See Figure 25. 
 I present this impossible and even fantastical desire in Straying 
deliberately and I frame it as both a matter of perspective (as in the disorders 
outlined) and a matter of morphology (as in the case of Caillois’ insects).370 I do 
this in order to propose that morphology and perspective are not so far apart 
when we are speaking about the ways in which we experience place. The space 
changes us, we change in relation to the space and it is all just a matter of 
perspective.  
 
 
 
                                            
370 See note 361 above. 
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I have tried and still failed to bend my 
voice in the shape of what is no longer 
my body.
Figure 25
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Movement and deep thought 
 
To move beyond the self, beyond one’s current place or position in relation to a 
situation, is crucial if we are to come to a new way of thinking, being, feeling, 
about that situation. It is also what happens when we feel deep emotion – we 
are moved.371 This theorization borders the literal and figurative. It takes into its 
compass a geography, a physical environment and an understanding of how the 
individual relates to that environment, and of course, it is also only a play on 
words, a metaphor – what it feels like. Movement has been an imperative 
necessity in the conduct of this research at both the literal and figurative level. I 
reached so many impasses – with my self, and the apparatus – that literal 
movement, a literal shift in position and perspective is what I continually 
enacted.372 Movement is critical to the affective experience that is conditioned for 
the audience in Straying. This works also at both the literal and figurative levels. 
The Voice in Straying yearns for a body and for movement, foregrounding the 
absence of her body. The audience has a body, and they can move, they can 
literally take up various positions and perspectives throughout the work. Their 
moving bodies have agency, a presentness that is available for transformation. 
This is unlike the Voice who is caught in a continual cycle of iterations and 
echoes. She seems unable to move and find different positions in relation to the 
image.  
 But movement might be a misplaced ambition, or at least, it is not 
uncomplicated or always yielding of positive consequences. This experience 
might be said to be a dislocation, as one moves (or is moved) to a different place 
in relation to a situation: ‘emotional experience cannot take place without some 
                                            
371 This relates to Cataldi’s central theory, which is an extension of Gabriel Marcel’s 
Mystery of Being, and Glen Mazis’ theory of e-motion in Emotion and Embodiment. See 
Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 11, 44 
372 Evidence of this can be found in Straying with the range of different natural 
environments (there was obviously a lot of ground covered during recording), and the 
multiple perspectives offered of a single subject (this is mostly evident in the depiction of 
the statues).  
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such dis-orientation’.373 This theorisation would imply that the feeling of 
displacement or disorientation is common to any profound experience. Profound 
experience manifests in the body’s unmaking and making new boundaries 
between itself and the world. Dislocation is not only a traumatic experience of 
the diaspora.  
 It is also important to consider this spatio-temporal movement in contrast 
to spatio-temporal stasis, in relation to the moving image – whose lineaments 
are of time and space, of movement, duration, and stasis. I have, in an earlier 
discussion on stasis and movement, concurred with Remes that stasis is the 
space of deep thought in the cinema. This is not antithetical to Cataldi’s 
argument, I only posit this as a possible hinge that provides access to a terrain 
otherwise unavailable outside of this particular audiovisual installation setting. 
The physical movement that an audience member can enact can also 
simultaneously be countered by the stasis, or long duration, of a particular shot 
playing on the screen.374 I have worked to enable a space of contemplation and 
deep thought for the audience, through their engagement with the image. I have 
also conditioned the space so that the audience has a very direct and physical 
relationship with the screens, a very present connection, as if the screens too, 
are bodies. This very meeting facilitates the possibility of a shift in established 
boundaries between here, and there.  
 This is an important part of Cataldi’s conceptualisation which says that  
when we are emotionally ‘moved’ we find ourselves somewhere in-between, 
‘de-bordered and re-bordering’.375 We do not simply take up another position, 
we do not simply find another point at which to stand but rather, we are 
somewhere ‘in-between’; in the process of finding stable ground, finding the 
seam between our body and place/image.  
 This feeling has a positive value that is about entering an in-between 
space where new experience is to be encountered. This is what Marks claims for 
                                            
373 Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 91. 
374 This is quite likely, as many of the shots in Straying are long, durational ones.  
375 Cataldi, Emotion, Depth and Flesh, 91.  
 164 
the intercultural film: new knowledge is to be found in the space between the 
seeable and the sayable. This in-between space where new language and new 
expression is sought: for as-yet unarticulated experience and knowledge. This is 
the experience and knowledge outside official histories and official knowledges.  
 I have facilitated a dynamic synthesised from a range of theoretical 
positions and formal decisions, which, as I interpret and perceive them together, 
have resulted in a landscape that is shifting; it moves, revealing a new terrain by 
which to navigate knowing. This knowing is simultaneously of the self and of the 
space through which the body moves. Movement, identity and place cannot be 
thought or experienced separately.376  This landscape accommodates stasis, 
and duration, a slow, imperceptible unfolding.  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
376 The entire conceit of Straying is this very impossibility. This is why the installation is 
splintered, fragmented, impossible.  
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EMBODIED AFFECT AND THE IMAGE 
 
 
The ideas engaged and encountered by this research can be seen as its 
(deliberate) limit and affordance. We might first look at how this plays out at the 
level of the image with the help of Anne Rutherford’s study of the 
phenomenology of cinema spectatorship. Rutherford’s theorisation is particularly 
pertinent to the present research for the cogent way in which she privileges the 
idea of mimeses in the conception of embodied affect.377 Rutherford’s aesthetics 
of embodiment rests on ‘the relationship between vision and the body, the role 
of movement and tactility in that relationship, and the connection of this complex 
to affective experience.’378 Mimesis is the ‘critical link’ in this complex and to 
cinema spectatorship. Rutherford takes her conception of mimesis from Michael 
Taussig, who describes the relationship between perceiver and perceived as a 
‘palpable sensuous connection between the very body of the perceiver and the 
perceived.’379 This connection between the perceiver and perceived is ‘a 
porousness between one’s self, one’s own body and the objects or images of 
the world’.380  
 This ‘porousness’, or ‘haptic visuality’, is a ‘sympathetic vibration’ with 
some part of the image that connects to a bodily understanding or knowledge of 
that quality in the image.381 Rutherford describes this concept as the ‘nitty-gritty’, 
an identification, or rather ‘visceral experience’, ‘a porousness between one’s 
self, one’s own body and the objects or images of the world.’382 An identification 
with the weightlessness of a fish swimming in water might be an example.383  
The sympathetic vibration with the -ness of an aspect of the image is what gives 
                                            
377 Rutherford, What Makes a Film Tick?  
378 Ibid., 151. 
379 Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: a particular history of the senses (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 21, quoted in Rutherford, What Makes a Film Tick?,159. 
380 Ibid. We might be reminded of Caillois’ take on mimesis as the ‘veritable lure of 
space’. 
381 Ibid. 
382 Rutherford, What Makes a Film Tick?, 159. 
383 Ibid. 
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rise to an ‘affective resonance’, an embodied experience of the image, the 
feeling of being moved or touched by it.384  
 This composition could be applied across a number of levels of this 
research project: to me as researcher, to the audience and to the narrative as 
articulated by the Voice. But it is in the (re)iteration of these across all of these 
levels that is important to my research. The formal setup of the installation allows 
the interaction between these levels of experience, so that each of these 
‘scores’385  (my experience as researcher, the audience’s experience and the 
Voice’s experience as set up in the narrative) both contributes to and 
problematises the themes in the work. The ‘resonance’ emerges from their 
interplay. The work is about making visible the search for vibration.  
 My experiences during the fieldtrip are written into the work, not only 
through the image, but also in the voice-over. The images document my search 
for place, my search for my self in that place and the emptiness that I 
encountered. They are testaments to my continual engagement with the moving 
image and the lack of any -ness, or identification, with what is represented in the 
image, and more a resonance with my disconnection from it.  
 The voice-over on one level articulates another kind of absence: the 
absence of the interviewees from the fieldtrip that are the sources of the stories 
that the Voice re-tells. On the other hand the Voice articulates my desire for 
identification with the image, and She too encounters images that do not 
“speak”. See Figure 26. 
 Affective resonance is exactly what the Voice in the installation yearns for. 
The premise is that if the image and the self are porous, then through affective 
experience the Voice would ‘vibrate’ with the place that She is displaced from. 
She leans toward the image so that She may have the sensation of touch. Her 
‘leaning’, however, can only be through language, through the vibration of her  
 
                                            
384 Ibid. Ruthorford does not use ‘-ness’ as a stand-alone term, however, I think it is a 
useful articulation of the concept.  
385 I mean ‘score’ here as a musical score, but also the way in which each of these 
experiences marks the work itself.  
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I wonder if that cry could release these 
statues from their stony forms?
Figure 26
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own Voice in the room. This is one of the affordances of the audiovisual mode in 
approaching this subject.  
 But, the Voice does not have a body with which to feel resonance with 
the image. It is also the limitation, then. The implication might be that one cannot 
understand the images or place if one does not have a body, if one does not 
experience with the body. Sight (evidence) and tongue (language) alone will not 
do. This narrative frame privileges a phenomenological attitude to the moving 
image, and yet simultaneously it also seems to deny it. The image is also a 
place, the implication being that one cannot know place without a body that can 
access its -ness.  
 The disembodied Voice uses language in her attempt to find a 
sympathetic vibration with the –ness of it.386  The Voice attempts to achieve 
legendary psychesthenia through words, so that She might remember who She 
is, and so that She might then reconstitute herself. With respect to Lewis 
Carroll’s 1865 novel Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Celeste Olalquiaga 
makes an almost opposite argument for Alice’s experience: rather than achieving 
legendary psychesthenia through language, Alice alleviates it; by naming her 
reality and by speaking it, everything assumes its proper delineations.387 
Language helps Alice achieve the right distance from her world. In my version, 
the Voice uses language initially in the hope of its opposite effect; She hopes the 
words can loosen the boundaries and delineations, relax a little and make room 
for her. But both intentions reach towards finding that distinction between the 
mind and a point outside the body. In both versions, both characters are relying 
on language to be able to articulate exactly, an unproblematic language, perhaps 
Benjamin’s impossible ‘pure language’.  
 It works for Alice, but it does not work in the installation. The Voice 
cannot name her world exactly. There seems to be a dissonance between the 
images on the screens and the images She conjures with her words; they are 
different worlds. The images we see are inadequate and the images She 
                                            
386  This is what I as researcher performed too.  
387 Celeste Olalquiga, Megalopolis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 4. 
 169 
attempts to conjure with words are absent. This act does not make the world 
and the objects in it more solid; it frays their edges, they bleed into other worlds, 
they transform, become memories or fantasies. 
 If the images are lacking the -ness that Rutherford identifies as critical to 
an embodied and affect experience of the moving image, then how have I 
created the conditions for an affective experience for the audience, as I have 
claimed I have? Physical movement and space are at the core of this elucidation. 
Rutherford points out that to be moved in affective experiences of the moving 
image does not mean it is a ‘physical movement across a physical space’, when 
speaking of the cinema:  
 
it is a movement of the entire embodied being towards a corporeal 
appropriation of or immersion in a space, an experience, a moment… 
groping towards a connection, a link-up with the carnality of the idea, the 
affect of the body.388  
 
So how does this movement away from the self and towards the carnality of the 
idea manifest for the audience of Straying? It is in the very relationship between 
the Voice and the images that the disconnected-ness is evoked. This between-
ness is actual, physical, in Straying. This is because we have created a density in 
the room, we have made a place of it with our moving bodies. It is given form, it 
is the space that the audience occupies. For this reason the movement in 
Straying is a physical movement, across physical space. The audience is 
afforded their body in this environment. By offering space to the audience I am 
saying, you must move if you are to know, you must walk into another space so 
that you might experience the mysterious, the hidden.  
 This is the in-between space of displacement and searching. I do not 
mean this only in the negative sense, the geographic sense, but in the sense of 
being moved deeply so you might come to a new position on things, a new 
                                            
388 Rutherford, What Makes a Film Tick?, 158. 
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knowledge.389 The resonance happens here. This is the space of co-implication 
and co-constitution, neither here nor there, but the space of distanced contact.  
 The screens in the room are also part of this resonance. The screens that 
hang in the room are like other bodies and the Voice refers to them as “skins”. I 
call them ‘bodies’ in the sense that Gregory J. Seigworth defines a body in his 
rendering of affect; where affect is not only a sympathetic reverberation but also 
a disconnection and body is a kind of conduit towards affective experiences: 
 
affect accumulates across both relatedness and interruptions in 
relatedness, becoming a palimpsest of force encounters traversing the 
ebbs and swells of intensities that pass between “bodies” (bodies 
defined not by an outer skin-envelope or other surface boundary but by 
their potential to reciprocate or co-participate in the passages of affect). 
Bindings and unbindings, becomings and un-becomings, jarring 
disorientations and rhythmic attunements. Affect marks a body’s 
belonging to a world of encounters or a world’s belonging to a body of 
encounters but also, in non-belonging.390 
 
Seigworth’s argument is compelling in relation to Straying because it articulates 
the very condition I intend to create with the use of the screens. Of course it is 
not the screens alone, but also how the Voice does and does not address them. 
The screens are a boundary that separates and unites, binding and unbinding, a 
border and a conduit. In this dual role, the notion of the internal and external is 
complicated; in this ‘world of encounters’, we are always making and unmaking 
boundaries. The screens in this kind of world are like windows opening onto an 
external world, but they are also like a boundary that keeps us on the outside of 
another interiority. In this perpetual movement, the internal and external are not 
stable entities; this is the space of co-mingling. The in-between state is how 
                                            
389 Rutherford describes this as the cinematic experience of ‘movement or displacement 
of the self.’ Ibid. 
390  Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, eds. The Affect Theory Reader (London: 
Duke University Press, 2010), 2. 
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Jennifer M. Barker describes the point at which film and viewer meet: ‘a liminal 
space in which film and viewer can emerge as co-constituted, individualised but 
related, embodied entities’.391  
 In Straying, the audience is immersed in this in-between space – 
between the voice and the image. This is the resonant space where the 
audience’s own body becomes the work, making and unmaking relationships, 
looking for resonances and being surprised by them. The ground is unstable, 
shifting. There is a feeling of discomfort, loss, searching and yearning, 
‘relatedness and interruptions in relatedness’. But perhaps the vibration with the 
-ness of it also engenders a buoyancy which is a beauty in the making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
391 Jennifer M. Barker, The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2009), 12. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Let us think back on the cubist artwork and consider how the fragmented image 
contributes to the feeling of its own incompleteness, but also how this 
incompleteness does not articulate a lack but an excess – all of the aspects of 
Dora Maar's face can never be consolidated into one.392 The fragmented image 
also implies movement, and perhaps because of movement we also have a 
sense of incompleteness because a continual transformation seems to be 
occurring. Straying and Casting can both be considered in this image. Return, 
Aspect, Passage, Hinge, Space and Flesh are parts that contribute to these 
images, but they do not complete the picture. The experience should not come 
to an end even as these pages do. The intention has been to stir further thinking 
about the installation, to inspire a different or another kind of engagement with it.    
 The task for me has been to make room for you, the reader/audience.393 
My need for the audience arose out of my crisis with image and language: when 
I could not see or say what I wanted. I appealed to poetry and I appealed to the 
body. The poetic structure made room for the audience, made room for the 
possibility of an embodied experience. I cannot show you everything in pictures 
and I cannot speak everything with words. I can, however, make such a 
condition so you may know ‘what it feels like’ to enact the making and unmaking 
of boundaries between self and space, self and language, and self and image, 
and what it feels like to be displaced in this act, and hence to come to new 
knowledge. I have had to make this kind of room because I could not make a 
representation of the thing I desired, but rather, the instrument itself, the 
                                            
392 This is a reference to Picasso and the discussion on Cubism in the Introduction. See 
note 13 above.  
 
393 This ‘making room’ is like Barthes and Glück. They both want to be needed and 
desired as readers.  
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apparatus (the camera, the moving image, sound) led me on the journey of 
making and unmaking my self in relationship to place. And this is the room I 
must offer to you so that the task is also yours.  
  The room that I made is not an empty space. The room – which refers now 
not only to the space of the installation, but to the room in the present exegesis – 
has been arranged and composed of experiences and particular theoretical 
concerns that support making space. We have looked at how poetry makes 
space with silence, how installation art practice understands the architecture of 
its residence to be foundational to the experience of it, how the cinema of stasis 
makes room for contemplation. These spaces are not empty because in making 
space we also gather: histories, experiences, memories.  
Making space complicates how we conceive of, and experience, time and 
duration. Time and space, of course, are the lineaments of the moving image, 
hence why this mode afforded this particular exploration. Predominantly we have 
been interested in ways in which to stop the flow of linear time and access a 
single moment more fully. We have considered how this is enabled through 
Deren’s poetic and vertical structure for the moving image, Remes’ ontology of 
the moving image as duration, the idea of the pregnant moment and the 
suspension of time, and the double movement of evolving and devolving.  Time 
moves in multiple directions, it creates a tear, a gape where we can embed more 
deeply, a dwelling through duration. It also encourages a look back. But not only 
a look – also a reach in this particular work.  
I have given the audience their body, architectures in which to dwell, made 
of concrete, represented, imagined and conjured times and places. We have 
looked at theoretical material that approaches the connection between bodies, 
histories, and places as a process, and in the process a dissipation of any 
boundaries that mark internal and external states: the creation of the flow from 
one into the other. The conditions in Straying enable the experience of this flow 
for the audience. Flow, as in a river: no point in the river, no moment is ever 
exactly the same. But what of our being able to stop the ‘flow’ of time? There is 
a fissure between duration, flow, dwelling, hiatus, and it is through this fissure 
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that we move. A consideration of the ontological and phenomenological status 
of the moving image guides us through this oscillation between movement and 
stasis.  
The installed moving image disturbs and challenges both its ontological 
and phenomenological status partly through its relationship to sound, and partly 
through the architectural and sculptural features that create a direct and 
concrete relationship with the bodies of the audience. This disturbs and 
challenges how the body and place respond to one another. The embodied 
experience of the audience is not only significant on a phenomenal level, it may 
manifest in such a way that their own bodies mark the space, contribute to its 
making, as they move or sit or stand, look at or retreat from the screens.  
This is a transitive space, a space of transformation. We must move and 
be moved to a new way of being. We need the body to ‘think’ what is hidden. I 
offer this up as a provocation for the audience to consider with their bodies: the 
range of experiences that make up their interaction with their environment, to 
consider the co-implication and co-constitution of the self and the environment. 
The space of the installation is a space where they can try out possibilities – like 
the making of a perambulatory essay.    
 This space is one that accommodates hybrid expressions; the 
documentary, the poetic, and the essayistic find their form and limits. Their ability 
to document, to speak truthfully and articulately, to offer up experience, is 
challenged in this space where they coexist. It is more than a coexistence, 
though; it is an exchange which finds similarities in this installation, which makes 
room for what is in excess of each form. What holds them together is their intent 
and attention to the subject. I used all of these forms with the intention of staying 
close to experience and following the path of thought.  
This kind of attention looks for reverberations, resonances and hidden 
resemblances. This is another commonality to be found in the documentary, the 
poem and the essay. It is a process, an event, not an object. The same could be 
said of the dynamic between place and body. It is a reverberation that offers a 
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resonance between history, memory, desire, the made and the unmade with the 
moving, thinking, body.  
My contribution is an opening of a space that can be called a body, an 
essay, a poem, a documentary; but my preferred term is simply a field where I 
have created the conditions for the embodied experience of disembodiment, 
displacement and the re(making) of the self by piecing together fragments that 
reverberate with our own sense of completeness, wholeness and 
connectedness. It is a kind of space that encourages our attention to be turned 
towards what Nietzsche calls our (mis)constructions, misinterpretations and 
misapprehensions of the world and our body in it: the chaos of becoming.394   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
394  Chamarette, Phenomenology and the Future of Film, 204. 
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STRAYING 
 
 
 
Voice over script for the audiovisual installation 
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Everything has its place, in the end, he said. 
 
 
She felt it all shifting, like tectonic plates.  
The shifts are within, great masses moving. 
 
 
I had to start by being somewhere else. 
 
 
How many turns of the season has it been? 
 
 
Where is the pain? Where in your body?  
Where is the loss? 
 
 
She had bled into it.  
It was not in her, she was in it.   
 
 
Perhaps that is the necessary beauty of it.  
 
 
What if I try to articulate this in the way an arm articulates a gesture: 
of pure pleasure 
or of forgetfulness 
or fatigue 
or sudden remembrance  
of her touch.  
 
 
The dancer doesn’t move his body, he moves space.  
 
 
Autumn is lovely here also. That matters.  
 
 
Everything is fascinating with a little bit of distance between here and there.  
Like in a museum. A status not earned, simply granted.  
 
 
Let us brush up against each other.  
I’ll close my eyes, turn my head.  
I won’t look at you.  
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Will you speak? You don’t have to. 
 
You might have some other place to be. 
 
 
Leave something behind when you go.  
Like you did last time.  
They were notes you had discarded  
but I call them gifts.  
They had no addressee  
but I kept them for my self.  
 
 
A thought is either being born or dying.  
Exposing, or sealing it off.  
Watch the light refract. 
 
 
What I would like, is for you to tell me everything you remember.  
I want to know what it was like. You can say ‘as if…’. 
And I’ll say ‘what if…’  
 
 
I want the colour of my voice to be the colour of the sky. I want the quality of that 
light to fill all my words, as if they were vessels and the light was a solid. I want 
everything in this moment to be in the way my sentence falls from my tongue. To 
re-articulate you. To imitate you in tone. A re-iteration, a reconstitution.  
 
 
Let me have a better view.  
Let it come back differently.   
 
 
No one ever comes back the way they first arrived.  
I heard that in some science-fiction story. 
I’ll use this line, and say: no one ever comes back the way they first arrived.  
 
 
Everything has its place, in the end, he said. 
 
 
The tongue cannot articulate all the contours fully. 
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When I’m in the forest I think of the sounds of the ocean.  
To hear, to think of, to be, to be in, to be made of: it’s all the same.  
 
 
Isn’t identity everyone’s problem?  
   
 
I’m told that you can tell the lay of the land just from watching the dancers 
dance. Each troupe dances their own land. It’s all in the feet, pounding and 
skimming across the floor. In mountainous areas they jump high, they are 
flamboyant. The dwellers below dance closer to the earth, their movements are 
small, measured. The women: they sing. About everyday things.  
 
The story is the dance, the dance is the landscape, the landscape is the body. 
 
 
When I’m in the forest I think of the sounds of the ocean.  
 
 
This is a true story. 
 
 
I used to see her gathering you back, returning to the banks like the attendant 
moon. If I were she and if you were lost to me, I would build a statue in your 
image to call you back to me.  
 
 
Perhaps that is the necessary beauty of it. 
 
 
Ideal shapes, dead, but life, preserved, decay, death, life, beauty, filth, obscurity 
of the bird shit on her shoulder, movement in the fall of her hand, her 
comfortableness, my voyeurism, my violation but her posing.  
 
 
Private moments in public spaces. 
 
 
What are you afraid of?  
Everyone is afraid of losing something. 
 
 
I am here at your feet. Enfold me. 
 
 
 
 182 
  
The further north you go, the flatter the land gets. Until you reach the furthest 
point, right up near the border, where there are the flattest plains you will ever 
see. Even, calm. That’s what life seemed like too: no great passions or 
disturbances. But here is where she fell in love. She has no record of this place 
or of this love, that man, his small child and their cat. She took no pictures here.  
 
Mountains and forests are easier to describe. They have texture. But flatness is 
so non-descript. And yet, this is where she ate ice-cream by the side of the dirt 
road, with the old seamstress. And it’s in the river behind the seamstress’ house 
she imagined he and she would swim, next summer. It was among the flat fields 
of sunflowers they said goodbye. All the heads turning in the same direction, as if 
they were waiting to be absolved by the sun. But their faces are so perfect, there 
could never be need of that. 
 
 
It was snowing when I first arrived. Not for the first time, less of an arrival, more 
of a return. It had snowed the previous three days, enough to cover everything 
over. It was starting  to melt when I first arrived. The black coming up through 
the white, the first week in March; a very unexpected snow-fall for that time of 
year. 
 
 
I repeat these stories, these other people’s words as an abstraction. I hear them 
like an echo, and I hear them only as words, as stories without context. And yet I 
repeat them so that I might find anchorage. 
 
 
Your oblivion is not mine. 
A change of form is not oblivion. 
 
Your dream is not mine.  
Even if it seemed that way once:  
that I could see what you described.  
I should have known then that the fact of having seen it, changed it.  
 
 
My expression will always fall short of the way I thought you up in early morning. 
My body speaks much more gracefully when I imagine the dance, in that drowsy 
and innocent time of day. The indulgence of the imagination doesn’t seem so 
hideous in the privacy of thought.  
 
 
 
 
An image only half conjured.  
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If I knew what I was looking for I might know what I have lost.  
 
 
Stop. Let me look at you. Stand still, let me admire you.  
To think of it now: you never looked at me. I thought it might come   
with time. 
 
 
When I say look, I mean touch.  
 
 
Look how she leans toward me.  
 
 
Let me sit by your feet.  
 
 
I heard about an island in the middle of a wide span in the river. The story was 
flamboyant and grand, their paradise they called it. So I went out looking for it. I 
followed the river, but the river split in 2 at some point, and I must have followed 
the wrong one of the two sleeves. Just before dusk I made it to the barge and 
crossed the river to a place called ‘White Church’. It was just the right name for 
it. All the white was blushing pink at that time of day.  
 
 
These are all tragedies, these are all causes for exaltation. 
 
 
Did you hear those birds? It sounded like a flock performing circles in the sky. 
Gymnasts. Like a performance and we are its spectators. But of course it 
happens whether we see it or not.  
 
 
There is some satisfaction in traversing the skin, 
but then inevitably you start to wonder what’s behind. 
 
 
I thought about going down to the field, to look for myself, to crouch poised with 
the camera, ready to take my evidence, to make a lasting record of what I know 
is already the past. I’m haunting these places like an unwanted ghost.  
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The most frightening moment was the moment I wondered whether the voice 
can be an apparition, in the way images are apparitions.  
 
Or the images performing an archaeology of the voice.   
 
In any case, things past.  
 
 
I stopped on the side of the road to rest for a while. I had been driving since early 
morning and I still had a way to go. I couldn’t tell you now where I was going, or 
where I ended up. But I tell you this because while I was stopped, a man from 
town happened to be passing. He stopped to tell me a story. It was about a 
town, that drowned in the river. All the streets, and street-lamps, all the houses, 
all the furniture in the houses, plates and spoons and vases, swimming the 
water. The people survived, but everything else sank to the bottom of the river. 
The residents were resettled, just up the hill a bit. New houses had been built for 
them, they had running water and paved footpaths. Soon after the resettlement, 
people started to die. Some old, some young. One by one they perished. A few 
of that generation still reside on that hill. They say it was the drowning that killed 
the rest. They missed too much their dirt streets and their water pumps in the 
garden. As the man got up to leave, he said: the one thing he missed most was 
being able to tell his grandson of his first love, and point to the tree where she 
and he had their first kiss.  
 
 
All are tragedies, all are causes for exaltation. 
 
 
If I knew what you would become, I would have paid you a different kind of 
attention. 
 
 
I would have called out a name, but I didn’t know which direction to call into.  
 
 
As it happens, many people’s stories unfold by the banks of rivers. Imagine 
walking along the edge, and finding all these bits of stories at every step, all 
these fragments, sinking into the mud, eroding into the water, and flowing away. 
It flows until someone notices a fragment they like, they gather it up and make a 
legend of it.  
 
 
 
You feel so far in the past. But I’ve counted the days and you were not so long 
ago. Or so far away.  
Crisis of desire is crisis of the imagination. ‘Crisis’ meaning ‘lack’.  
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It’s all about distance.  
You need to be far away enough so desire has a space in which to be.  
You have to be far away enough so you are mysterious to me.  
It’s a matter of perspective. And distance.  
Distance is crucial to nurturing desire.  
 
But the distance is imaginary. Spatially it’s real, but not vast, not impossible.  
It’s a distance I create in order to cross. It’s a game.  
 
To invert this, you might say that you can cross vast and impossible distances 
with imagination.  
 
I can imagine us close, touching, I can imagine so well it feels like memory.  
 
Staying connected with yourself in the presence of another. A movement both 
into the self, and toward the other, but not exceeding the boundary of the skin. 
Something like the hand that touches and is touched. Touch, of all the senses, is 
the first to develop in the womb. That’s just trivia, I don’t know how it helps us to 
understand desire. And longing. And absence. When the other is not in the 
room.  
 
How far or close do we need to be to our object of desire? What is the ultimate 
distance? Or do I just need to think it to become it? Just to desire it is to be 
changed. Changed but not in the image of the other. Changed but no closer to 
the object.  
 
If it’s true desire it will never get its fill.  
 
I want to defeat this corporeal body. 
 
 
Don’t speak for a while. Things evaporate when you speak endlessly.  
 
 
I cannot follow this thought to any satisfactory end. 
 
 
There’s a fishing story I would like to tell. Or rather to re-tell. 
It is not my story, it is the story of a man who always fished in the very same 
spot since his youth. Up at dawn, on the train, and headed north. Then cross the 
bridge, and find a spot on the bank of the river. Then the war started. He hadn’t 
been for some time. He missed his early morning trips, so he made an exception 
this particular day. It was a misty morning, I think he said. You couldn’t see two 
meters in front of you. He was in the small dingy, on the water, when the fog 
began to part. He saw two swans, flying a meter above the surface. As he tells 
the story, the sight of the parting mist and the swans appears before him, his 
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eyes become moist with the vision. Then he tells me: some time later, while he 
eats his packed lunch, he hears gunshots, not far off. You do and you don’t get 
used to this sound, he says. He stays on the water a few more hours, and then 
heads back over the bridge to the railway track. He gets to the other bank, and 
he sees white on the water. One swan circling the feathers. There seems to be 
more to the story, more he could tell me, but he can’t go on. I’m not sure I 
understand the depth of his pain. But then, he was speaking from within the time 
of war. 
 
 
All are tragedies, all are causes for exaltation. 
 
 
What can I say that will move you?  
 
How should I gesture, to call you back to me 
 
 
A stirring of the inner landscapes. I used to think there would be evidence, 
somewhere, of this. Evidence of the kind you can hold onto. Evidence of the kind 
you can preserve.   
 
 
It is an impossible perspective. 
 
 
This is the fifth time we have seen this very image. It comes back and I know I’ve 
seen it before but each time it comes back differently.  
 
 
I think of walking. Climbing over rocks to the stream. 
 
 
Should I tell you about something I love? Stop me if I’ve told you already. I can’t 
remember any more what I have said and what I have only thought. Maybe you 
hate hearing this sort of thing. Maybe it doesn’t move you. But I’ll say it anyway. 
It’s about how I love the sensation of the air at a very particular time of year. 
Usually in late summer, when the days are still warm but the nights get cool. 
There is a particular time of day, when the sun is setting, or just set, and the air 
still a little warm in the centre, but the edges are cooling. And as you walk you 
feel the cool and then the warm of the air, as if walking through something solid. 
Or the way you feel the water change temperature as you walk from the shallows 
into the deep. I find the memory of this very moving. Is this what late summer is 
like everywhere, do you know? 
 
Madness finds its way somewhere in there between landscape and the body.  
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I could take the view that psychosis is just a loss of perspective. But madness 
sometimes seems more real. The world is more honest with me when I am mad 
in it.  
 
  
Conduits for transformation: the seasons. 
 
 
I think of all the lives that haven’t been through this building, that haven’t 
appeared in these windows or on these balconies to smoke, to leave their lover 
on the bed, to open the window and beg for a breeze to come through the hot 
hotel room. The river is on the other side. Who would have guessed that one day 
there would be one lone man posing as a security guard in the lobby, all the rest 
of the rooms empty?  
 
At one time this building spoke of so many great things, of such a huge hope. 
But the dreams that were had in those rooms, and the dreams that were had on 
this street looking up, what they admired in this façade, the future that these 
people saw, then, that they envisaged, that future never came. We never lived 
those days, never encountered those times. Not them and not us. And now, this 
monument is something totally other, not beautiful. A nuisance. No one has 
money to knock it down, no one has money to fix it up. So what is this man in 
the lobby doing down there?  
 
I think about the final moments that happened in those rooms, before it was all 
shut up and condemned. She looks at the curtains and wonders who it was 
exactly who drew that curtain to that point, carelessly leaving it slightly ajar; the 
hand that shut the door for the last time? I wonder whether they were aware of 
the significance of the moment, or that the moment would gather significance 
over time until I would be here looking up and wondering, making pictures. 
 
 
I went to street corners, and fields, attended to flowers, and rivers, with such 
attention, I learnt all their rhythms by heart.  
No one has ever loved this place as I love it. No one has ever made such a 
loving record of its squares and monuments. 
That’s a lie. These records are only consequences. 
At some point we must acknowledge that these are all apparitions. 
 
Not just sight, but sound. If there are repercussions for seeing, which there are, 
are there repercussions for listening? 
 
I would have called out a name, but I didn’t know which direction to call into.  
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Speak. I can’t tell it all on my own. 
 
 
All are tragedies, all are causes for exaltation. 
 
 
Perhaps that is the necessary beauty of it. 
 
 
There are many moments I could go back to. They are like objects I can hold in 
the hand, spin around, and describe exactly what I see. But it means nothing to 
you for me to recount every object in the room, to spin it around, and describe 
its shape. You can’t decant everything; you can’t exactly describe your lover’s 
skin or the taste of her thighs. We don’t share these things with others, we don’t 
re-tell these stories. For such beauty there is no need for words, or images. I will 
not evoke these things for you. It’s like trying to retell a dream, it never makes 
sense to anyone else. 
 
 
We are completely separate, you and I.  
 
 
This is a very frightening place.  
 
 
No one ever comes back the way they first arrived.  
 
 
To think it is to become it, to desire it is to be changed.  
What a farce. I am still here and you are still there. Distance between us. 
Uncrossable. You remain impenetrable. 
 
 
She asked to be buried in the earth from which she issued.  
 
Yield a little. Give me a small piece of grass somewhere, or let me be under the 
tree I loved most in my grandfather’s orchard? Is that not mine? Do I not own 
that tree and the soil where it is planted and the small house that sits at the top 
of the path? Do you need some kind of proof of my enduring devotion, my 
unfailing memory? I can describe the feel of the bark of that cherry tree. Sour 
cherry. My brother’s favourite was the sweet cherry on the other side. I can 
show you it in pictures.  
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The skin is the boundary which needs to be crossed.  
 
 
An image only half conjured.  
 
 
There is a butterfly which has markings on the underside of its wings. When 
predators approach, the butterfly throws open the wings to reveal a monstrous 
face with two huge eyes. It resembles nothing in the environment, it is an 
imagined predator, collectively imagined, we all take this image to be a sign of 
warning. Humans too, they pin the butterfly to their doors, the monstrous face of 
its underside wards off evil spirits. It’s all in the eyes. 
 
 
Why don’t you think of the beginning? That’s often the way we proceed. Pretend 
that you can locate it. Past objects and passed moments are now endowed with 
significance, because we now call them: the beginning. It’s satisfying to point 
and say ‘there’. Something to do with destiny, as if it were planted in every 
moment.  
 
 
Destiny, as in density. They are completely different. I prefer density. It is about 
the ability to enter this moment, as opposed to perpetually proceeding to the 
next.  
 
 
I filled the silence with noble thoughts, making the silence between us profound. 
But at some point I had to acknowledge the void. A shell that has been left for 
dead.   
 
 
I have strayed from the text. I could say it another way: at some point I had to 
say: I am not wanted.  
 
 
Conduits for transformation:  
darkness,  
repetition,  
ritual,  
incantation,  
loss of time,  
loss of self,  
commingling.  
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This is the eighth time we have seen this image.  
 
 
If I visit another 2 towns, and make another six shots on six street corners, if I 
see another 5 statues, if I frame the woman bathing in the park from 6 
perspectives… And now if I watch the sequence through 10 times, if it plays 
continuously for 20 hours, for 30 hours… And so on… I might know what I was 
looking for, I might know what I’ve lost.  
 
 
I cannot follow this thought to any satisfactory end.  
 
 
I remember walking. Climbing over rocks to the stream. 
 
 
I am thinking about the story of the birds: they travel so far and so many die 
away, give up. A small number complete the journey to the river. It’s so old you 
know it before you have heard it. And yet we repeat and repeat. The birds were 
searching for their king, and they heard he was by the banks. When the birds 
finally arrived, they looked in, and all they saw was a reflection of themselves in 
the water. 
 
 
We laughed and ran and laughed so hard we could no longer keep up with each 
other. You were so far ahead, or behind, I couldn’t see.  
 
 
I would have called out a name, but I didn’t know which direction to call into.  
 
 
I think of apparitions again, of images, and voices, and I’m frightened again.  
 
 
One early morning I made my way to the town square which was surrounded by 
mountains all around. I expected to be alone. Of course the strays were out, but 
they were my regular companions on these early mornings. No, there was 
something else. There were voices, there was singing, and strings. I found the 
group of teenagers sitting outside the youth centre. I think they had been 
drinking all through the night. They had one guitar between them and they were 
singing 1980s hits. This was some kind of passed-down nostalgia from their 
parents and grandparents. These kids never knew that golden time. When I 
asked them to sing again, they were suddenly shy and said they only had 4 
strings left on the guitar and that just wouldn’t do for making any kind of 
permanent record.  
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Come here. Let me touch this skin and find the weak spot that will yield.  
Let me climb in.  
I want to find the mark that says: I was here.  
I want to find the trinkets I left behind so you could remember me.  
 
 
I wasn’t sure which way I should be reaching. Toward ‘out there’ or toward ‘in 
here’? Do you begin inside the self or do you begin outside you and I? I wasn’t 
sure which way it was supposed to flow. It’s not like a river. My rudders were 
only memory images, images of desire. I kept telling my self that it doesn’t take 
much to shift perspective.  
 
 
It’s about locating points: one on the inside, the other on the outside. It’s about 
distinctions. It’s about the right distance. But my desire flows too strongly 
towards your skin, and beyond that, all the way inside your image is where I 
want to lose my self. A metamorphosis, not a psychosis; a talent. But also you 
might say: a lure of space.  
 
 
I need the dark, for a while, please. Pure darkness, because the dark sits so 
close to the skin. Dark space is not just an absence of light. It is charged with a 
haptic quality, it touches everything, I can feel it touching me, bleeding into me, 
or perhaps I bleed into it. A commingling.   
 
 
We watch this image for the tenth time now, and we will keep watching it. 
Repetition turned to incantation. I imagine it as a whirling dervish.  
 
 
The possibility of touch is more than touch itself. 
 
 
No I don’t believe this.  
 
 
I believed I might transform it just by looking at it.   
 
 
To glance 
To take everything in, all at once 
 
 
I paid such attention to how I was going to remember you.  
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I glanced so I could take all of you in at once, as in: to swallow you up.  
 
Did you see me? 
I didn’t see me make an impression on you. I just assumed that that’s what 
happened.  
 
 
I think I want to go back to that time when we believed we could slip into the 
shape of a lion, or a tree. And come back again.  
 
 
We need more space, not more time, to think our way into this. To speak, to 
dance, into the self. 
 
 
We need a square of the kind that was built for Chinese emperors. A large 
expanse, for walking, and thinking. Now we stalk the surface, walk around the 
edges, we admire them, we don’t walk and think.  
 
 
Music makes space, too.  
 
 
These spectres are still here, still playing. I’ve lost count how many times we 
have seen this image. Counting isn’t easy, they seem to come back differently. 
Maybe you pay them a different kind of attention.  
 
 
I heard a cry. I don’t remember now if it was I who cried. I don’t think I 
recognised the voice.  
 
 
I feel I ought to speak differently of different things.  
 
 
I have studied the subject and I have studied the movements. Sometimes I think 
I see me, you, in every tree, I appear in every window. Sometimes I think I see 
you crossing the court.  
 
And yet, there is no point to point to and say ‘there’.  
 
  
If I could reach out, touch this screen, I think it would feel like touching my own 
skin.  
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For now, I only have this tongue. No body to offer up gestures. Not of longing, 
not of celebration, not of mourning. But someone is revelling out there, pounding 
the earth with their feet, and gesturing with their phantoms. But you won’t let me 
see.   
 
 
I have tried and still failed to bend my voice, my tongue, my word, in the shape 
of the image? Or in the shape of the memory of that place? In the shape of what 
is no longer my body.  
 
 
Conduits for transformation: darkness, repetition, ritual, incantation, loss of self, 
commingling. 
 
The correlate for a voice would simply be silence. Or sometimes a scream.  
 
 
I remember walking. Climbing over rocks to the stream. Over the stream to the 
other bank. It was hot. I sat there for a while . A butterfly came and flapped in my 
ear. It hovered over my toes, my knees, my belly. I felt like a flower. 
 
 
I’ve been told statues once marked mileage on a road. Not numbers, signs, 
names. But bodies. No one then would have used a figure of speech such as: in 
the middle of nowhere.  
 
Statues marked burial sites. Marking the dead and the site.  
 
I watch the unfolding of the ‘here’, in the way we watch the unfolding of the 
‘now’. 
 
 
I wonder if that cry could release these statues from their stony forms?  
It would be tantamount to a loss of place and a loss of body.  
 
 
What about those statues that we are still excavating, that are missing a head, 
an arm; parts of them lost in the landscape. We’ve come to accept and know 
the classics without limbs. It would be strange to find these phantoms now and 
re-attach them.  
 
 
What happens to the images if there is no witness? 
 
 
I’ve strayed from the text.  
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I can’t tell it all on my own. 
 
 
Should I borrow another line and say: no one ever comes back the way they first 
arrived?  
But that’s just from a science fiction movie.  
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